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PRELIMINARY MEMORANDUM
October 9, 1981 Conference
List 1, Sheet 1
No. 81-9

~from CA 9 (~,

WASHINGTON, et al.

N~: Wright, dissenting)

v.
SEATTLE SCHOOL
DIST. NO. 1, et al.
1.

SUMMARY:

Federal/Civil

Timely

Appellants contest the CA's decision holding

unconstitutional a state initiative that prohibits local school
boards -- in the absence of a need to remedy constitutional
violations -- from assigning students to schools other than the
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one geographically nearest or next nearest the student's
residence. 1
2.

FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS BELOW:

The Washington

Constitution charges the State with a duty "to make ample
provision for the education of all children residing within its
borders, without distinction or preference on account of race,
color, caste, or sex."

Art. IX,

§

1.

Appellants aver that "no

washington school district has ever been judicially declared to
have committed a single act of intentional racial segregation in
violation of the Fourteenth Amendment in the operation of public
schools."

Juris. Statement 4.

Against this backdrop, the

appellee Seattle school board in 1977 adopted a resolution aimed
at eliminating perceived racial imbalance in the district's
schools. 2 To implement the resolution, the board adopted in March
1978 a plan of race-conscious student assignments.

Similar

student assignment policies were adopted and implemented by the
appellee school districts of Tacoma and Pasco.
Meanwhile, an organization of citizens opposed to the
student assignment policies, appellant CiVIC, drafted and
campaigned for Initiative 350, which the State's voters adopted
at the November 1978 general election.

The initiative provides

1 similar issues are raised in Crawford v. Board of
Education, No. 81-38, which is also scheduled for consideration
at th2 October 9 conference.
The school board defined racial imbalance to exist when
the combined minority enrollment in a school exceeded the
district-wide average by 20%. It also provided that "the single
minority enrollment ••• of no school will exceed 50 percent of
the student body."
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that "no school board ••• shall directly or indirectly require
any student to attend a school other than a school which is
geographically nearest or next nearest the student's place of
residence ..•• "

wash. Rev. Code§ 28A.26.010 (Cum. Supp. 1981).

It provides exceptions "[i]f a student requires special
education, care or guidance"; "[i]f there are health or safety
hazards" between the student's residence and the neighborhood
school; or if the neighborhood school "is unfit or inadequate
because of overcrowding, unsafe conditions or lack of physical
facilities."

Ibid.

Initiative 350 also expressly provides that

-

it "shall not prevent any court of competent jurisdiction from

a djuidicating constitutional issues relating to the public
schools."

Id. § 28A.26.060.

Following the November 1978 election, the appellee school
districts, together with certain individual plaintiffs, brought
suit in federal court challenging the constitutionality of
Initiative 350.

The court permitted extensive intervention by

parties who claimed that the school districts operated
unconstitutional dual school systems.

The court later bifurcated

the proceedings to delay consideration of the intervenors'
claims.

The United States was permitted to intervene on behalf

of the plaintiffs.
Following an extended trial, the DC (Voorhees - W.D. Wash.)
declared Initiative 350 unconstitutional and permanently enjoined
its enforcement.

The court based its judgment on three grounds:

(1) "[Initiative 350] forbids mandatory student
assignments for racial reasons but permits such

- 4 -

student assignments for purposes unrelated to
race, (2) a racially discriminatory purpose was
one of the factors which caused Initiative 350 to
be adopted, and (3) the initiative is overly
inclusive in that it permits only court-ordered
busing of students for racial purposes even
though a school board may be under a constitutional duty to do so even in the absence of a
court order." App. to Juris. Statement A-27.
The DC refused to award attorney's fees to the appellee
school districts since their litigation expenses were already
financed through public funds.

The court also refused to award

attorney's fees to the intervenors because their role in the
first phase of the litigation had been de minimis.

The court

noted that it would entertain a motion for fees following
completion of that phase of the litigation devoted to
intervenors' claims of unlawful segregation within the school
districts.
TheCA affirmed by a divided vote.

Relying on this Court's

decision in Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385 (1969), and the
decision of the DC in Lee v. Nyquist, 318 F. Supp. 710 (W.D.N.Y.
1970), aff'd, 402

u.s.

935 (1971), the CA held that Initiative

350 is unconstitutinal because it embodies an impermissible
legislative classification based on race. 3 The statute
"legislatively differentiates student assignment for purposes of
achieving racial balance from student assignment for any other
significant reason."

App. to Juris. Statement B-5.

It is of no

consequence that the classification is established covertly by

3Accordingly, the court expressly declined to address the
second and third grounds on which the DC relied.
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omission, rather than expressly on the face of the statute. 4
The court also concluded, in support of its central holding,
that Initiative 350 "radically restructures the political process
of Washington by allowing a state-wide majority to usurp
traditional local authority over local school board educational
policies."

Id., at B-7.

TheCA recognized this Court's holding

in Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman, 433

u.s.

406, 413-14 (1977),

that a school board may rescind previously adopted desegregation
measures that the board was under no constitutional duty to adopt
in the first place.

In this case, however, "a different

governmental body - the state-wide electorate - rescinded a
policy voluntarily enacted by locally elected school boards
App. to Juris. Statement B-11.

"

The State's interest in restoring

traditional neighborhood school assignment practices was
insufficiently compelling to override the interest of local
school boards in promulgating their own educational policies.
Finally, the CA considered the cross-appeal of appellees
challenging the DC's denial of attorney's fees.

The court held

that the DC had abused its discretion in denying fees to the
school districts.

Successful plaintiffs ordinarily should

recover attorney's fees unless an award would be unjust.

That

the school districts are publicly funded entities does not render
an award to them unjust.

The court also abused its discretion in

4The court relied on the DC's finding that Initiative 350
"was conceived, drafted, advocated and adopted for the specific
purpose of overriding the decision of the Seattle School Board to
balance Seattle schools racially by means of student
assignments." App. to Juris. Statement B-4, B-6 n.4.

-
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denying an award to the intervenors.

Although their

participation in the first phase of the trial was not
substantial, the intervenors did devote substantial time and
effort preparing for the bifurcated second phase.

That the

second phase may have been rendered unnecessary by virtue of the
DC's holding on the constitutionality of Initiative 350 does not
preclude an award of fees.

"To retrospectively deny attorney's

fees because an issue is not considered or because a party's
participation proves unnecessary would have the effect of
discouraging the intervention of what in future cases may be
essential parties."
In dissent Judge Wright argued that although Initiative 350
does treat student assignments to achieve racial balance
differently than student assignments for other purposes, that
difference is not a racial classification.

It is a means of

expressing a preference for neighborhood schools and
dissatisfaction with the burdens of mandatory busing.

Merely

addressing a problem that involves a racial minority does not
create ipso facto a racial classification.

The majority has

chosen to find such a classification in order to avoid the
laborious inquiry into intent that would otherwise be required. 5
3.

CONTENTIONS:

(1) Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman,

supra, indicates that a school board may constitutionally rescind
desegregation measures that it was under no constitutional duty
5Judge Wright also reached, and rejected, the other
grounds on which the DC relied in invalidating the Initiative.
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to adopt.

Presumably, this is so despite the fact that the

decision to rescind is taken with the knowledge that racial
matters are involved.

Otherwise, no governmental entity would be

able to curtail "affirmative action" programs.

If a local school

board is permitted to take such action, the superior legislative
authority of the State should be allowed to do so as well.
(2}

The CA's opinion confuses treatment of racial problems

with treatment on the basis of race.

In so doing, it distorts

equal protection analysis in order to avoid the inquiry into
intent and motive that plainly is required. 6
not sanctioned by Lee and Hunter.

This departure is

Those cases establish the

principle that a governmental body may not "stack the political
deck" against a minority that seeks adoption of laws in its
interest.

In this case, however, the State-- and not the local
bears primary responsibility under the state

school boards

constitution for educational policy.

Proponents of mandatory

busing must convince either the legislature or the electorate
that their cause is worthy.

But they do not confront any special

burden in the governmental process not shared by proponents of
every other proposal affecting educational policy.
(3}

The DC's decision is at odds with those of four CA's

which have upheld the Equal Educational Opportunities Act of
1974, 20

u.s.c.

§

1701 et seq.

That statute expresses a

6Appellants request that the Court articulate the
criteria for determining illicit discriminatory intent in an
initiative or referendum. They object to the DC's decision not
to investigate the probable intent of the voters in determining
whether Initiative 350 was motivated by racial bias.

- 8 congressional declaration of policy in favor .of neighborhood
schools and forbids federal courts and agencies from ordering
transportation of students to schools other than those closest or
next closest to their homes.
(4)

Nothing in the legislative history of either the Civil

u.s.c.

Rights Attorneys' Fees Award Act, 42
Emergency School Aid Act, 20

u.s.c.

§

§

1988, or the

3205, indicates that

Congress intended municipal corporations to receive attorney's
fees from the State that created them.

The "private attorney

general" rationale is particularly inapt here, because the
appellee school districts have financed their lawsuit from funds
already appropriated by the State for such purposes.
4.

RESPONSE:

The appellee school districts have moved to

dismiss or affirm.

They track the CA's opinion in arguing that

the decisions below were compelled by Lee and Hunter.

Initiative

350 treats racial student assignment matters differently from
other student assignment matters.

By foreclosing the attainment

of important minority educational goals at the local level, it
"structures the political process in a nonneutral manner."

And,

since the law establishes a racial classification, it is
presumptively invalid, regardless of intent.
Appellees submit that the CA's decision does not preclude a
school board from reversing a decision voluntarily to desegregate
its schools.

The reversal, however, must avoid the creation of a

racial classification in the use of student assignments.
Initiative 350 is also quite different from the Equal Educational
Opportunity Act of 1974.

That law expressly preserves the

-
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authority of local school boards voluntarily to desegregate.
20

u.s.c.

§

See

1716.

Appellees also maintain that the DC was correct in its
alternative finding that Initiative 350 was adopted with a
discriminatory purpose.

The initiative will result in increased

school segregation to the detriment of minorities; the history of
the initiative indicates it was adopted to reverse the Seattle
desegregation plan; proponents departed from normal procedures by
seeking approval of the initiative at the state, rather than
local, level.

The DC was also correct in concluding that the

initiative is impermissibly overinclusive.

It prohibits all

voluntary efforts to desegregate, regardless of whether they are
necessary to satisfy perceived constitutional requirements.
School boards ought to be free to desegregate their schools
without awaiting a court order declaring the boards' policies
unconstitutional.

(The State contends that Initiative 350

permits school boards to use busing when necessary to remedy
constitutional violations.)
Turning to the attorney's fee question, appellees maintain
that nothing in the relevant statutes or in their legislative
histories indicates a congressional intention to limit fee awards
to private parties.

The policy of the statutes is to encourage

litigation vindicating civil rights.

That policy is served no

less by awards to publicly funded litigants than by awards to
private parties.

Moreover, the State is incorrect in implying

that an award would duplicate funding already provided by the
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State.

The appellees' budgets are funded by local property taxes

as well as state appropriations.
The appellee intervenors have also filed a motion to dismiss
or affirm.

The States of Arizona, Kansas, Nebraska, and Utah ,

as amici curiae, have filed a brief in support of the
jurisdictional statement.

They argue, inter alia, that a

statutory racial classification dictates different results for
members of different races, by reason of their race.

Initiative

350 creates a classification among reasons for mandatory busing.
It does not create a racial classification on its face.

Rather,

it indicates an intent to adopt a policy against the use of
racial classifications in assigning students to schools.

It may

be that the statute was adopted for discriminatory reasons, but
that is impossible to know without further inquiry into intent.
Finally, the SG has filed a memorandum urging the Court to
note probable jurisdiction.

Although the United States

intervened on behalf of the appellees in the DC, the SG notes
that the United States now supports the appellants in arguing
that Initiative 350 should be upheld.

Should the Court reverse

the CA, it may either remand the case for consideration of the
remaining grounds on which the DC relied, or it may decide those
issues itself.
5.

The SG does not address the attorney's fee issue.

DISCUSSION:

This case presents two questions.

The

first, which concerns the constitutionality of Initiative 350, is
within the Court's appellate jurisdiction and is plainly
substantial.

The second, which concerns the award of attorney's

fees to the appellee school districts, is not an appealable

-
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C-111
If
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~~~~
Nevertheless, it too presents an important and ~ ~
~
unresolved issue which the Court may wish to address should it
~

question.

note probable jurisdiction to consider the first question.
The CA held that Initiative 350 creates an impermissible
racial

cl~ ssi~ication.

-----

That holding is

signifi~ant,

I

~

in par t

>

because it obviates the need to investigate purpose and intent.
Unlike most laws that create racial classifications, Initiative
350 does not expressly confer benefits or impose disadvantages on
the basis of race.

Rather, by omission, it prohibits the
~

assignment of all children beyond their neighborhood schools for
the purpose of achieving racial balance.

To treat this decision

as one creating a racial classification is, in effect, to
conclusively presume that the voters' opposition to busing is a
manifestation of racial discrimination.

The presumption may be

true, but it ought to be established through the sort of
investigation this Court has required in testing allegations of
discriminatory intent.
Despite all of
Court's decision
Hunter was a city
ordinances forbid

CA may have
Erickson,

en justified by this
ra.

At issue in

J~W

both repealed existing
housing d' crimination and required the

approval of

a precondition to enactment of new

ordinances.

All other ordinances regulating the real estate

market could become effective merely upon passage by the City
Council.

The Court determined that the charter amendment created

a racial distinction among that class of persons who would seek
the enactment of ordinances regulating the real estate market.
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393

u.s.,

at 390.

The Court also condemned the amendment because

it placed "special burdens on racial minorities within the
governmental process."

Id. at 391.

Hunter was decided before this Court's recent elaboration of
the differences between racial classification, disparate impact,
and discriminatory intent in cases such as washington v. Davis,
426 U.S. 229

(1976), and Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan

Housing Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977).

In addition, Hunter may

best be explained as prohibitting the imposition of special
burdens on minorities who seek legal protection through the
legislative process.

Initiative 350 imposes no similar burdens.

As the SG argues in his memorandum, the initiative, at most,
reallocates responsibility for student assignment from the school
the met ods of legislative

board to the State.

ch ~ e 1 ~ level in a way that burdens minorities.
Contrary to theCA's reasoning, it is doubtful that the Equal
Protection

Clause~

se forbids such reallocations of authority.

This appeal raises one final issue worth discussing, and
that is the extent to which governmental entities may rescind
measures designed for the benefit of racial minorities without
running afoul of the presumption against racial classifications.
As appellants note, the Court in Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman,
supra, intimated that such rescissions are permissible, provided
that adoption of the measures was not constitutionally compelled
in the first place.

The discussion in Brinkman, however, is

abbreviated and this appeal presents the opportunity for more
thorough consideration.
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I would note probable jurisdiction.
Appellees have filed motions to dismiss or

affirm~

the

United States and amici have filed briefs in support of the
jurisdictional statement.
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BENCH MEMORANDUM

To:
From:

March 20, 1982

Mr. Justice Powell
David Levi

Nos. 81-9 & 81-38:

Washington v. Seattle School District
Crawford v. Board of Education of Los
Angeles

Question Presented

Whether

the

state

may

limit
.........---.

c-1

the

I 'school boards to order mandatory busing when

not required by the Fourteenth Amendment?

power

of

local

this busing

is

2•

./"(

Whether

the

state

may

limit

busing

to

the

power

of

state

\\

courts

to

order

mandatory

instances

in

which

a

federal court would order mandatory busing?

I

do

not

pretend

to

have

mastered

these

exceptionally difficult cases, but I hope that the following
summary and analysis is useful.
are

analytically

I conclude that the two cases

indistinguishable--although

the

two

anti-

busing laws differ greatly in their particulars--and that they
are both constitutional.

I.

Facts and Decisions Below

A.

The Washington Initiative

Initiative

350 was passed

state-wide election.

in November,

1978, at a

The initiative forbids any school board

from "directly or indirectly" requiring "any student to attend
a school other than the school which is geographically nearest
or next nearest the student's place of residence."

-

three

exception__§

initiative:

to

this

prohibition

included

There are
in

the

if a student requires special education, if there

are health or safety hazards, or if the school nearest or next
nearest is unsafe or overcrowded, the student may be assigned
to a more distant

·~.

school.

The

Initiative does not bar any

3

voluntary programs:

magnet

schools

"or

0

any other

voluntary

option offered to students" are still permissible.

Further,
lr

the

Initiative does

,,

not

purport

to

limit

the

power

of any

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ --

~t "from adjudicating constitutional issues relating to the

p~ ls."

racial

indicates

~

sc ~ l,

unless

the

busing

the} ~~

is court ordered.

Although the Initiative is not specifically directed to busing
for

1-o

~/"'~

In short, the Initiative prohibits busing beyond
"next ~ ear est"

/7_. _

~~

desegregation,
that

this

was

the

history

one

of

of
its

Initiative

the
prime

~~~

J1~~

Uo

targets.

Specifically, Seattle had just adopted a wide-ranging plan of
mandatory

busing

Initiative

would

for

integration.

permit

voluntary

Note,

however,

programs

and

that

would

the
also

permit assignment (and busing) to the "next nearest" school to
be made on the basis of race.
The District Judge held that the Initiative violated
the Fourteenth Amendment for

three reasons:

mandatory student assignments for

"(1)

it forbids

racial reasons but permits

such student assignments for purposes unrelated to race,

(2) a

racially

which

discriminatory

purpose was one of

caused Initiative 350 to be adopted, and

the

facts

(3) the intiative is

overly inclusive in that it permits only court-ordered busing
of students for racial purposes even though a school board may
be under a constitutional duty to do so even in the absence of
a court order."

...

A)~

4.

The
Court's
struck

CA9

first
down

affirmed

rationale

as

an

argues

the

only:

basis

"the

impermissible

of

statute

legislative

the

District

was

correctly

...

class1f1cat1on

although

AJ~ '- \.
--rr-~>

z;~
/'-~-- .. :
''di-~

His argument proceeds in three parts.

that

C lftf

Judge ~ ly~ s opinion is not a modeld~ti.~"•·t"

based on racial criteria."
of clarity.

on

the

Initiative

does

not

explicit racial classification it does in effect:

First, he
embody

an

it permits

busing for three reasons but not for the purpose of achieving
racial

balance.

Having

established

that

Initiative

350

employs a racial classification, he then argues that such a
classification

is

Court in

~unter

Nyquist,

318 F.

aff'd,

402 U.S.

impermissible

v. Erickson,
Supp.
935

710

under

the

decision

393 U.S.

385

(1969)

(W.D.N.Y.

(1971).

1970)

of

this

and Lee v.

(3-Judge Court),

These decisions establish that

the political process may not be re-structured in such a way
as to make it more difficult for racial minorities to achieve
their legislative goals.
must be condemned:

Under this principle the Initiative

"[I]t is manifest that Initiative 350 both

creates a constitutionally-suspect racial classification and
radically restructures the political process of Washington by
allowing
authority
Finally,

a

state-wide
over

local

majority
school

Judge Ely argues

to

baord

traditional

educational

local

policies."

that the classification cannot be

supported by any compelling interest.
a

usurp

The State's interest in

state-wide neighborhood school policy is not as strong as

the

interest

"of

the

locally elected school boards and

the

~/<A--

5.

community they represent in promulgating their own educational
policy. Therefore, we hold that Initiative 350, which attempts
to wrest from local control the formulation and implementation
of educational and desgregation policies, is not supported by
any compelling state interest."

B.

Judge Wright dissented.

The California Proposition

Proposition
article

I,

section

adopted

at

a

1,

initiative

an

7 (a)

measure

amending

of the California Constitution, was

state-wide election on November

1979.

6,

The

proposition instructs that no state court shall order busing
"(1)

except to remedy a specific violation by such party that

would

also

Clause

constitute

of

the

Constitution,
permitted

obligation or

violation

14th

and

under

a

(2)

of

the
the

Amendment

to

unless

federal

federal

a

decisional

responsibility

upon

Equal

law

Protection

United
court
to

such party

States

would

impose
to

be
that

remedy

the

specific violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th
Amendment."
the

--

Proposition

intact:

---

Although restricting the power of state courts,
leaves

the

powers

of

local

school

boards

"Nothing herein shall prohibit the governing board of

a school district from voluntarily continuing or commencing a
school integration plan."
The
constitutional.

state

court

found

that

the

School boards remain under a

Proposition

was

~~tate law dut~\/

-

6.

to

desegregate

segregation.
busing;

-

~g

the

In

school

fulfilling

regardless
their

of

the

cause

of

duty the Boards ma Y..-? rder

but no state court may order the Boards to require
(unless a federal court would order busing). The effect ~1-LYV

of the proposition

is simply "to withdraw one desegregative

technique from the state court's arsenal of remedies available
to

alleviate

leave

all

unintended,

other

non-purposeful

available

segregation,

techniques

intact."

rejected the argument that the proposition was
Reitman v. Mulkey, 1967,
supra.

387 U.S.

proposition

The

law

remedy be

said

not

court

invalid under

authorize

private

Nor can the recission of a state

to violate the rule

conclusion would be

The

to

369 or Hunter v. Erickson,

did

discrimination as in Mulkey.

but

illogical:

"If a

in Hunter.

state

Such a

is not under

a

federal duty to adopt a particular act in the first place .••
recisision of the act cannot be unconstitutional."

II.

Relevant Case Law

There

are

four

relevant

decisions,

the

most

important of which is Hunter v. Erickson.

housing

1.

Hunter v. Erickson

In

1964

ordinance

the

Akron

City

establishing

Council
a

enacted

Commission

on

a

fair
Equal

f~ · I

7.

Opportunity in Housing.

Following passage of this ordinance,

a proposal for charter amendment was placed on the ballot at a
general

election

electorate.

upon

The

petition

charter

of

more

amendment

than

10%

provided

of

the
"Any

that

ordinance enacted by the Council of The City of Akron which
---~_...

regulates
......,. the use, sale,
the

basis

of

rac_e,

lease .•. of real property ••. on

color,

religion,

national

origin

or

ancestry must first be approved by a majority of the electors
~~----~-----------------------------voting on the question at a regular or general election before
said

ordinance

charter

shall

amendment,

be

the

effective."

1964

fair

As

housing

a

result

of

the

ordinance

was

no

that

charter

longer valid.
The

Court

(per

White,

amendment was unconstitutional.

J.)

held

the

In general, measures passed

by the City Council became law in 30 days and were subject to
referendum only if 10% of the electors signed an appropriate
petition.

The

ordinances

to

effect

of

the

charter

amendment

was

that ) ~f dfr
~kr

any

other

~,

ordinances--were automatically subject to a referendum.

This

~ ~

was

"an

housing

end

housing

discrimination--unlike

/'JA~~~·..J~ ~""'·~

explicitly racial classification treating raciai ~--~
.__....... ...-. "-'"...... ~-----------......
matters differently from other racial and housing

matters."

---

The effect of this explicit racial classification

was to place "special burdens on racial minorities within the
governmental process."
It is noteworthy that the Court did "not hold that
mere repeal of an existing ordinance violates the Fourteenth

8.

Amendment."

Thus,

had

the

fair

housing

ordinance

been

repealed in the normal way--by a referendum following upon a
petition

of

10%

of

the

voters--there

would

have

constitutional violation.
In

been

no

~.f4,-

concurrence

Justice

emphasized 1\ t h a t

Harlan

minorities could not complain if any particular governmental
process--e.g.
equal rights

bicameralism--made
legislation.

it

more

difficult

to

pass

"In the case before us, however,

the city of Akron has not attempted to allocate governmental
power on the basis of any general principle.

Here, we have a

provision

that

making

difficult

for

has

the

certain

clear
racial

purpose
and

of

religious

achieve legislation that is in their

it

more

minorities

interest."

to

Through the

existing referendum process Akron voters could always repeal
any particular fair housing measure that they disliked.
effect

of

the

charter

amendment,

however,

was

to

make

The
it

difficult to pass a fair housing law even when the electorate
was not aroused to passionate opposition.

2.

Lee v. Nyquist

This decision by a 3-judge court (Hayes, Henderson,
Burke) was summarily affirmed by this Court.
The state statute at issue in Lee provided that "no
student shall be assigned or compelled to attend any school on
account of race, creed, color, or national origin, or for the

9.

purpose

of

achieving

equality

in

attendance

or

increased

attendance or reduced attendance, at any school, of persons of
one

or

more

origins"

particular

unless

"with

education having
such

board

the

state

been

creeds,

express

jurisdiction,

having

prohibited

races,

approval

or

of

national

a

board

of

a majority of the members of

elected."

education

colors,

In

officials

short,

and

the

statute

appointed

boards from assigning students on the basis of race.

school
Buffalo

has an appointed Board of Education, and parents of children
attending

Buffalo

schools

brought

suit

to

challenge

the

held

the

statute.
Writing
statute

was

for

invalid

the court,
under

the

rested its decision on Hunter.

~·~
e state

tha ~ t

whenever

Judge Hayes
14th

Amendment.

that
The

court

"The principle of Hunter

is

creates an 'explicitly racial classification'

it differentiates between the treatment of problems

involving racial matters and that afforded other problems in
the

same

area."

The

New

York

statute

"by

prohibiting

the

implementation of plans designed to alleviate racial imbalance
in

the

schools

except with

the

approval of a

local elected

board ••. creates a single exception to the broad supervisory
powers
local
clearly

the

state

publich

II
.
rac1al

Commissioner

education.

of
The

~

classification,

Educatione
statute

treating

exercises over
thus

creates

educational

a ~~

matters

involving racial criteria differently from other educational

10.

matters

and

making

it

more

difficult

to

deal

with

racial

imbalance in the public schools."

3.

Reitman v. Mulkey (1967)

~ - 7J~~~k~

pre~n~::--t~ -~~

Reitman

...y'

(White,

invalidated Proposition 14, an amendment to the

J.)

Proposition 14 provided that neither

California constitution.

the State nor local governments "shall deny, limit or abridge,
the right of any person ••• to decline to sell, lease or
rent

such property to such person or persons as he,

absolute
\__

discretion,

14

Proposition
regulating

did

chooses."
more

than

The

repeal

in

housing,

private discrimination

found

Court

just

in his
that

existing
it

laws

authorized

private discrimination in the housing market.
Justice Harlan dissented.
is

that California

has

effected

"[A]ll that has happended

a

pro

tanto repeal

prior statutes forbidding private discrimination.
no

more

afoul

California's
statutes
should

in

of

the

failure
the

first

Fourteenth
to

pass

any

instance."

""'permit J:!l£: political

Amendment
such

,,

its

This runs

than would

have

antidiscrimination

He argued that

process

of

a degree of

the Court

-

leeway and

flexibility in dealing with racial matters:

"When legislation

in

should

this

field

is

unsuccessful

there

be

wide

opportunities for legislative amendment, as well as for change
through

such

processes

as

the

popular

initiative

and

11.

referendum.

Here

the

electorate

itself

overwhelmingly

wished to overrule and check its own legislature on a matter
left open by the Federal Constitution."

4.

Dayton

Bd.

of

Ed.

v.

Brinkman,

433

U.S.

406

(1977)

In Dayton I a subsequent School Board rescinded the
resolutions

adopted by an earlier Board.

Justice Rehnquist

found no constitutional violation in such a recission:
"The
Board
had
not
acted
to
undo operative
regulations affecting the assignment of pupils or
other aspects of the management of school affairs,
cf Reitman, but simply repudiated a resolution of a
predecessor Board stating that it recognized its own
fault in not taking affirmative action at an earlier
date. We agree with the Court of Appeals' treatment
of this aciton, wherein that court said:
'The question of whether a
rescission of
previous Board action is
in and of itself a
violation of appellants' constitutional rights is
inextricably bound up with the question of whether
the Board was under a constitutional duty to take
the action which it initially took • . . . . If the Board
was not under such a duty, then the rescission of
the initial action in and of itself cannot be a
constitutional violation.'"

III.

Analysis

The question in both cases is whether the particular
limitation on school assignments so changes the "rules of the
game"

that the holding

in Hunter

is applicable.

Both cases

12.

susceptible

are

to

such

an

analysis.

limitation on the state court's power

The

California

to order busing is an

unusual limit on the courts' authority and one which makes it
more difficult to proponents of busing to get the relief they
seek.
-a

Moreover, the rules have been changed in a general way-

particular

Arguably,

exericise

of

authority

was

not

repealed.

proponents of desegregation have been particularly

burdened by a unique alteration in judicial process.
Similarly, with respect to the Washington case one
may argue that the limit on the local school board's authority
marks a change
who

favor

in the rules that particularly burdens those

busing

for

desegregation

desegregation generally.
The

3-judge

appointed

court
boards

Lee,

there
of

supra,

held

that

education

a

unique

and

who

is closely
a

to

those

limit

limitation of

analogous.

on

order

favor

power

busing
the

for

desegregation

placed

powers

of

state boards.

Likewise, one could argue that the limit on the

ability of local school boards to bus imposes a unique limit
on

the

traditional

powers

of

the

local

school

board.

Alternatively, one may a ~e that whereas the school board may
order

busing

desegregation.

for

some
Thus,

reasons,
the

it may not order busing

Initiative

imposes

a

limit on the school board's power to order busing.

for

non-neutral
Moreover,

as in Hunter, the rules of the game have been changed. Under
Dayton it is clear that the Seattle Board of Education itself
could have

repealed

its desegregation plan.

Further,

it is

likely that even the State through initiative could repeal the
Seattle plan.

But here no particular plan has been repealed.

Rather, as a general matter busing by local school boards has
been removed from the array of local school board powers.
On the other hand, strong arguments can be advanced
for

distinguishing

----------~----

----

To begin with

Hunter.

I

~

t~~

start with

otion in Harlan's dissent in Reitman that the Court ought not
~

make it impossible for legislatures and voters to experiment
(:
ith race related programs.
Putting Hunter to the side, one
would think that a state ought to be able to try affirmative
action program of various sorts--busing, hiring, etc--but yet
retain the

freedom to terminate such programs if

they prove

unsuccessful.
Moreover,

I

taking

in

Hunter

classification.

and

Lee

embodied

that

To begin with the

both of these cases can be distinguished.
regulation

think

an

explicit

racial

Here we have at least facial neutrality.

the California cas:--all- : : ing ordered by a

state court

opposed

another.

permits busing

for

in

Washington

the

Initiative

reasons of safety or school overcrowding

but prohibits busing for any other purpose without particular
regard to busing for integration.
Further,
busing

proponents

it is not clear to me that the burden on
is

comparable

to

proponents of fair housing in Hunter.

the

burden

placed

U~
~

~

No mention is made of busing for one purpose as
Again,

_

·~

In

prohibited.
to

~

on

In California, busing

.L'to

proponents

may

techniques

from

continue

to

courts;

these

other

than

seek

integration

local

seek

school

court

courts

busing--e.g.

burden seems

busing

boards.

ordered
may

by

Indeed,

integration

order

magnet

from

integration
In

schools.

somewhat greater.

or

Even so,

by

other

they

may

the

state

through

means

washington

the

the proponents of

integration may still seek their goal through voluntary busing
plans and

through any other voluntary programs.

believe that mandatory busing for

Further,

I

integration may be ordered

in Washington after the Initiative so long as the student is
not

bussed

perspective,
limit

on

beyond
it

the

is as

non-court

next

if

the

ordered

nearest

school.

From

this

Initiative placed a

30 minute

-

school

busing.

In

the

Pasco

~

---.

district, for example, there are many schools near the black
neighborhoods

but

very

few

in

the

white

neighborhoods.

Ironically, after the initiative, white students can be bussed
to

the

"next

nearest

school"--which

would

be

in

black

neighborhoods-- although blacks may not be bussed out of their
neighborhoods since the next nearest school is still

in the

black quarter.
Perhaps
distinguished

in

most
line

with

convincingly,
the suggestion

Hunter

may

be

in Dayton that a

school board may rescind its own previous action.

In Hunter

the city council was restructured by the city electorate so as
to

disfavor

contrast

one

there

classification
is

simply

of

recission

legislation.
of

powers

Here

by

previously

I

by

granted

the

state

to

some

other

body--school

boards or

Thus, in the California case the state has withdrawn

courts.

J I

\\

a power granted to the state courts.

Similarly, in Washington

the

of

state

--

delegated

regathers

to

itself

to

school

some

the

~~
~J-1)

~

sovereign power

~---- ~-'----------------------------

legislation

local

removing

boards.

Had

housing

legislation

fair

Ohio

state
or

passed
racial

legislation generally from the power of local municipalities
Hunter would be more closely analogous.

-

------..--

I can see no reason why the state should not be able
....

to withdraw powers it has previously granted.
partially

funding

local

school

boards

the

Suppose that in
state

~

4/1/~

stipulated ~

that funds were not to be used for mandatory busing--unless

t-1-~

required by the federal constitution--or for any affirmative

~~

action without state authorization.

That would seem perfectly

appropriate to me if the state's reason was to maintain some
consistent state policy on the treatment of race.

Similarly,

suppose that in passing some state anti-discrimination law the
State

chooses

plaintiffs.
because

Would

other

damages?

not

provide

that

fall

plaintiffs

If as an

restrictions,

to

why

for

afoul of

under

initial matter

may

it

not

punitive

damages

the Hunter

state

law

may

for

principle
seek

such

the state may order such

alter

its

grant

of

authority

subsequently?
In
slippery.
West.

addition,

the Hunter

characterization

is quite

The Initiative process is well established in the

It is not clear to me that there has been any change in

.LUo

the

political

process

in

Washington.

Busing

opponents--

stymied at the local level--took their grievance to the State
level.

That

is

the

typical pattern.

Had busing proponents

lost at the local level they too may have sought relief at the
next

level.

California
process.
a

Similarly,
proposition

is

works

not

any

clear

change

to
in

me

that

the

the

political

It changes the variety of relief one may attain from

state court,

ought

it

to

be

but

I

viewed

am not sure that state court remedies
as

a

part

of

the

political

process--

although the argument is credible.
In short, I think that Hunter is distinguishable in
both cases.

I acknowledge that the California proposition is

somewhat

easier

to

remedies

rather

than

Hunter

seems

less

uphold.

Because

some change

clearly

in

as well

proponents

as

appears

the

applicable.

permits so many other avenues for
boards,

it

involves

judicial

political process,
Moreover,

since

it

relief--from local school

from state courts--the burden on busing
slight.

Obviously,

the

Court

wi 11 feel

some pressure to reaffirm its faith in integration, and so to
invalidate

one

Initiative

would

of

these

be

less

measures.

Perhaps

vulnerable

to

the

Washington

attack had

it

been

aimed solely at the Seattle plan--although I doubt respondents
would

agree

to

this.

Yet

it would seem odd

to permit

the

state wide electorate to abolish a local plan but not permit
the electorate to set state wide policy as a general matter •

.'

On

balance,

I

think

that

the similarities

between

the two schemes are stronger than the differences, and would
uphold both.
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 81-9

WASHINGTON, ET AL., APPELLANTS v. SEATTLE
SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 1 ET AL
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF
APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
[June - , 1982]

JUSTICE BLACKMUN delivered the opinion of the Court.
We are presented here with an extraordinary question:
whether an elected local school board may use the Fourteenth Amendment to defend its program of busing for integration from attack by the State.
I
A

Seattle School District No. 1 (District), which is largely coterminous with the city of Seattle, Wash., is charged by state
law with administering 112 schools and educating approximately 54,000 public school students. About 37% of these
children are of Negro, Asian, American Indian, or Hispanic
ancestry. Because segregated housing patterns in Seattle
have created racially imbalanced schools, the District historically has taken steps to alleviate the isolation of minority students; since 1963, it has permitted students to transfer from
their neighborhood schools to help cure the District's racial
imbalance. 1
1
In 1971, the District implemented a program of mandatory reassignments to integrate certain of its middle schools. This prompted an attempt to recall four school board members who had voted for the program.
That attempt narrowly failed. See 473 F. Supp. 996, 1006 (WD Wash.
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Despite these efforts, the District in 1977 came under increasing pressure to accelerate its program of desegregation. 2 In response, the District's Board of Directors (School
Board) enacted a resolution defining "racial imbalance" as
"the situation that exists when the combined minority student enrollment in a school exceeds the districtwide combined average by 20 percentage points, provided that the single minority enrollment . . . of no school will exceed 50
percent of the student body." 473 F. Supp. 996, 1006 (WD
Wash. 1979). The District resolved to eliminate all such imbalance from the Seattle public schools by the beginning of
the 1979-1980 academic year. 3
In September 1977, the District implemented a "magnet"
program, designed to alleviate racial isolation by enhancing
educational offerings at certain schools, thereby encouraging
voluntary student transfers. A "disproportionate amount of
the overall movement" inspired by the program was undertaken by Negro students, however, id., at 1006, and racial
imbalance in the Seattle schools was found to have actually
increased between the 1970-1971 and 1977-1978 academic
years. The District therefore concluded that mandatory re1979).
2
Several community organizations threatened legal action if the District
did not initiate a more effective integration effort, while the Mayor of Seattle and a number of community leaders, by letter dated May 20, 1977,
urged the District to adopt "a definition of racial isolation and measurable
goals leading to the elimination of racial isolation in the Seattle Public
Schools prior to a Court ordered and mandated desegregation remedy."
App. 139.
3
The District Court found that the actions of the School Board were
prompted by its members' "desire to ward off threatened litigation, their
desire to prevent the threatened loss of federal funds, their desire to relieve the black students of the disproportionate burden which they had
borne in the voluntary efforts to balance the schools racially and their perception that racial balance in the schools promotes the attainment of equal
educational opportunity and is beneficial in the preparation of all students
for democratic citizenship regardless of their race." 473 F. Supp., at 1007.

- - - - - - - - - ---
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3

assignment of students was necessary if racial isolation in its
schools was to be eliminated. Accordingly, in March 1978,
the School Board enacted the so-called "Seattle Plan" for desegregation. The plan, which makes extensive use of busing
and mandatory reassignments, desegregates elementary
schools by "pairing'' and "triading'' predominantly minority
with predominantly white attendance areas, and by basing
student assignments on attendance zones rather than on
race. The racial makeup of secondary schools is moderated
by "feeding'' them from the desegregated elementary
schools. App. 142-143. The District represents that the
plan results in the reassignment of roughly equal numbers of
white and minority students, and allows most students to
spend roughly half of their academic careers attending a
school near their homes. Brief for Appellee Seattle School
District 5.
The desegregation program, implemented in the 1978--1979
academic year, apparently was effective: the District Court
found that the Seattle Plan "has substantially reduced the
number of racially imbalanced schools in the district and has
substantially reduced the percentage of minority students in
those schools which remain racially imbalanced." 473 F.
Supp., at 1007.

B
In late 1977, shortly before the Seattle Plan was formally
adopted by the District, a number of Seattle residents who
opposed the desegregation strategies being discussed by the
School Board formed an organization called the Citizens for
Voluntary Integration Committee (CiVIC). This organization, which the District Court found "was formed because of
its founders' opposition to The Seattle Plan," 473 F. Supp., at
1007, attempted to enjoin implementation of the Board's
mandatory desegregation program though litigation in state
court; when these efforts failed, CiVIC drafted a statewide
initiative designed to terminate the use of mandatory busing

81-9-0PINION
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for purposes of racial integration. 4 This proposal, known as
Initiative 350, provided that "no school board ... shall directly or indirectly require any student to attend a school
other than the school which is geographically nearest or next
nearest the student's place of residence ... and which offers
the course of study pursued by such student. . .. " See
Wash. Rev. Code § 28A.26.010 (1981). 5 The initiative then
set out, however, a number of broad exceptions to this requirement: a student may be assigned beyond his neighborhood school if he "requires special education, care or guidance," or if "there are health or safety hazards, either natural
or man made, or physical barriers or obstacles ... between
the student's place of residence and the nearest or next
nearest school," or if "the school nearest or next nearest to
his place of residence is unfit or inadequate because of overcrowding, unsafe conditions or lack of physical facilities."
See ibid. Initiative 350 also specifically proscribed use of
seven enumerated methods of "indirec[t]" student assignment-among them the redefinition of attendance zones, the
pairing of schools, and the use of "feeder'' schools-that are a
part of the Seattle Plan. See § 28A.26.030. The initiative
envisioned busing for racial purposes in only one circumstance: it did not purport to "prevent any court of competent
jurisdiction from adjudicating constitutional issues relating to
the public schools." See § 28A.26.060.
' Washington's Constitution reserves to the people of the State "the
power to propose bills, laws, and to enact or reject the same at the polls,
independent of the legislature." Wash. Const. Art. II, § 1. Such initiatives are placed on the ballot upon the petition of 8% of the State's voters
registered and voting for governor at the last preceding regular gubernatorial election. § l(a). If passed by the electorate, an initiative may not
be repealed by the state legislature for two years, although it may be
amended within two years by a vote of two-thirds of each house of the legislature. § 41. See generally Comment, Judicial Review of Laws Enacted by Popular Vote, 55 Wash. L. Rev. 175 (1979).
5
The text of Initiative 350 is now codified as Wash. Rev. Code
§§ 28A.26.010-28A.26.900 (1981).

.

------------------
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Its proponents placed Initiative 350 on the Washington ballot for the November 1978 general election. During the ensuing campaign, the District Court concluded, the leadership
of CiVIC "acted legally and responsibly," and did not address
"its appeals to the racial biases of the voters." 473 F. Supp.,
at 1009. At the same time, however, the court's findings
demonstrate that the initiative was directed solely at desegregative busing in general, and at the Seattle Plan in particular. Thus, "[e]xcept for the assignment of students to effect
racial balancing, the drafters of Initiative 350 attempted to
preserve to school districts the maximum flexibility in the assignment of students," id., at 1008, and "[e]xcept for raciallybalancing purposes" the initiative "permits local school districts to assign students other than to their nearest or next
nearest schools for most, if not all, of the major reasons for
which students are at present assigned to schools other than
their nearest or next nearest schools." I d., at 1010. 6 In
campaigning for the measure, CiVIC officials accurately represented that its passage would result in "no loss of school
district flexibility other than in busing for desegregation purposes," id., at 1008, and it is evident that the campaign focused almost exclusively on the wisdom of "forced busing'' for
integration. See id., at 1009.
On November 8, 1978, two months after the Seattle Plan
went into effect, Initiative 350 passed by a substantial margin, drawing almost 66% of the vote statewide. The
initative failed to attract majority support in two state legislative districts, both in Seattle. In the city as a whole, however, the initiative passed with some 61% of the vote.
Within the month, the District, together with the Tacoma
and Pasco school districts, 7 initiated this suit against the
6
At the beginning of the 1978--1979 academic year, approximately
300,000 of the 769,040 students enrolled in Washington's public schools
were bused to school. Ninety-five percent of these students were transported for reasons unrelated to race. 473 F. Supp., at 1002.
7
Along with Seattle, Tacoma School District No. 10 and Pasco School
District No. 1 are the only districts in the State of Washington with com-
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State in United States District Court for the Western District of Washington, challenging the constitutionality of Initiative 350 under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
The United States and several
community organizations intervened in support of the District 8; CiVIC intervened on behalf of the defendants.
After a nine-day trial, the District Court made extensive
and detailed findings of fact. The court determined that
"[t]hose Seattle schools which are most crowded are located
in those areas of the city where the preponderance of minority families live." 473 F. Supp., at 1001. Yet the court
found that Initiative 350, if implemented, "will prevent the
racial balancing of a significant number of Seattle schools and
will cause the school system to become more racially imbalanced than it presently is," "will make it impossible for Tacoma schools to maintain their present racial balance," and
will make "doubtful" the prospects for integration of the
Pasco schools. /d., at 1010; see id., at 1001, 1011. Except
for desegregative busing, however, the court found that "almost all of the busing of students currently taking place in
prehensive integration programs, and therefore the three are the only districts affected by Initiative 350. See 473 F. Supp., at 1009. Since 1965,
Pasco has made use of school closures and a mandatory busing program to
overcome the racial isolation caused by segregated housing patterns; if students attended the schools nearest their homes, three of Pasco's seven elementary schools would have a primarily white and three a primarily minority student body. Id., at 1002-1003. The Tacoma school district has
made use of school closures, racially controlled enrollment at magnet
schools, and voluntary transfers-though not mandatory busing-to enhance racial balance in its schools. I d., at 1003-1004.
~ Several of the intervenor plaintiffs also alleged that the District had engaged in de jure segregation, and therefore was operating an unconstitutional dual school system. The District Court therefore bifurcated the litigation, first addressing the constitutionality of Initiative 350. Because of
the court's conclusions on that question, the allegations of de jure segregation did not go to trial and have not been addressed by the District Court or
by the Court of Appeals.
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[Washington] is permitted by Initiative 350." ld., at 1010.
And while the court found that "racial bias ... is a factor in
the opposition to the 'busing' of students to obtain racial balance," id., at 1001, it also found that voters were moved to
support Initiative 350 for "a number of reasons," so that "[i]t
is impossible to ascertain all of those. reasons [o]r to determine the relative impact of those reasons upon the electorate." Id., at 1010.
The District Court then held Initiative 350 unconstitutional, for three independent reasons. The court first concluded that the initiative established an impermissible racial
classification, in violation of Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U. S.
385 (1969), and Lee v. Nyquist, 318 F. Supp. 710 (WDNY
1970) (three-judge court), summarily affd, 402 U. S. 935
(1971), "because it permits busing for non-racial reasons but
forbids it for racial reasons." 473 F. Supp., at 1012. The
court next held Initiative 350 invalid because "a racially discriminatory purpose was one of the factors which motivated
the conception and adoption of the initiative." I d., at 1013. 9
Finally, the District Court reasoned that Initiative 350 was
unconstitutionally overbroad, because in the absence of a
court order it barred even school boards that had engaged in
de jure segregation from taking steps to foster integration. 10
9
The District Court acknowledged that it was impossible to determine
whether the supporters of Initiative 350 "subjectively [had] a racially discriminatory intent or purpose," because "[a]s to that subjective intent the
secret ballot raises an impenetrable barrier." 473 F. Supp., at 1014. The
court looked instead to objective factors, noting that it "marked [a] departure from the norm ... for the autonomy of school boards to be restricted
relative to the assignment of students," and that it marked a similar "departure from the procedural norm" for "an administrative decision of a
subordinate local unit of government ... [to be] overridden in a statewide
initiative." /d., at 1016. These factors, when coupled with the "racially
disproportionate impact of the initiative," its "historical background," and
"the sequence of events leading to its adoption," were found to demonstrate that a "racially discriminatory intent or purpose was at least one
motivating factor in the adoption of the initiative." Ibid.
10
The District Court noted that school boards that had practiced de jure
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ld., at 1016. The court permanently enjoined implementation of the initiative's restrictions.
On the merits, a divided panel of the United States Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed, relying entirely on
the District Court's first rationale. 633 F. 2d 1338 (1980). 11
By subjecting desegregative student assignments to unique
treatment,· the Court of Appeals concluded, Initiative 350
"both creates a constitutionally-suspect racial classification
and radically restructures the political process of Washington
by allowing a state-wide majority to usurp traditional local
authority over local school board educational policies." 633
F. 2d, at 1344. In doing so, the court continued, the initiative "remove[s] from local school boards their existing authority, and in large part their capability, to enact programs
designed to desegregate the schools." !d., at 1346 (emphasis
in original; citation omitted). The court found such a result
contrary to the principles of Hunter v. Erickson, supra, and
Lee v. Nyquist, supra. The court acknowledged that the
issue would be a different one had a successor school board
attempted to rescind the Seattle Plan. Here, however, "a
different governmental body-the state-wide electorate-rescinded a policy voluntarily enacted by locally elected school
boards already subject to local political control." 633 F. 2d,
at 1346. 12
segregation are under an affirmative obligation to eliminate the effects of
that practice. 473 F. Supp., at 1016. See Columbus Board of Education
v. Penick, 443 U. S. 449, 458-459 (1979).
11
The Court of Appeals therefore did not address the District Court's alternative finding that Initiative 350 had been adopted for discriminatory
reasons, or its conclusion that the initiative was overbroad. 633 F. 2d, at
1342.
12
After the decision on the merits, the District Court had declined to
award attorney's fees to the plaintiff school districts because the districts
are state-funded entities. App. to Juris. Statement C-1. The Court of
Appeals reversed on this issue, concluding that the District Court had
abused its discretion in denying fees. The Court of Appeals determined

---------
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The State appealed to this Court. We noted probable jurisdiction to address an issue of significance to our Nation's
system of education. - - U. S. - - (1981).

II

A
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees racial minorities the right to full participation in the political life of the community. It is beyond dis- \
pute, of course, that given racial or ethnic groups may not be
denied the franchise, or precluded from entering into the political process in a reliable and meaningful manner. See
White v. Regester, 412 U. S. 755 (1973); Nixon v. Herndon,
273 U. S. 536 (1927). But the Fourteenth Amendment also
reaches "a political structure that treats all individuals as
equals," Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U. S. 55, 84 (1980) (STEVENS,
J.' concurring in the judgment), yet more subtly distorts governmental processes in such a way as to place special burdens
on the ability of minority groups to achieve beneficial
legislation.
This principle received its clearest expresion in Hunter v.
Erickson, supra, a case that involved attempts to overturn
antidiscrimination legislation in Akron, Ohio. The Akron
city council, pursuant to its ordinary legislative processes,
had enacted a fair housing ordinance. In response, the local
citizenry, using an established referendum procedure, see
393 U. S., at 390, and n. 6; 393-394, and n. * (Harlan, J., concurring), amended the city charter to provide that ordinances
regulating real estate transactions "on the basis of race,
color, religion, national origin or ancestry must first be apthat the school districts fell within the language of the attorney's fees statutes, 42 U. S. C. § 1988 and 20 U. S. C. § 3205, seen. 28, 'infra, and it reasoned that "[a]s long as a publicly-funded organization advances important
constitutional values, it is eligible for fees under the statutes." 633 F. 2d,
at 1348.
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proved by a majority of the electors voting on the question at
a regular or general election before said ordinance shall be effective." I d., at 387. This action "not only suspended the
operation of the existing ordinance forbidding housing discrimination, but also required the approval of the electors before any future [fair housing] ordinance could take effect."
I d., at 389-390. In essence, the amendment changed the requirements for the adoption of one type of local legislation: to
enact an ordinance barring housing discrimination on the
basis of race or religion, proponents had to obtain the approval of the city council and of a majority of the voters citywide. To enact an ordinance preventing housing discrimination on other grounds, or to enact any other type of housing
ordinance, proponents needed the support of only the city
council.
In striking down the charter amendment, the Hunter
Court recognized that, on its face, the provision "draws no
distinctions among racial and religious groups." 393 U. S.,
at 390. But it did differentiate "between those groups who
sought the law's protection against racial ... discriminations
in the sale and rental of real estate and those who sought to
regulate real property transactions in the pursuit of other
ends," ibid., thus "disadvantag[ing] those who would benefit
from laws barring racial . . . discriminations as against those
who would bar other discriminations or who would otherwise
regulate the real estate market in their favor." I d., at 391.
In "reality," the burden imposed by such an arrangement
necessarily "falls on the minority. The majority needs no
protection against discrimination and if it did, a referendum
might be bothersome but no more than that." Ibid. In effect, then, the charter amendment served as an "explicitly
racial classification treating racial housing matters differently from other racial and housing matters." Id., at 389.
This made the amendment constitutionally suspect: "the
State may no more disadvantage any particular group by
making it more difficult to enact legislation in its behalf than
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it may dilute any person's vote or give any group a smaller
representation than another of comparable size." I d., at 393
(emphasis added).
Lee v. Nyquist, 318 F. Supp. 710 (WDNY 1970) (threejudge court), offers an application of the Hunter doctrine in a
setting strikingly similar to the one now before us. That
case involved the New York education system, which made
use of both elected and appointed school boards and which
conferred extensive authority on state education officials.
In an effort to eliminate de facto segregation in New York's
schools, those officials had directed the city of Buffalo-a
municipality with an appointed school board-to implement
an integration plan. While these developments were proceeding, however, the New York Legislature enacted a statute barring state education officials and appointed-though
not elected-school boards from "assign[ing] or compell[ing]
[students} to attend any school on account of race ... or for
the purpose of achieving [racial] equality in attendance . . . at
any school." 318 F. Supp., at 712. 13
Applying Hunter, the three-judge District Court invalidated the statute, noting that under the provision "[t]he
Commissioner [of Education] and local appointed officials are
prohibited from acting in [student assignment] matters only
where racial criteria are involved." I d., at 719. In th
court's view, the statute therefore "place[d] burdens on the
implementation of educational policies designed to deal with
race on the local level" by "treating educational matters involving racial criteria differently from other educational matters and making it more difficult to deal with racial imbalance
in the public schools." Id., at 719 (emphasis in original).
This drew an impermissible distinction "between the treatment of problems involving racial matters and that afforded
other problems in the same area." Id., at 718. This Court
13
As does Initiative 350, the New York statute apparently permitted voluntary student transfers to achieve integration. See n. 16, infra.
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affirmed the District Court's judgment without opinion. 402
u. s. 935 (1971).
These cases yield a simple but central principle. As Justice Harlan noted while concurring in the Court's opinion in
Hunter, laws structuring political institutions or allocating
political power according to "neutral principles"-such as the
executive veto, or the typically burdensome requirements for
amending state constitutions-are not subject to equal protection attack, though they may "make it more difficult for
minorities to achieve favorable legislation." 393 U. S., at
394. Because such laws make it more difficult for every
group in the community to enact comparable laws, they "provid[e] a just framework within which the diverse political
groups in our society may fairly compete." I d., at 393.
Thus, the political majority may generally restructure the political process to place obstacles in the path of everyone seeking to secure the benefits of governmental action. But a different analysis is required when the State allocates
governmental power non-neutrally, by explicitly using the
racial nature of a decision to determine the decisionmaking
process. State action of this kind, the Court said, "places
special burdens on racial minorities within the governmental
process," i d., at 391 (emphasis added), thereby "making it
more difficult for certain racial arrl religious minorities [than
for other members of the comm1..nity] to achieve legislation
that is in their interest." I d., at 395 (emphasis added) (Harlan, J., concurring). Such a structuring of the political process, the Court said, was "no more permissible than [is] denying [members of a racial minority] the vote, on an equal basis
with others." I d., at 391.

III
We believe that the Court of Appeals properly focused on
Hunter and Lee, for we find the principle of those cases dispositive of the issue here. In our view, Initiative 350 must
fall because it does "not attemp[t] to allocate governmental
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power on the basis of any general principle." Hunter v.
Erickson, 393 U. S., at 395 (Harlan, J., concurring). Instead, it uses the racial nature of an issue to define the governmental decisionmaking structure, and thus imposes substantial and unique burdens on racial minorities.
A

Noting that Initiative 350 nowhere mentions "race" or
"integration," appellants suggest that the legislation has no
racial overtones; they maintain that Hunter is inapposite because the initiative simply permits busing for certain enumerated purposes while neutrally forbidding it for all other reasons. We find it difficult to believe that appellants' analysis
is seriously advanced, however, for despite its facial neutrality there is little doubt that the initiative was effectively
drawn for racial purposes. Neither the initiative's sponsors,
nor the District Court, nor the Court of Appeals had any difficulty perceiving the racial nature of the issue settled by Initiative 350. Thus, the District Court found that the text of
the referendum was carefully tailored to interfere only with
desegregative busing. 14 Proponents of the initiative candidly
"represented that there would be no loss of school district
flexibility other than in busing for desegregation purposes."
473 F. Supp., at 1008. And, as we have noted, Initiative 350
in fact ..tllows school districts to bus their students "for most,
if not all," of the non-integrative purposes required by their
educational policies. !d., at 1010. The Washington electorate surely was aware of this, for it was "assured" by CiVIC
officials that "'99% of the school districts in the state'"those that lacked mandatory integration programs-"would
not be affected by the passage of 350." ld., at 1008-1009.
It is beyond reasonable dispute, then, that the initiative was
"The Court of Appeals accepted the District Court's characterization of
the initiative, and even the dissenting judge in the Court of Appeals agreed
that Initiative 350 addresses a "racial" problem. 633 F. 2d, at 1353.
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enacted '"because of,' not merely 'in spite of,' its adverse effects upon" busing for integration. Personnel Administrator of Massachusetts v. Feeney, 442 U. S. 256, 279 (1979).
Even accepting the view that Initiative 350 was enacted
for such a purpose, the United States-which has changed its
position during the course of this litigation, and now supports
the State-maintains that busing for integration, unlike the
fair housing ordinance involved in Hunter, is not a peculiarly
"racial" issue at all. Brief for United States 17, n. 18.
Again, we are not persuaded. It undoubtedly is true, as the
United States suggests, that the proponents of mandatory
integration cannot be classified by race: Negroes and whites
may be counted among both the supporters and the opponents of Initiative 350. And it should be equally clear that
white as well as Negro children benefit from exposure to
"ethnic and racial diversity in the classroom." Columbus
Board of .Education v. Penick, 443 U. S. 449, 486 (1979)
(POWELL, J., dissenting).
See Milliken v. Bradley, 418
U. S. 717, 783 (1974) (MARSHALL, J., dissenting). 15 But neither of these factors serves to distinguish Hunter, for we
may fairly assume that members of the racial majority both
favored and benefited from Akron's fair housing ordinance.
Cf. Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman,-- U. S. - - , - (1982) (slip op. 11-12, and n. 17); Gladstone, Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U. S. 91, 111, 115 (1979).
In any event, our cases suggest that desegregation of the
public schools, like the Akron open housing ordinance, at bottom inures primarily to the benefit of the minority, and is deAppellants and the United States do not challenge the propriety of
race-conscious student assignments for the purpose of achieving integration, even absent a finding of prior de jure segregation. We therefore do
not specifically pass on that issue. See generally Swann v. CharlotteMecklenberg Board of Education, 402 U. S. 1, 16 (1971); North Carolina
State Board of Education v. Swann, 402 U. S. 43, 45 (1971). Cf. University of California Regents v. Bakke, 438 U. S. 265, 300, n. 39, 312-314
(1978) (opinion of POWELL, J.).
15

- - -----
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signed for that purpose. Education has come to be "a principal instrument in awakening the child to cultural values, in
preparing him for later professional training, and in helping
him to adjust normally to his environment." Brown v.
Board of Education, 347 U. S. 483, 493 (1954). When that
environment is largely shaped by members of different racial
and cultural groups, minority children can achieve their full
measure of success only if they learn to function in-and are
fully accepted by-the larger community. Attending anethnically diverse school may help accomplish this goal by preparing minority children "for citizenship in our pluralistic society," Estes v. Metropolitan Branches of the Dallas
NAACP, 444 U. S. 437, 451 (1980) (POWELL, J., dissenting),
while, we may hope, teaching members of the racial majority
"to live in harmony and mutual respect" with children of minority heritage. Columbus Board of Education v. Penick,
443 U. S., at 485, n. 5 (POWELL, J., dissenting). Lee v.
Nyquist settles this point, for the Court there accepted the
proposition that mandatory desegregation strategies present
the type of racial issue implicated by the Hunter doctrine. 16
•• The United States seeks to distinguish Lee by suggesting that the statute there at issue "clearly prohibited" all attempts to ameliorate racial imbalance in the schools, while Initiative 350 permits voluntary desegregation efforts. Brief for United States 25. Even assuming that this
distinction would otherwise be of constitutional significance, its premise is
not accurate. The legislation challenged in Lee did permit voluntary integration efforts, for it expressly exempted from its restrictions "the assignment of a pupil in the manner requested or authorized by his parents or
guardian." 318 F. Supp., at 712. Thus, as the District Court in Lee
noted, the statute "denie[d] appointed officials the power to implement
non-voluntary programs for the improvement of racial balance." I d., at
715 (emphasis added). The difficulty in Lee-as in this case-stemmed
from the Lee District Court's conclusion that a voluntary program would
not serve to integrate the community's schools: "Voluntary plans for
achieving racial balance ... have not had a significant impact on the problems of racial segregation in the Buffalo public schools; indeed it would appear that racial isolation is actually increasing." Ibid. Thus the statute

----------------------- -
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It is undeniable that busing for integration-particularly
when ordered by a federal court-now engenders considerably more controversy than does the sort of fair housing ordinance debated in Hunter. See Estes v. Metropolitan
Branches ofthe Dallas NAACP, 444 U. S., at 448-451 (PowELL, J., dissenting). But in the absence of a constitutional violation, the desirability and efficacy of school desegregation
are matters to be resolved through the political process.
For present purposes, it is enough that minorities may consider busing for integration to be "legislation that is in their
interest." Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U. S., at 395 (Harlan,
J., concurring). Given the racial focus oflnitiative 350, this
suffices to trigger application of the Hunter doctrine.

B
We are also satisfied that the practical effect of Initiative
350 is to work a reallocation of power of the kind condemned
in Hunter. The initiative removes the authority to address a
racial problem-and only a racial problem-from the existing
decisionmaking body, in such a way as to burden minority interests. Those favoring the elimination of de facto school
segregation now must seek relief from the state legislature,
or from the statewide electorate. Yet authority over all
other student assignment decisions, as well as over most
other areas of educational policy, remains vested in the local
school board. Indeed, by specifically exempting from Initiative 350's proscriptions most non-racial reasons for assigning
students away from their neighborhood schools, the initiative
expressly requires those championing school integration to
surmount a considerably higher hurdle than persons seeking
comparable legislative action. As in Hunter, then, the community's political mechanisms are modified to place effective
challenged in Lee and Initiative 350 operated in precisely the same way to
"deny ... student[s] the right to attend a fully integrated school." Brief
for United States 25.

-----·--·-
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decisionmaking authority over a racial issue at a different
level of government. 17 In a very obvious sense, the initiative
thus "disadvantages those who would benefit from laws barring" de facto desegregation "as against those who . . . would
otherwise regulate" student assignment decisions; "the reality is that the law's impact falls on the minority." Hunter v.
Erickson, 393 U. S., at 391.
The state appellants and the United States, in response to
this line of analysis, argue that Initiative 350 has not worked
any reallocation of power. They note that the State necessarily retains plenary authority over Washington's system of
education, and therefore they suggest that the initiative
amounts to nothing more than an unexceptional example of a
17
In Hunter, the procedures for enacting racial legislation were modified
in such a way as to place effective control in the hands of the citywide electorate; here, the power to enact racial legislation has been reallocated. In
each case, the effect of the challenged action was to redraw decisionmaking
authority over racial matters-and only over racial matters-in such a way
as to place comparative burdens on minorities. While the United States
observes that the proponents of integrated schools remain free to use
Washington's initiative system to further their ends, that was true in
Hunter as well: proponents of open housing were not barred from invoking
Akron's initiative procedures to repeal the charter amendment, or to enact
fair housing legislation of their own. It surely is an excessively formal exercise, then, to argue that the procedural revisions at issue in Hunter imposed special burdens on minorities, but that the selective allocation of
decisionmaking authority worked by Initiative 350 does not erect comparable political obstacles. Indeed, in a sense the situation here is less favorable to minority interests than was the arrangement in Hunter, for the Akron charter amendment at least made provision for the passage of fair
housing legislation, while Initiative 350 on its face forbids virtually all mandatory desegregation strategies. The United States would note that Initiative 350's "modification of state policy [was] not the result of any unusual
political procedure," Brief for United States 30, for initiatives and referenda are often used by the Washington electorate. But that observation
hardly serves to distinguish this case from Hunter , since the fair housing
charter amendment was added through the unexceptional use of Akron's
initiative procedure. See 393 U. S., at 387.
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State's intervention in its own school system. In effect, they
maintain that the State functions as a "super school board,"
Tr. of Oral Arg. 5, 17, which typically involves itself in all areas of educational policy. And, the argument continues, if
the State is the body that usually makes decisions in this
area, Initiative 350 worked a simple change in policy rather
than a forbidden reallocation of power. Cf. Crawford v. Los
Angeles Board of Education, post.
This at first glance would seem to be a potent argument,
for States traditionally have been accorded the widest latitude in ordering their internal governmental processes, see
Holt Civic Club v. Tuscaloosa, 439 U. S. 60, 71 (1978), and
school boards, as creatures of the State, obviously must give
effect to policies announced by the state legislature. But
"insisting that a State may distribute legislative power as it
desires ... furnish[es] no justification for a legislative structure which otherwise would violate the Fourteenth Amendment. Nor does the implementation of this change through
popular referendum immunize it." Hunter v. Erickson, 393
U. S., at 392. The issue here, after all, is not whether
Washington has the authority to intervene in the affairs of
local school boards; it is, rather, whether the State has exercised that authority in a manner consistent with the Equal
Protection Clause. As the Court noted in Hunter, "though
Akron might have proceeded by majority vote ... on all its
municipal legislation, it has instead chosen a more complex
system. Having done so, the State may no more disadvantage any particular group by making it more difficult to
enact legislation in its behalf than it may dilute any person's
vote." I d., at 392-393. Washington also has chosen to
make use of a more complex governmental structure, and a
close examination both of the Washington statutes and of the
Court's decisions in related areas convinces us that Hunter is
fully applicable here.
At the outset, it is irrelevant that the State might have
vested all decisonmaking authority in itself, so long as the po-
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litical structure it in fact erected imposes comparative burdens on minority interests; that much is settled by Hunter
and by Lee. 18 And until the passage of Initiative 350, Washington law in fact had established the local school board,
rather than the State, as the entity charged with making decisions of the type at issue here. Like all 50 States, see Brief
for National School Boards Assn. as Amicus Curiae 11,
14-16, Washington of course is ultimately responsible for providing education within its borders, see Wash. Const., Art.
IX; Wash. Rev. Code§ 28A.02.010 (1981); ch. 28A.41 (establishing a uniform school financing system); Seattle School
Dist. v. State, 90 Wash. 2d 476, 585 P. 2d 71 (1978), and it
therefore has set certain procedural requirements and minimum educational standards to be met by each school. See,
e. g., §§ 28A.Ol.010, 28A.Ol.020 (length of school day and
year); ch. 28A.27 (mandatory attendance); ch. 28A.67
ch.
28A.05
and
(teacher
qualifications);
§§ 28A.58. 750-28A.58. 754 (curriculum). But Washington
has chosen to meet its educational responsibilities primarily
through "state and local officials, boards, and committees,"
§ 28A.02.020, and the responsibility to devise and tailor educational programs to suit local needs has emphatically been
vested in the local school boards.
Thus "each common school district board of directors" is
made "accountable for the proper operation of [its] district to
the local community and its electorate." § 28A.58. 758(1).
To this end, each school board is "vested with the final
responsibility for the setting of policies ensuring quality in
the content and extent of its educational program" (emphasis
" The Court noted in Hunter that Akron "might have proceeded by majority vote ... on all its municipal legislation," 393 U. S., at 392; the charter amendment was invalidated because the citizens of Akron did not reserve all power to themselves, but rather distributed it in a non-neutral
manner. In Lee, of course, the State had unquestioned authority to vest
all power over education in state officials.
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added). Ibid. School boards are given responsibility for,
among many other things, "establish[ing] performance criteria" for personnel and programs, for assigning staff "according to board enumerated classroom and program needs," for
setting requirements concerning hours of instruction, for
establishing curriculum standards "relevant to the particular
needs of district students or the unusual characteristics of the
district," and for evaluating teaching materials.
§ 28A.58. 758(2). School boards are generally directed to
"develop a program identifying student learning objectives
for their district[s]," §§ 28A.58.090; see also § 28A.58.092, to
select instructional materials, § 28A. 58.103, to stock libraries
as they deem necessary, § 28A.58.104, and to initiate a variety of optional programs.
See, e. g., §§28A.34.010,
28A.35.010, 28A.58.105. School boards, of course, are given
§§ 28A.58.010, 28A.58.075,
broad corporate powers.
28A.59.180. Significantly for present purposes, school
boards are directed to determine which students should be
bused to school and to provide those students with transportation. § 28A.24.055.
Indeed, the notion of school board responsibility for local
educational programs is so firmly rooted that local boards are
subject to disclosure and reporting provisions specifically designed to ensure the board's "accountability" to the people of
the community for "the educational programs in the school
distric[t]." § 28A.58. 758(3). And, perhaps most relevantly
here, before the adoption of Initiative 350 the Washington
Supreme Court had found it within the general discretion of
local school authorities to settle problems related to the denial of "equal educational opportunity." 19 Citizens Against
9

Indeed, even the State's efforts to help ensure equal opportunity in
education and to encourage desegregation are cast in cooperative terms,
and are designed to assist school districts in implementing programs of
their choosing.
See, e. g., Wash. Rev. Code §§28A.21.010(3),
28A.21.136(1) and (3) (1981); cf. § 28A.58.245(3).
'
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Mandatory Bussing v. Palmason, 80 Wash. 2d 445, 453, 495
P. 2d 657, 663 (1972). It therefore had squarely held that a
program of desegregative busing was a proper means of furthering the school board's responsibility to "administe[r] the
schools in such a way as to provide a sound education for all
children." ld., at 456, 495 P. 2d, at 664. 20 See State ex rel.
Citizens Against Mandatory Bussing v. Brooks, 80 Wash. 2d
121, 492 P. 2d 536 (1972); State ex rel. Lukens v. Spokane
School District, 147 Wash. 467, 474, 266 P. 189, 191 (1928). 21
Given this statutory structure, we have little difficulty concluding that Initiative 350 worked a major reordering of the
State's educational decisionmaking process. Before adoption of the initiative, the power to determine what programs
would most appropriately fill a school district's educational
needs-including programs involving student assignment and
desegregation-was firmly committed to the local board's
discretion. The question whether to provide an integrated
learning e'nvironment rather than a system of neig_hborhood
schools surely involved a decision of that sort. See Citizens
Against Mandatory Bussing v. Palmason, 80 Wash. 2d, at
459-460, 495 P. 2d, at 666-667. After passage of Initiative
350, authority over all but one of those areas remained in the
20

The Washington Supreme Court noted that "as long as the school board
authorized or required students to attend schools geographically situated
close to their homes, they had such a right. But the right existed only
because it was given to them by the school authorities." 80 Wash. 2d, at
452, 495 P. 2d, at 662.
21
We also note that the State has not attempted to reserve to itself exclusive power to deal with racial issues generally. Municipalities in Washington have been given broad powers of self-government, see generally Wash.
Const., Arndt. 40; Wash. Rev. Code §§ 35.22.020, 35.23.440, 35.27.370,
35.30.010 (1981); Wash. Rev. Code Tit. 35A (Optional Municipal Code), and
Washington courts specifically have held that municipalities have the
power to enact antidiscrimination ordinances. See, e. g., Seattle Newspaper-Web Pressmen's Union Local No. 26 v. City of S eattle, 24 Wash. App.
462, 604 P. 2d 170 (1979). Cf. 5 E. McQuillin, Municipal Corporations
§ 19.23, p. 425 (3d eel. rev. 1981).
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hands of the local board. By placing power over desegregative busing at the state level, then, Initiative 350 plainly "differentiates between the treatment of problems involving racial matters and that afforded other problems in the same
area." Lee v. Nyquist, 318 F.Supp., at 718. The District
Court and the Court of Appeals similarly concluded that the
initiative restructured the Washington political process, and
we see no reason to challenge the determinations of courts familiar with local law. Cf. Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U. S., at
769 (WHITE, J., dissenting).
That we reach this conclusion should come as no surprise,
for when faced with a similar educational scheme in Milliken
v. Bradley, supra, 22 the Court concluded that the actions of a
local school board could not be attributed to the State that
had created it. We there addressed the Michigan education
system, which vests in the State constitutional responsibility
for providing education: "'The policy of [Michigan] has been
to retain control of its school system, to be administered
throughout the State under State laws by local State agencies ... to carry out the delegated functions given [them] by
the legislature."' Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U. S., at 794
(MARSHALL, J., dissenting), quoting School District of the
City of Lansing v. State Board of Education, 367 Mich. 591,
595, 116 N.W. 2d 866, 868 (1962). See Milliken v. Bradley,
supra, at 726, n. 5. To fulfill this responsibility, the State of
Michigan provided a substantial measure of school district
funding, established standards for teacher certification, determined part of the curriculum, set a minimum school term,
approved bus routes and textbooks, established disciplinary
procedures, and under certain circumstances had the power
even to remove local school board members. See id., at
795-796 (MARSHALL, J., dissenting). See id., at 726, n. 5,
One amicus observes that many States employ a similar educational
structure. See Brief for National School Boards Assn. as Amicus Curiae
11, 14-16, App. 1a-10a.
22
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727 (describing State controls over education); id., at 768 and
n. 4 (WHITE, J., dissenting) (same); id., at 794 (MARSHALL,
J., dissenting) (same).
Yet the Court, noting that "[n]o single tradition in public
education is more deeply rooted than local control over the
operation of schools," concluded that the "Michigan educational structure ... in common with most States, provides
for a large measure of local control." !d., at 741-742. Relying on this analysis, the Court determined that a Michigan
school board's assignment policies could not be attributed to
the State, and therefore declined to permit interdistrict busing as a remedy for one school district's acts of unconstitutional segregation. If local school boards operating under a
similar statutory structure are considered separate entities
for purposes of constitutional adjudication when they make
segregative assignment decisions, it is difficult to see why a
different analysis should apply when a local board's desegregative policy is at issue.
In any event, we believe that the question here is again
settled by Lee. There, state control of the educational
system was fully as complete as it now is in Washington.
See generally N.Y. Educ. Law §§ 305, 306, 308-310 (McKinney) (1969 and Supp. 1981). The state statute under attack
reallocated power over mandatory desegregation in two
ways: it transferred authority from the State Commissioner
of Education to local elected school boards, and it shifted authority from local appointed school boards to the state legislature. 23 When presented with this restructuring of the political process, the District Court declared that it could
"conceive of no more compelling case for the application of
the Hunter principle." 318 F. Supp., at 719. This Court of
course affirmed the District Court's judgment. We see no
z• When authority to initiate desegregation programs was removed from
appointed school boards and from state education officials, the only body
capable of exercising power over such programs was the state legislature.
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relevant distinction between this case and Lee; indeed, it is
difficult to imagine a more precise parallel. 24

c
To be sure, "the simple repeal or modification of desegregation or anti-discrimination laws, without more, never has
been viewed as embodying a presumptively invalid racial
classification." Crawford v. Los Angeles Board of Education, post, at--, (slip op. 10). See Dayton Board of Education v. Brinkman, 443 U. S. 526, 531, n. 5 (1979); Hunter
v. Erickson, 393 U. 8., at 390, n. 5. As Justice Harlan
noted in Hunter, the voters of the polity may express their
displeasure through an established legislative or referendum
procedure when particular legislation "arouses passionate opposition." Id., at 395 (concurring opinion). Had Akron's
fair housing ordinance been defeated at a referendum, for example, "Negroes would undoubtedly [have lost] an important
2
' The United States makes only one attempt to distinguish Lee in this
regard: Lee is inapposite, the United States maintains, because the statute
at issue there "blocked desegregation efforts even by 'a school district subject to a pre-existing order to eliminate segregation in its schools,'" and
therefore-purportedly in contrast to Initiative 350-"interfere[d] with the
efforts of individual school districts to eliminate de jure segregation."
Brief for the United States 25, quoting Lee v. Nyquist, 318 F. Supp., at
715. If by this statement the United States seeks to place the District
Court's holding and this Court's affirmance in Lee on the ground that the
New York statute interfered with Buffalo's attempts to eliminate de jure
segregation, its submission is simply inaccurate. At the time of the Lee
litigation, Buffalo had not been found guilty of practicing intentional segregation. See Arthur v. Nyquist, 573 F. 2d 134, 137 (CA2 1978). As the
United States notes, Buffalo was under a "pre-existing order to eliminate
segregation in its schools"-but that order was issued by the New York
Commissioner of Education, because he had found Buffalo's schools de
facto segregated. Appeal of Dixon, 4 N.Y. Educ. Dept. Reports 115
(1965). See Lee v. Nyquist, 318 F. Supp., at 714-715. Lee did not concern de jure segregation; it is to be explained only as a straightforward
application of the Hunter doctrine.

-~--
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political battle, but they would not thereby [have been] denied equal protection." I d., at 394.
Initiative 350, however, works something more than the
"mere repeal" of a desegregation law by the political entity
that created it. It burdens all future attempts to integrate
Washington schools in districts throughout the State, by
lodging decisionmaking authority over the question at a new
and remote level of government. Indeed, the initiative, like
the charter amendment at issue in Hunter, has its most pernicious effect on integration programs that do "not arouse extraordinary controversy." !d., at 396 (emphasis in original).
In such situations the initiative makes the enactment of racially beneficial legislation difficult, though the particular
program involved might not have inspired opposition had it
been promulgated through the usual legislative processes
used for comparable legislation. 25 This imposes direct and
undeniable burdens on minority interests. "If a govern-·
mental institution is to be fair, one group cannot always be
expected to win," id., at 394; by the same token, one group
cannot be subjected to a debilitating and often insurmountable disadvantage.
IV
In the end, appellants are reduced to suggesting that
Hunter has been effectively overruled by more recent decisions of this Court. As they read it, Hunter applied a simple
25
That phenomenon is graphically demonstrated by the circumstances of
this litigation. The long-standing desegregation programs in Pasco and
Tacoma, as well as the Seattle middle school integration plan, have functioned for years without creating undue controversy. Yet they have been
swept away, along with the Seattle Plan, by Initiative 350. As a practical
matter, it seems most unlikely that proponents of desegregative busing in
smaller communities such as Tacoma or Pasco will be able to obtain the
statewide support now needed to permit them to desegregate the schools
in their communities.

81-9-0PINION
26

WASHINGTON v. SEATTLE SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 1

"disparate impact" analysis: it invalidated a facially neutral
ordinance because of the law's adverse effects upon racial minorities. Appellants therefore contend that Hunter was
swept away, along with the disparate impact approach to
equal protection, in Washington v. Davis, 426 U. S. 229
(1976), and Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Dev.
Corp., 429 U. S. 252 (1977). Cf. James v. Valtierra, 402
u. s. 137 (1971).
Appellants unquestionably are correct when they suggest
that "purposeful discrimination is 'the condition that offends
the Constitution,"' Personnel Administrator of Massachusetts v. Feeney, 442 U. S., at 274, quoting Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenberg Board of Education, 402 U. S. 1, 16
(1971), for the "central purpose of the Equal Protection
Clause .... is the prevention of official conduct discriminating
on the basis of race." Washington v. Davis, 426 U. S., at
239. Thus, when facially neutral' legislation is subjected to
equal protection attack, an inquiry into intent is necessary, to
determine whether the legislation in some sense was designed to accord disparate treatment on the basis of racial
considerations. Appellants' suggestion that this analysis
somehow conflicts with Hunter, however, misapprehends the
basis of the Hunter doctrine. We have not insisted on a particularized inquiry into motivation in all equal protection
cases: "A racial classification, regardless of purported motivation, is presumptively invalid and can be upheld only upon
an extraordinary justification." Personnel Administrator of
Massachusetts v. Feeney, 442 U. S., at 272. And legislation
of the kind challenged in Hunter falls into this inherently suspect category. 26
There is one immediate and crucial difference between
Hunter and the cases cited by appellants. While decisions
such as Washington v. Davis and Arlington Heights consid' " The State does not suggest that Initiative 350 furthers the kind of compelling interest necessary to overcome the strict scrutiny applied to explicit racial classifications.
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ered classifications facially unrelated to race, the charter
amendment at issue in Hunter dealt in explicitly racial terms
with legislation designed to benefit minorities "as minorities," not legislation intended to benefit some larger group of
underprivileged citizens among whom minorities were disproportionately represented. This does not mean, of course,
that every attempt to address a racial issue gives rise to an
impermissible racial classification. See Crawford v. Los Angeles Board of Education, post. But when the political process or the decisionmaking mechanism used to address racially
conscious legislation-and only such legislation-is singled
out for peculiar and disadvantageous treatment, the governmental action plainly "rests on 'distinctions based on race.'"
James v. Valtierra, 402 U. S., at 141, quoting Hunter v.
Erickson, 393 U. S., at 391. And when the State's allocation of power places unusual burdens on the ability of racial
groups 'to enact legislation specifically designed to overcome
the "special condition" of prejudice, the governmental action
seriously "curtail[s] the operation of those political processes
ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities." United
States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U. S. 144, 152-153, n. 4
(1938). In a most direct sense, this implicates the judiciary's
special role in safeguarding the interests of those groups that
are "relegated to such a position of political powerlessness as
to command extraordinary protection from the majoritarian
political process." San Antonio School Dist. v. Rodriguez,
411 u. s. 1, 28 (1973). 27
Hunter recognized the considerations addressed above,
and it therefore rested on a principle that has been vital for
over a century-that "the core of the Fourteenth AmendWe also note that singling out the political processes affecting racial issues for uniquely disadvantageous treatment inevitably raises dangers of
impermissible motivation. When political institutions are more generally
restructured, as JUSTICE BRENNAN has noted in another context: "The
very breadth of [the] scheme ... negates any suggestion" of improper purpose. Walz v. Tax Commission, 397 U. S. 664, 689 (1970) (concurring
opinion).
27
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ment is the prevention of meaningful and unjustified official
distinctions based on race." 393 U. S., at 391. Just such
distinctions infected the reallocation of decisionmaking authority considered in Hunter, for minorities are no less powerless with the vote than without it when a racial criterion is
used to assign governmental power in such a way as to exclude particular racial groups "from effective participation in
the political proces[s]." Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U. S., at 94
(WHITE, J., dissenting). Certainly, a state requirement that
"desegregation or anti-discrimination laws," Crawford v. Los
Angeles Board of Education, post, at - - (slip op. 10), and
only such laws, be passed by unanimous vote of the legislature would be constitutionally suspect. It would be equally
questionable for a community to require that laws or ordinances "designed to ameliorate race relations or to protect
racial minorities," id., at - - (slip op. 11), be confirmed by
popular vote of the electorate as a whole, while comparable
legislation is exempted from a similar procedure. The
amendment addressed in Hunter-and, as we have explained, the legislation at issue here-was less obviously pernicious than are these examples, but was no different in
principle.

v
In reaching this conclusion, we do not undervalue the magnitude of the State's interest in its system of education.
Washington could have reserved to state officials the right to
make all decisions in the areas of education and student assignment. It has chosen, however, to use a more elaborate
system; having done so, the State is obligated to operate that
system within the confines of the Fourteenth Amendment.
That, we believe, it has failed to do. 28
Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is

Affirmed.
28

Appellants also challenge the Court of Appeals' award of attorney's
fees to the school district plaintiffs, see n. 12, supra, arguing that state-
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funded entities are not eligible to receive such awards from the State. In
our view, this contention is without merit. The districts are plainly parties covered by the language of the fees statutes. See 42 U. S. C. § 1988
(1976 ed., Supp. IV) ("In any action ... to enforce a provision of sections
1981, 1982, 1983, 1985, and 1986 of this title ... the court, in its discretion,
may allow the prevailing party, other than the United States, a reasonable
attorney's fee as part of its costs.") (emphasis added); 20 U. S. C. § 3205
(1976 ed., Supp. IV) ("Upon the entry of a final order by a court of the
United States against a ... State ... for failure to comply with ... the
fourteenth amendment to the Constitution of the United States as [it] pertain[s] to elementary and secondary education, the court, in its discretion
... may allow the prevailing party, other than the United States, a reasonable attorney's fee as part of its costs.") (emphasis added). Nothing in the
history of the statutes suggests that this language was meant to exclude
state-funded entities. To the contrary, the Courts of Appeals have held
with substantial unanimity that publicly-funded legal services organizations may be awarded fees. See, e. g., Dennis v. Chang, 611 F. 2d 1302
(CA9 1980); Holley v. Lavine, 605 F. 2d 638 (CA2 1979), cert. denied sub
nom. Blum v. Holley, 446 U. S. 913 (1980); Lund v. Affleck, 587 F. 2d 75
(CAl 1978). And when it enacted § 1988, Congress cited with approval a
decision awarding fees to a state-funded organization. See H.R. Rep. No.
94-1558, p. 8, n. 16 (1976) (citing Incarcerated Men of Allen County Jail v.
Fair, 507 F. 2d 281 (CA6 1974). In any event, the underlying congressional policies are served by awarding fees in cases such as the one before
us: no matter what the source of their funds, school boards have limited
budgets, and allowing them fees "encourage[s] compliance with and enforcement of the civil rights laws." Dennis v. Chang, 611 F. 2d, at 1306.
See id., at 1306-1307. While appellants suggest that it is incongruous for
a State to pay attorney's fees to one of its school boards, it seems no less
incongruous that a local board would feel the need to sue the State for a
violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. We see no reason to disturb the
judgment of the Court of Appeals on this point.
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Court's finding of fact that "[e]xcept for racially
balancing purposes, Initiative 350 permits local school
districts to assign students other than to their nearest
or next nearest schools for most, if not all, of the major
reasons for which students are at present assigned to
schools other than their nearest or next nearest schools."

8.

classification

and

radically

restructures

the

political

process of washington by allowing a state-wide majority to
usurp traditional local authority over local school board
educational policies." 633 F.
Initiative
unnecessary

invalid

on

to address

this

2d, at 1344.
basis,

the

9

Finding the

Court

the District Court's

found

it

alternative

holdings. 10

9 Although
the
Court
of
Appeals
stated
that
Initiative 350
"radically restructures the political
process" and "wrest[s] from local control the formulation
and
implementation
of
educational
and desegregation
policies," the court nowhere sought to support these
conclusory statements. Nor were any findings made by the
District Court with respect to the Washington political
system.
Indeed, it is apparent that both the District
Court and the Court of Appeals considered that the
Initiative
embodied
a
"constitutionally-suspect
classification based on racial criteria" simply because it
deals with --.
a matter connected to race relations.
~

10 Judge Wright dissented.
In his view Initiative
350 could not be said to embody a racial classification.
The Initiative does not classify individuals on the basis
of their race.
It simply deals with a matter bearing on
race relations.
Moreover, no racial classification ' is
created because the citizens of a State favor mandatory
school reassignments for some purposes but not for reasons
of race. The benefits and problems associated with busing
for one reason are not the same as for another. Finally,
Judge Wright could not understand how the exercise of ~
authority
by
the
State
could
create
a
racial
classification. The State had not intervened by altering
the legislative process in a way that burdened racial
minorities.
Charged by the State Constitution with the
responsibility for the provision of public education, the
State had simply exercised its authority to run its own
school system.
Judge Wright also addressed the District Court's
alternative holdings that Initiative 350 is overbroad or
that it was motivated by discriminatory intent. He found
no basis for either conclusion.

~

The principles that should guide us in reviewing
constitutionality

the

established.

of

Initiative

350

are

well

To begin with, it is no concern of o ; rs how

the States choose to distribute their sovereign authority
as among their various institutions. See National League
of

Cities

v.

Usery,

Superior Court, 339

u.s.

426

u.s.

833

{1976)

~

Hughes

v.

460, 467 {1950). "[A]ccording to

the institutions of this country, the sovereignty in every
State resides in the people of the State, and ••. they may
alter

and

change

pleasure."
v.

393
The

concurring).
a

legislature
governing

form of government at their own
{1849)~

Luther v. Borden, 7 How. 1, 47

Erickson,

States

their

u.s.

394

{1969)

Constitution does

particular
and

385,

division

judiciary

bodies.

It

or

does

of

not

not

institutions of local government.

{Harlan,

dictate

authority

between

Hunter

state

protect

to

the

between

and
or

J.

local
define

As we have noted, the

States have "extraordinarily wide latitude ••• in creating
various

types

of

political

subdivisions

and

conferring

authority upon them." Holt Civic Club v. Tuscaloosa,

439

;;

10.

u.s.

60, 71 (1978) . 11
Thus,

a State may choose to run its schools

from the state legislature or through local school boards
just

as

it

may

choose

to

address

the

matter

of

race

relations at the State or local level.

The only relevant

constitutional

freedom to order

limitation on a State's

its political institutions is that it may not do so in a
fashion

designed

minorities within

to

"[place]

special

burdens

the governmental process."

on

racial

Hunter

v.

Erickson, supra, at 391 (emphasis added).

11 In

Community Communications Co. v. Boulder,
(1982), the Court explained that all
soverel'i19 authority in the United States res ides either
with the Federal government or with the States:

u.s.

,

"The States possess a significant measure of
sovereignty under our Constitution.
But this
principle contains its own limitation: Ours is
a 'dual system of government," [Parker v. Brown,
317 u.s. 341, 351 (1943)]
(emhpasis added),
which has no place for sovereign cities.
As
this Court stated long ago,
all sovereign
authority 'within the goegraphical limits of the
United States' resides either with
'the Government of the United States, or [with]
the States of the Union. There exist within the
broad domain of sovereignty but these two.
There may
be cities,
counties,
and other
organized
bodies
with
limited
legislative
functions, but they are all derived from, or
exist in, subordination to one or the other of
these.'
United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375,
379 (1886) (emphasis added)."
~

See Sailors v. Board of Ed ation, 387 u.s. 105, 109
(1967) ("Save and unless the s e, county, or municipal
government runs afoul of a federally protected right, it
has vast leeway in the management of its internal
affairs."); Fortson v. Morris, 385 u.s. 231, 234 (1966).

~

11.

the

Unlike

ordering

internal

of

government, the Constitution has quite a bit more to say
about the way in which States deal with
may not act on the basis of a racial classification
unless necessary to further a compelling state interest.
See McLaughlin v. Florida, 379

u.s.

184, 196 (1964).

Nor

vu-~tmay

they act

in an ostensibly neutral

purpose is discriminatory.

u.s.

229

(1976).

i~

fashion

their

See Washington v. Davis,

426

Even so, the States retain an area of

freedom and discretion when dealing with racial matters or
with

questions

affecting

racial

minorities.

A neutral

State law will not be held unconstitutional simply because
it has

a

minority.

disproportionately adverse
See id.

effect on

a

racial

And a law specifically addressed to a

racial question will not be invalidated necessarily: The
Court has recognized a

distinction between treatment of

race relations and treatment of individuals on the basis
of race.

__,

See Crawford v. Los Angeles Bd. of Ed.,

U.S.

(1982); ante, at
Moreover,

in certain limited circumstances, the

Court has held that a State may treat persons differently

12.

on

the

Regents

basis
v.

suggested

of

race.

Bakke,
that

438

even

See
u.S.

in

University

265

the

of

(1978) .

California

The Court has

absence of

a

finding

of

a

~

constitutional violation, States or school authorities may
A
conclude "that in order to prepare students to live in a
pluralistic society each school [should] have a prescribed
ratio of Negro to white students."
Mecklenberg Board of Education,

Swann v. Charlotte-

402 u.s.

1,

16

(1971).

See University of California Regents v. Bakke, supra, at
300, n. 39 (opinion of Powell, J.).

But this is a matter

of policy within the State's discretion.
held,

or

even

constitutional
persons

intimated,

violation,

a

that

we have never

absent

State must

choose

differently on the basis of race.

obligation on a
Amendment

State to do "more"

requires.

In

the

a

federal
to

treat

There

is no

than the Fourteenth

absence

of

a

federal

constitutional violation requiring race-specific remedies,
a

policy of

violate

no

particular,

strict

racial

federal

neutrality

constitutional

by a

State would

principle.

In

a neighborhood school policy and a decision

not to assign students on the basis of their race, does

13.

not offend the Fourteenth Amendment in itself. 12
III
A

~
principles

Application of these

w~

....

~~~

t

se, leads me to a different

,.~ ... / ;-:-<tL, ':1 Hv:- ~

con~ ion than that reached by the Court.

Through the

•

~,.££~~

Initiative process the State has A' adopteJ a...,Eeighborhood

sc'tof-p~ ~-::f.~~t~ ~ ..ade

/

~

w:i:'t1're-\:l.t respect: te rage.

~he State's decision to 'b/se-4 the

~~~~~

Initiative ~ legislative technique does

"'

llOt

sriolat e_ any

,

~~

See James v. Valtierra, r
\ 402
1

u.s.

1137'

~: 1 ~
violate

the

142

(1971).

Nor

does

the

State's

racial neutrality in student assignments

Equal

Protection

Clause

of

the

Fourteenth

Amendment.

None of the school districts involved in this

litigation

was

assignments

required

to

adopt

race

specific

school

in order to remedy a federal constitutional

(
12 see Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Ed., 402
u.s. 1, 28 (1971) ("Absent a constitutional violation
there would be no basis for judicially ordering assignment
of students on
racial bas is.
All things being equal,
with no history of discrimination, it might well be
desirable to assign pupils to schools nearest their
homes.").

/f'""'

w.;

.(

-~

tJ...e_,~~~
~a_/~

P-1~,

/

14.

violation.

Any

one

of

program

integration

them

might

have

cancelled

violating

without

the

its

Federal

Constitution. 13
Moreover, t do nee

~ a racial classification.
requires

or

differently
precisely
school

suggests
on

the

account

of

opposite

districts

basis of

that

The Initiative in no way

persons
their

effect:

&iii no

are

to

be

Indeed,

race.

treated
it

~
~ ~ Initiative

has
350 )

longer ~ assign students on the

race absent a court order.

wise policy is not for us to say.

Whether

this

is

Children of all races

(
benefit
all

from neighborhood schooling

races

benefit

from

exposure

diversity in the classroom."
v.

Penick,

443

dissenting).

But

u.s.
as

to

"ethnic and

racial

~

Columbus Board of Education

449,
the

just as children of

486

Court

(1979)
explains,

(Powell,
whether

J. ,

the

benefits of mandatory school assignments for the purpose
of racial

integration outweigh the costs,

is a question

13 The Court consistently has held "that the Equal
Protectoin Clause is not violated by the mere repeal of
race related legislation or policies that were not
required by the Federal Constitution in the first place."
Crawford v. Los Angeles Bd. of Ed., supra, at

~
~

c~..:t<._

?

h-e_~
t1l<.e_

.tJy

~~

15.

that

the

"[I]n

political process constitutionally may decide:

the

absence

desirablili ty
matters

to

and

be

of

a

constitutional

efficacy

resolved

of

school

through

the

violation,

the

desegregation

are

political process."

See ante, at
Certainly,

the

Initiative

treats

mandatory

student reassignments for reasons of race differently from
reassignments for other reasons.

But this difference in

treatment does not create a racial classification.

"The

Ir{

Constitution does not require things which are different
in

fact or

were

the

opinion to be treated
same."

v.

Tigner

in law as though they

Texas,

310

u.s.

141,

147

(

I

\
I

(1940) •

The

benefits

and

burdens

associated

with

the

I

assignment of students on the basis of race are unique.
The

State

avoid
whereas

a

may

conclude

safety

hazard

reassignments

Similarly,

the

that

State

or
on
may

mandatory

reassignments

overcrowding
the

basis

decide

of
that

are
race
an

to

justified
are

not.

employment

preference in State hiring for veterans is wise policy but
conclude that a preference on the basis of race detracts
from the ideal of racial

I

\

lfp/ss 6/16/82
SEA13 Sally

Seattle
Possible Substitute language
for III-A (pp. 13-15)

Application of these settled principles
demonstrates the serious error of today's decision - an
~

error that cuts deeply into heretofore unquestioned right
A

of a state to structure decision-making
government.

~

authority ~

its

In washington, as in many other states, use

of an initiative - a popular referendum - to determine
state policy is a valid and uniquely democratic
legislative technique.
142 (1971).

See James v. Valtierra, at 137,

In this case, by Initiatve 350, the state

adopted a policy of racial neutrality in student
assignments. As there had been no state segregated
schools, Washington was perfectly free to adopt this
policy.
The issue here arises only because the Seattle
School Board - in the absence of a then established state
policy and exercising its broad discretion - had chosen to
adopt race specific school assignments with extensive
busing.

It is not questioned that the school board

itself, at any time thereafter, could have changed its
mind and cancelled its integration program without
violating the federal Constitution. 13

Yet this Court, by

2.

a process of reasoning that defies rational understanding,

.

~

holds that neither the leg1slature or the people of the
~

State of Washington could alter what the school board had
decided.
The Court holds that the people of washington by
Initiative 350 created a racial classification, and yet
concedes that identical action by the Seattle school board
itself would have created no such classification.

This is

not an easy argument to answer because it seems to make no
sense.

School boards are the creation of supreme state

authority, whether in a state constitution or by
legislative enactment.

Until today's decision no one

would have questioned the authority of a state to abolish
school boards altogether, or to require that they conform
to any lawful state policy.

And in the State of

Washington, a neighborhood school policy would have been
lawful.

Under today's decision this heretofore undoubted

supreme authority of a state's electorate is to be
curtailed whenever a school board - or indeed any other
state board or local instrumentality - adopts a race
specific program that arguably benefits racial minorities.

3.

Once such a program is adopted, only the local or
subordinate entity that approved it will have authority to
change it.

The Court offers no authority or relevant

explanation for this extraordinary subordination of the
ultimate sovereign power of a state

~
~action

1\

to racial matters by subordinate bodies.

with respect

The Constitution

of the United States does not require such a bizarre
result.
This dissent well could conclude at this point.
Yet, even if one assumes that somehow the federal

~~

Constitution now imposes special e-onditiens on the

""'
exercise of state sovereignty once a local school board
has acted, this is certainly not a case where a state - in
moving to change a locally adopted policy - has
established some racially discriminatory requirement.

It

is essential to bear in mind that no finding has been made
in this or in any other case, that schools in washington
J
have been segregated by state action.

Thus, there had

been no constitutional violation to be remedied by the
Seattle board or the state.

Nor does initiative 350

authorize or approve segregation in any form or degree.

4.

It is neutral on its face, and neutral as public policy.
It merely limits the discretionary authority of school
boards to seek racial balance by mandatory busing beyond
certain limits.

The rationale of the initiative is that

children of all races benefit from neighborhood schooling,
just as children of all races benefit from exposure to
"ethnic and racial diversity in the classroom".
Board of Education v. Penick, 443
(1979) (Powell, J., dissenting).

u.s.

Columbus

449, 486

(David:

other authority

for this?)

Note to David:
III-A.

The above is a rough shot at rewriting

There may be flaws in some of my rather simplistic

reasoning, and also some repetition.
get this straight.

I count on you to

But, if I am right, this sort of

argument has considerable force.

The difficulty is that

having made it, there is not much left to be said.
In any event, it seems to me that most, if not
all, of III-B commencing with the last sentence at the

5.

bottom of page 14, can be eliminated as a secondary type
of argument.

16.

violate the Equal Protection Clause simply because it must
deal with a particular, race related issue.
v.

Los Angeles Board of Education,

See Crawford

supra.

?

Nor does the

State violate the Equal Protection Clause because it fails
to treat all mandatory school reassignments--whether
racial balance or

for

for

safety--as if they were the same,

when, in fact, they are not.
B

Finally,
Initiative

350

I

places

minorities within

agree

with

"special

the

burdens

Court
on

the governmental process,"

Erickson, supra, at
State's

cannot

that

racial

Hunter

v.

391~~~;-;;'e~~

t4V(iec..~
distribution of . authority i.,., jtt!Stif4ed.

"

~

In my

view, Initiative 350 is simply a reflection of the State's
political process at work.
in any respect.

It does not alter that process

It does not require,

for

example,

that

all matters dealing with race--or with integration in the
schools--must henceforth be submitted to a referendum of
the people.

Cf. Hunter v. Erickson, supra.

The State has

done no more than precisely what the Court has said that
it

should do:

It

has

"resolved

through

the

political

17.

process"

the

"desirability

school desegregation."

and

efficacy

of

[mandatory]

Ante, at

The political process in Washington, as in all
States,

permits persons who are dissatisfied at a

local

level to appeal to the State legislature or the people of
the State for redress.

Such a process is inherent in the

fl--,_
continued

sovereignty

~~o~~

of

the

Stat f."

~ere

&.4-

is

~

nothing

~

it.

Nor

is there anything singular about

the State's decision to deal with a matter on the State
level

rather

than

by

delegation

to

local

officials.

this and certainly no Constitutional violation. 14
In

this

case,

by means

of

an

Initiative,

the

State of Washington has asserted its authority over one

14 cf. James v. Valtierra, 402 u.s. 137, 142 (1971}
("(O]f course a lawmaking procedure that 'disadvantages' a
particular group does not always deny equal protect ion.
Under any such holding, presumably a Stte would not be
able
to require
referendums on any ~ subject unless
referendums were required on all, because they would
always disadvantage some group.
And this Court would be
required to analyze governmental structures to determine
whether a gubernatorial veto provision or a filibuster
rule is likely to 'disadvantage' any of the diverse an
shifting groups that make up the American people."}.

18.

aspect of public schooling and race relations just as it
has over many other aspects of public schooling and race
relations,

and

over

many

other

areas

of

life.

By

regulating in this manner, the State has not singled out
matters
and

of

unusual

interest to racial minorities
treatment.

The State deals

~

for

-1

with

particular
almost an

4~~~
infinite range of questions at the State level/

~~
1~.

If the assertion of the State's authority over
its local school boards violates the Fourteenth Amendment
in

this

"remote"

case--because
political

removal

body,

political strength of

of

see ante,

decisiot aking
at __ ,

to

dilutes

local minority groups--then

it

a
the
is

~~~

difficult to see why any

decisio~aking at the StateA level )

dealing with racial matters would not violate the Equal
Protection Clause as well.

A policy of racial neutrality

in public hiring or in admission to State University's--if
imposed by the people of the State, the State legislature,
or the State Supreme Court in its

interpretation of the

State Constitution--would then be unconstitutional.

~

of

the

States

to

deal

with

one

of

the

most

pressing social issues confronting our society.
I
prior

find nothing

decisions

of

in the Constitution, or

this

Court,

that

would

in the

~-# eqtlire

~~~~k~~~~~-d

her
'

th~.

Such a rule contradicts the principle

of State sovereignty that the Constitution

Nonetheless,
Court

in Hunter

v.

Erickson,

supra,

~~

f olds that Initiative 350 "imposes substantial
burdens on racial minorities" in the governmental process,
must be found unconstitutional.

See ante,

the people of
amendment that "not only suspended the operation of
existing ordinance forbidding housing discrimination, but

15 The Court also relies at certain critical points
in its discussion on the summary affirmance in Lee v.
Ny~uist, 318 F. Supp. 710 (WDNY 1970, summarily aff~402
u •. 935 (1971}. As we have often noted, however, summary
affirmances by this Court are of little precedential
force.
See Metromedia, Inc. v. San Diego, 453 u.s. 490,
500 (1981}. A summary affirmance "is not to be read as an
adoption of the reasoning supporting the judgment under
review."
Zobel v. Williams,
U.S. __ ,
n. 13
(1982}.

20.

also

required

the

approval

of

the

electors

before

any

future [anti-discrimination] ordinance could take effect."
393

u.s.,

at 389-390.

Although the charter amendment was

facially neutral, the Court found that it could be said to
embody
the

a

racial classification:

law's

impact

falls

on

the

"[T]he

reality

minority.

is

The

needs no protection against discrimination."

that

majority

Id., at 391.

By making it more difficult to pass legislation in favor
of

racial

burdens

minorities,

on

racial

the

amendment

minorities

placed

within

the

"special

governmental

process." Ibid.
The holding in Hunter rests upon three elements >
as

the

court

recognizes.

First,

explicitly addressed a racial matter.
of

the

amendment was

clearly

to

Finally,
"racially

their

the

benefit--e.

these

conscious

three

amendment

Second, the effect

g.,___fair

process

was

singled

factors,

out

housing

radically

legislation--and

disadvantageous treatment."
of

Akron

to deprive minorities of something

political

legislation--[was]

the

for

Ante, at 27.
legislation

laws.

altered:

only

such

peculiar

and

In the presence
may

be

held

21.

unconstitutional
though

there

even

has

though

been

facially

no

finding

neutral
of

a

and

even

purpose

to

discriminate.
Each of the elements underlying the holding in
Hunter is indispensable.
will

not

Thus,

provide

if

directed

a

The absence of any one of them

basis

the

particular

to

a

for

condemning

legislation

racial

matter,

is
it

state
not

action.

expressly
be

not

will

unconstitutional even though it may harm racial minorities
and

even

James v.
state
alters

though

it alters

Valtierra,

action
the

deals

402

the political process.

u.s.

expressly

137

(1971).

with

governmental process,

racial minority,

it will not be

a

but
found

Similarly,

racial
fails

See

matter
to

if
and

burden a

unconstitutional.

See United Jewish Organizations of Williamsburgh, Inc. v.
Carey, 430
a

u.s.

racial matter

144 (1977).

Finally, if a State addresses

by removing a benefit racial

~

minori~

consider to be in their interest, but in no way alters the
political process so as to disadvantage minority groups, a
constitutional

violation

will

not

necessarily

absent a showing of discriminatory intent.

be

found

Otherwise, a

22.

State could never

"merely repeal"

an affirmative action

program.

See Crawford v. Los Angeles Board of Education,

U.S.

(1982); Hunter v. Erickson, supra, at 390, n.

5.

The

Court

argues

that

each

one

Hunter elements is present in this case.

of

the

9-f-.

~irst,

the

three
Cotl~t

finds that Initiative 350 deals explicitly with a racial

tvafl •"%(- ~ ~
Seg~ d,

matter j

,

it

argues

that

-

mandatory

--

busing A for

racial integration is in the interest of racial minorities
even

in

the

~

~A it
regulate

absence

of

a

constitutional

violation)
1\

-

concludes that the decision by the State to

mandatory

integration at

school

the "remote"

reassignments
State level,

for

racial

rather

than by

delegation to school officials, subjects racial minorities
"to a debilitating and often insurmountable disadvantage"
as compared to other groups.

Ante, at

I will not quarrel with the Court's
~

that Initiative 350 addresses a racial problem despite

despite~~~~~-a~:: .:c:h:ol~~~~ii~~

facial neutrality and
~ ~~~e.~..., ~ 4VZ-~4o· uQ __,;.....,
reassignments
But I

fa ~

find little to support the Court's conclusion that

Initiative 350 places

a~

burden on racial minorities

h64c~{
Vr"'-

or that it "redraw[s] decisionmaking authority over racia

~.u&;::

~
matters--and only over racial matters--in such a way as to
place comparative burdens on minorities."

~
The Court states that

~

"our cases suggest

desegregation of the public schools ... at bottom inures
primarily to the benefit of the minority, and is designed
that

purpose."

Ante,

at

But

the

question

addressed by Initiative 350 is not the value of racially
Rather,

integrated education.
the

costs

of

achieving

Initiative 350 addresses
integration

racial

through

tu.,~~~~
~"=>
mandatory reassignment ~. Just as integration{ benefi ~ all

..

.

students, so, too, mandatory reass1gnment on the basis of
race

potentially

race.

Thus,

it

may
is

harm
far

all

from

students

clear

whatever

~

thrt,

their
in

the

H-Jabsence

of

a

constitutional

violation,

~ the

mandatory

reassignment of students on the basis of race necessarily
benefits racial minorities or that it is even viewed with
favor

~

·

~
~

Ante, at

n. 17.

for

lv~

by

racial

minorities.

See

Crawford

Education of the City of Los Angeles,

u.s.

v.

Board of

__,

n.

~~

24.

c:P~

/

32 {1982).

As the Court indicates, the busing question is

complex and is best resolved by the political process.
Moreover, it is significant that Initiative 350
places no limits on voluntary programs or on court ordered
reassignments.

It

permits

school

districts

to

school closings for purposes of racial balance.

order
And it

--~.hA-~~--

permits school districts to order a student to attend the
1\

"next

nearest"--rather

racial

integration.

than

Thus,

nearest--school

to

promote

the Tacoma School District's

~~
voluntary

integration

Initiative
mandatory
maintain

program

while

350,

assignments
racial

to

balance

is

the

mtleh

A:et

Pasco

the

next

although

affected -'(by

District--through
nearest

now

school--can

it will be white

-~~~~~
children who must ride the busses. 1 ~ ~ ...e;tl .. j

9..-c.. ~ ~ ~~
T~roug h-

~

wl:l4eh

A

~uncertain

of

racial

350

open,

and

i-n

l:i9Qt

the

~~~~
-

1\

that

Initiative

//")<_.

~
~

~g

( ?,z_

~

Cilr::tr::tot say

k~~--

certaiRty

~)

~.

--l..l-i.-c.;

L in the absence of a constitutional violation~ I
w~tb

e{

benefits ArQil.pQQ &¥,.( mandatory pupil assi9'fl1fte+lts

~~~~ - -

~

.,_,"/

integration

1

~ Initiative -\ leaves

~

/f eLL~ ~I

techniques

the

~±aces

a

~

a..~a

~ ~ ·~1-a..t.&. ~-

racial minor i tie s.l Unlike
housing laws at issue in Hunter, we

-"~ ""¥"

the

fair

iohat this

~

...

~~~
•

~~~~~~
_rJ ~egi slat:iQ~ II.Ras t:he~ clear purpose
difficult

for

certain racial

legislation that is in their

of

it

making

minorities

more

to achieve

interest." 393 u.S., at 395

(Harlan, J., concurring).
In
minorities,

the

absence

Hunter

has

of

no

a

clear

burden

application.

on

But

racial

Hunter

irrelevant to this case for another reason as well.
rule

in

Hunter

applies

only

where

the

political

is
The
or

decisionmaking process has been redrawn "in such a way as
to place comparative burdens on minorities"

~s a/1-t!o..J
n.

17.

Ante, at __ ,

'"d'c~ff'J
has not

In this

50.

been redrawn or

altered.~

Nor have racial minorities

asked to bear a unique or comparative burden.

The State

,.,~~~
simply

has

placed.A mandatory

reassignments

for

raci~

balance among the much larger group of questions regulated
at

the

State

level.

Racial

minorities,

if

4

they

are

burdened by Initiative 350, are not singled out for unique
treatment.

They are precisely like any other group that

€0 sometime ~ prefer
authorities.

~
Sl:...4

a matter to be delegated to local

operation of a system with multiple layers of authority.
Thus,

if the admissions committee of a State law school

developed an affirmative

action~~~~~~

-:=Jwo'1;_dr~ ~n~titutional
~1

stteh pla-Rs or

admissions

~

~.h-/-~

establishing~ criteria

to intervene by

~

for the oean

~

for

by prohibiting any such plan--even though

decisions

were

traditionally

left

to

the

~~vi-~
Committee.
any

way

faculty

l

\101:2~ ~ ---

extraordinary--if
of

the

law

decided

"

the

school

university as a whole.

i:t unconstitutional--or

H"Rd

or

matter
to

And if the

~~
'taken to

wttS"

the

faculty

m~~te

of

in
the
the

were

y the University President, the Chancellor of the

University System, or the Board of Regents, I still would
find nothing in the Federal Constitution or the decision
ft._J-

in Hunter

<ff

In short,

~h

would authorize this Court to intervene.

it seems

totally irrelevant whether the State

~ traditionally~ intervened

in school affairs.

The fact

27.

is that the State may, and often does, intervene in local
affairs in a variety of areas.

An appeal to the State is

not an alteration of the system,

it is the system.

even

must

assuming

that

the

State

But

demonstrate

some

historical interest in public schooling or race relations,
the

Court's

attempt

to

demonstrate

that

Initiative

350

represents a unique thrust by the State into these areas

~w_ ~~~.J.z#~A~~~~
is

utterly

tmpersaasi?e.

The

Court's

own

discussion

indicates the breadth of the State's activity.

The Common

~

School Provisions of the State's Code of Laws is nearly
200

pages

matters.

long

governing

a

broad

variety

of

school

Any one who takes a moment to leaf through these

pages of the State code will have little doubt that the
State has taken seriously its constitutional obligation to
provide

public

education.

See

Art.

IX,

("The

§2

legislature shall provide for a general and uniform system
of public schools"); Seattle School District v. State, 90
wash. 2d 476, 518, 585 P. 2d 71, 95 (1978).
In

1 igh t

of

the

wealth

of

regulation of

the

~~~s/d~~~

public schools by the State, it 1g
degree

of

prior

State

Y~lear

interference

by

to me - just what

the

"'

State

would

28.

~~

~~~5~
.:J;u,.~P-J
satisfy the Col1'r t.

v

Apparently the State may specify the

'\
design and marking of
may

specify

the

school buses, §28A.03.079,

rules

and

regulations

and it

concerning

the

training of school bus drivers, §28A.04.131, but it may
not specify when these buses are

to be

used for

racial

integration'f-·Uol'-eover) 1 t is undoubtedly true that in many

-

areas

of

school

authority
delegate

life,

the State has chosen to delegate

to local authorities.
are

education.

no

less

State

Yet these decisions to

decisions

affecting

public

They are decisions as to what is properly left

to local officials and what is properly left to the State.
But Initiative 350 is just such a decision as well.
In addition to public school affairs generally,
the State has

taken a direct

discrimination

in

§ 4 9 . 6 0 • 01 0

seq.

et

the

interest

schools

and

IX,

Article

§1

in ending racial
elsewhere.
of

the

See
State

Constitution specifically prohibits discrimination in the
provision of public schooling:

"It is the paramount duty

of the state to make ample provision for the education of
all

children

distinction

or

residing
preference

within
on

its

account

borders
of

race,

without
color,

29.

caste,

or

sex."

The

State

this

section

of

interpreted

Supreme
the

State

Court

has

not

Constitution

to

prohibit race conscious school assignments in the absence
of a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Against Mandatory Bussing v.
495 P.
would

2d 657
have

rendered

(1972)

thought

such

a

.1 6

Palmason,

Cf. Citizens

80 Wash.

2d 445,

But until today's decision one

that

the

State

decision without

Court

violating

could

have

the Federal

Constitution.

v
We

are

not

asked

to

decide

the

wisdom

of

a

policy that limits the ability of local school districts
to adopt mandatory reassignments for racial balance.

We

must decide only whether the Federal Constitution permits
the State to adopt such a policy.

'keP~~~/;>

~he

Coort does -Rot in

16 In Palmason, the washinton Supreme Court turned
back a challenge to a desegregation plan adopted by the
Seattle School District and approved by the State
Supreintendent of Pulbic Instruction. The court held that
opponents of the plan were not entitled to attack it by
means of a local referendum:
"Initiative and referendum
procedures can be invoked at the local level only if their
exercise is not in conflict with state law. • • • Clearly
they cannot be used to interfere in the management of the
state's school system." 80 Wash. 2d at 450, 495 P. 2d, at
661. Judge Wright noted in his dissent the irony "that a
federal court would now hold that the stte itself may not
interfere in its own school system."

30 •

.a.RY

\~-a::p

i-~timat.e

that the School Districts in this case

were under a federal constitutional obligation to adopt
mandatory busing.

Nor is it suggested that having tried a

system of mandatory race conscious school assignments, the
School Districts might not decide to return to a voluntary
program.

d-----s~-pOHC)l
Statf at

Co u r t

l'Mthe~,

oG~j~Q~oC;C:.:Iitri!S,__-t:(;eO.......:It;..~h~e~
....~S..t:t-'ilaL.It:.fe!--)---:.
~

in

w-<.

\Jifta~

s imp 1 y

t~

level

~tea.

~

I would Aot dictate to erre

~

offgo;;;nmen~ decisions

public schools must be taken.

affecting the

I · 4iilo Aot ttnde! s tanO the

~~~~£-e.(.~
Federal Constitutiont1te iRt£YQO so eeeply into the State's
internal structure.
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MEMORANDUM
TO:

David

DATE:

FROM:

Lewis F. Powell, Jr.

June 16, 1982

81-9 Seattle
This will be a suggestion with respect to Part
III-B (pp. 16-19).
I think III-B could be eliminated as a separate
part.

In III-B we are

address~ng

primarily our basic

position that the Court strikes a blow at the very heart of
state sovereignty.

Some of what is now said in III-B can be

used to advantage in the III-A argument - particularly the
first paragraph in III-B and the first full paragraph on
page 18.

The remainder of III-B is expendable, except

perhaps a sentence or two that you may wish to save for Part
IV dealing with Hunter.
If this suggestion is adopted, the structure of
our opinion would be as follows:
Part I - introduction and summarized facts to
frame the issue.
Part II - the governing principles, with
particular emphasis on the constitutional law of
desegregation.
Part III - our basic attack on the Court opinion
as an unprecedented interference ' with the exercise of state
political authority.

2.

Part IV- distinguishing Hunter, but more briefly
- much more briefly than at present.

Your first draft gives

Hunter more attention than it deserves.
this case is fundamentally different.

I am now persuaded
Let us focus on the

principal distinction between this case and Hunter, rather
than go through a long and detailed point-by-point
exposition of the differences.

Hunter did create at the

city level a new governmental structure that imposed a new
obstacle forminorities to overcome.
neither.

Initiative 350 did

Here we are dealing with the exercise of supreme

authority by vote of the people establishing a statewide
policy on a question always within its power, but not
exercised until initiative 350.

No new obstacle was

created, as you have emphasized.

L.F.P., Jr.
ss
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MEMORANDUM
'T'O:

David

DATE:

FROM:

Lewis F. Powell, Jr.

June 16, 1982

81-9 Seattle
This will be a suqgAstion with

re~p~ct

to

~art

I I!-B ( np • J 6-1.9 ) •
I

part.

think !I!-B could be eliminated as a separate

In III-B we are addressinq primarily our basic

position that the

~ourt

state sovpreignty.
u~ed

strikes a blow at the very heart of

SomP of what ts now said in III-B can be

to advantaqe in the III-A arqument - particularly the

first parAgraph in III-B and the first full PAragraph on
paqe 18.

The remainder of III-R is

perhaps a sentence or two that you

exoen~able,
~ay

except

wish to save for Part

IV dealinq with Hunter.
If this suggestion is adopted, the structure of
our opinion wouln be as f.ollm111s:
Part "£ - i.ntroduction and summarized facts to
frame the i.ssue.
Part II - the governing principles, with
parti.cular emphasis on the constitutional law of
deseqregation.
Part III - our basic attack on the Court opinion
as an

unpr~cedented

political. authority.

.·

.'

·.~

interference with the exercise of state

2.

Part IV- disti.nguishing Hunter, but more briefly
- much more briefly than at

Your first draft gives

pres~nt.

Hunter more at tent ion than it deserves.
this case is fundamentally different.

I am now per sua.ded
Let us focus on the

principal distinction between this case and Hunter, rather
than go through a long and

point-by-point

~etailed

exposition of the nifferences.

Hunter did create at the

city level a new governmental structure that imposed a new
obstacle forminorities to overcome.
neither.

Here we are dealinq with

Initiative 350 did
th~

exercise of supreme

authority by vote of the people establishing a statewide
policy on a question _ab1ays wtthin its power, but not
exercised until initiative 350.

No new obstacle was

created, as you have emphaslzed.

L.F.P., ,Jr.

ss
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MEMORANDUM
TO:

David

DATE:

FROM:

Lewis F. Powell, Jr.

June 16, 1982

81-9 Seattle
In line with some of the thoughts we have
discussed this morning, I have roughed out - and attach
hereto - some language that may be considered in a revision
of Part III-A.

The purpose would be to emphasize, early in

our opinion, what you and I both think is our strongest
point.
As I have indicated in a separate little memo, I
believe Part III-B can be eliminated, and Part III can
include what is the heart of our opinion.

Feel free to

state this as you think best, using only the enclosure to
the extent it fits in with your revision.
I am fully aware, David, that with both of us
"scribbling" at the same time, I am making revisions .b..,~
especially difficult , ier yeu.

I am prompted to proceed in

this fashion only because we have a Conference tomorrow, and
I also have a good deal of work to do on Mississippi State.
I feel under no pressure to circulate Seattle even
tomorrow.

Let us do the best we can to destroy the Court

opinion in about 15 to 18 typewritten pages.
doing it carefully.

L.F.P., Jr.
ss

It is worth
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MEMORANDUM
'1"0:

navJ.d

DATE:

FROM:

Lewis F. Powell, Jr.

June 16, 1982

81-9 Seattle
tn line with some of the thouqhts we
discussea this morning, I have roughed out -

hav~

an~

attach

hereto - some language that may be considered in a revision
of Part III-A.

'T'he purpose woula be to emphasize, earlv in

our opinion, what you and I both think is our strongest
poi.nt.
As I have indicated in a separate little memo, I
believe Part III-B can be eliminated, ana Part III can
include what is the he>art of our opinion.

Feel free to

state this as you think heot, using only the enclosure to
the extent it fits in with your revision.
I

am fully aware, David, that with hoth of us

"scribbling" at the same time, I am making revisions
especi.ally difficult for you.

I

am prompted to proceed in

this fashi.on only because we have a Conference tomorrow, and

r also have
I

tomorrow.

a good deal of \..rork to do on Mississl.ppi State.

feel under no pressure to circulate Seattle even
Let us do the best we can to destroy the Court

opinion in about 15 to 18 typewritten pages.
doing it carefully.

L. F. P. , Jr.

ss

It is worth
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MEMORANDUM
DATE:

TO:

David

FROM:

Lewis F. Powell, Jr.

June 16, 1982

81-9 Seattle
This is a "piecemeal" comment, addressed only to
Part II.
This is viewed as a busing case.

Although the

central issue is whether the 14th Amendment limits the power
of a state to structure its own government, this issue is
best understood - certainly from our viewpoint - in the
context of what the Constitution requires with respect to
desegregation.

I therefore would commence Part II with a

summary - and perhaps quotations in footnotes - of the basic
principles of desegregation.
The Court has never held that there is an
affirmative duty to integrate in the absence of a finding of
invalid segregation.
washington.

No such finding has ever been made in

The state - whether acting through a school

board or legislature or by referendum - was perfectly free
to follow a neighborhood policy, and to take no affirmative
steps to integrate pupils.

Even where desegregation is

ordered because of a constitutional violation, the Court has
never held that racial balance itself is a constittuional
requirement.

This is said in Swann, possibly in Milliken I

and either Dayton or Columbus I.

And Pasadena held that

even where there had been segregated schools, once

2.

desegregation was accomplished no further duty existed to
maintain integration.
All of this can be said as briefly as possible,
but driving home the fact that there has never been a
constitutional violation in Washington, and that the Seattle
school board acted on its own initiative in ordering
mandatory busing to achieve racial balance.

At that time,

there had been no determination of state policy on the
question of achieving racial balance in the schools by
mandatory busing away from the neighborhood schools.

Thus,

the Seattle board acted within its general authority without
specific direction from the legisture or people of the
state.

It was then free to act, and the question that we

address primarily is whether its action created vested
constitutional rights that limited indefinitely (perhaps
forever!) the sovereign authority of the people of
washington to enact otherwise perfectly valid laws.
As I indicated illegibly in the margin a couple of
times, we are not talking simply about "mandatory pupil
assignment" by the school board.

This occurs every year as

population shifts require changes in attendance areas.

The

issue here concerns mandatory busing to achieve racial
balance beyond a defined limit.

Rather than undertake to

spell all of this out whenever we mention it, I suggest that
we define - in a note - the term "mandatory busing" to be
used interchangeably with "mandatory busing to achieve
racial balance".

,_ '

3.

The second part of Part II, stating general
principles should summarize the principles you already have
stated.

These two are important and necessary to our

decision.

L.F.P., Jr.

ss
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MEMORANDUM
TO:

David

DATE:

FROM:

Lewis F. Powell, Jr.

June 16, 1992

81-9 Seattle
This is a "piecemeal" comment, addresseo only to
Part II.
This is viewed as a busing case.

Although the

central issue is whether the 14th Amendment limits the power
of a state to structure its own government, this issue is
best understood - certainly from our viewpoint - in the
context of what the Constitution requires with respect to
deseqreqation.

I therefore would commence Part II with a

summary - and perhaps quotations in footnotes - of the basic
principles of desegregation.
The Court has never held that there is an
affirmative duty to integrate in the absence of a finding of
invalid segregation.
Washington.

No such finding has ever been made in

The state - whether acting through a school

board or legislature or by referendum - was perfectly free
to follow a neighborhood policy, and to take no affirmative
steps to integrate pupils.

Even

wh~re

desegregation is

ordered because of a constitutional violation, the Court has
never held that racial balance itself is a constittuional
requirement.

This is said in Swann, possibly in

and either Dayton or Columbus I.

~illiken

And Pasadena held that

even where there had been segregated schools, once

I

2.

desegregation was accomplished no further duty existed to
maintain integration.
All of. this can be said as briefly as possible,
but driving home the fact that there has never been a
constitutional violation in Washington, and that the Seattle
school board acted on its own initiative in ordering
mandatory busing to achieve racial balance.

At that time,

there had been no determination of state policy on the
question of achieving racial balance in the schools bv
mandatory busing away from the neighborhood schools.

Thus,

the Seattle board acterl within its general authority without
specific direction fr:om the J.egisture or people of the
state.

it was

th~n

fr:P.e to act, and the question that we

address primarily is whether its action created vested
constitutional riqhts that limited indefinitely (perhaps
forev~r!)

the sovereign authority of the people of

Washinqton to enact otherwise perfectly valid laws.
As I indicated illegibly in the margin a couple of
times, we are not talking simply about "mandatory pupil
assignment" by the school board.

~his

occurs every year as

population shifts requlre changes in attendance areas.

The

issue here concerns mandatory busing to achieve racial
balance bevond a defined limit.

Rather: than undertake to

spell all of this out whenever we mention it, I suggest that
we define - in a note - the term "mandatory busing" to be
used interchangeably with "mandatory busing to achieve
racial balance".

3.

The second

~art

of Part !I, stating general

principles should summarize the pri.nciPles you already have
stated.

The~e

two are important and necessary to our

deci~ion.

L.F.P., Jr.
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Justice Powell, dissenting.
The people of the State of washington, by a two
to one vote,

have adopted a neighborhood school pol icy.

The policy is binding on local school boards but in no way
,
affects the authority of state or federal courts to order
school

transportation

Fourteenth
power

of

Amendment.
local

school

to
Nor

remedy
does

districts

the
to

violations
policy
establish

of

affect

the
the

voluntary

transfer programs for racial integration or for any other
purpose.
In the absence of a constitutional violation, no
decision of this Court compels a school district to adopt

-

2.

or

maintain

a

mandatory

integration. 1

Accordingly,

the

of

adoption

an

busing

program

for

racial

the Court does not hold that

identical

policy

by

local

school

f[p_~}
districts would

In~tea<l,

be unconstitutional.

it holds

that the adoption of a neighborhood school policy at the
State level--rather than at the local level--violates the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
I

dissent

from

the

Court's

unprecedented

intrusion into the structure of a state government.
School

Districts

Constitutional
programs.
ultimately
education,

in

this

case

obligation

to

were
adopt

under

The

no

Federal

mandatory

busing

The State of Washington, the governmental body
responsible

for

has determined

the

provision

of

that certain mandatory

public
busing

programs are detrimental to the education of its children.
"[T] he

Fourteenth

Amendment

leaves

the

States

free

to

distribute the powers of government as they will between
their

legislative

and

judicial

branches."

Hughes

v.

1 Throughout
this
dissent,
I
use
the
term
"mandatory busing" to refer to busing--or mandatory
student reassignments--for the purpose of achieving racial
balance.

3.

Superior Court,
that

339

Amendment

distribute

the

u.s.

leaves
powers

460,

467

the

States

of

(1950).

government

In my view,

equally

free

to

State

and

election,

the

between

local governmental bodies.
I

At

the

November,

1978,

general

voters of the State adopted Initiative 350 by a two to one
majority. 2 The Initiative sets forth a neighborhood school
policy binding on local school districts.

It establishes

a general rule prohibiting school districts from "directly
or indirectly requir[ing] any student to attend a school
other than the school which is geographically nearest or
next nearest the student's place of residence." Wash. Rev.
Code

§28A.26.010

(1981).

The

rule

may

be

avoided

in

individual instances only if the student requires special
education;

if there are health or safety hazards between

the student's residence and

the nearest or next nearest

school; or if the nearby schools are overcrowded, unsafe,

2 The
Initiative passed
by
almost
66%
of
the
statewide vote.
In Seattle the Initiative passed by over
61% of the vote.
It failed in only two of Seattle's
legislative districts--one predominantly black and one
predominantly white.

4.

or lacking in physical facilities.
The
limitations
policy.

Initiative
upon

It

Initiative
offering

the

shall

includes

scope

expressly

of

its

provides

"preclude

specialized

Ibid.

or

two

significant

neighborhood

that

nothing

in

the establishment of
enriched

educational

school
the

schools
programs

which students may voluntarily choose to attend, or of any
other voluntary option offered to students. " 3

Moreover,

and

state and

critical

federal

to

this

case,

the

authority of

courts to order mandatory school

assignments to

remedy constitutional violations is left untouched by the
Initiative:
competent

"This chapter shall not prevent any court of
jurisdiction

from

adjudicating

constitutional

issues relating to the public schools." 4
This

suit was

filed

in United States District

3 In addition to this reservation of authority to
school districts,
the Initiative also reserves
"the
authority
of
any
school
district
to
close
school
facilities." 28A.26.030.
4unlike the constitutional amendment at issue in
Crawford v. Los Angeles Bd. of Ed., __ U.S. __ (1982),
Initiative 350 places no limits on the State courts in
their interpretation of the State Constitution. Thus, if
mandatory school assignments were required by the State
Constitution-- although not by the Fourteenth Amendment of
the Federal Constitution--Initiative 350 would not hinder
a State from enforcing the State constitution.

5.

Court

shortly

after

the

Seattle School District,
School

Districts 5

and

Initiative

was

enacted.

The

joined by the Tacoma and Pasco
certain

individual

plaintiffs,

argued that the Initiative violated the Equal Protection
Clause of
agreed,

the Fourteenth Amendment.

and,

affirmed.

in a

split decision,

Relying on Hunter

v.

The District Court
the Court of Appeals

Erickson,

393

u.s.

385

(1969), the Court of Appeals concluded that Initiative 350
"both

a

creates

classification

and

constitutionally-suspect

radically

restructures

the

racial
political

process of Washington by allowing a state-wide majority to
usurp traditional local authority over local school board
educational policies." 633 F. 2d, at 1344. 6

5 Tacoma School District No. 10 and Pasco School
District No. 1 are the only other school districts in
Washington with extensive integration programs. Pasco has
relied upon school closings and mandatory busing to
achieve racial balance in its schools.
Only minority
children are bused under the Pasco plan. 473 F. Supp., at
1002.
In addition to school closings,
the Tacoma
integration plan relies upon voluntary techniques--magnet
schools and voluntary transfers.
6Judge Wright dissented.
In his view Initiative
350 could not be said to embody a racial classification.
The Initiative does not classify individuals on the basis
of their race.
It simply deals with a matter bearing on
race relations.
Moreover, no racial classification is
created because the citizens of a State favor mandatory
school reassignments for some purposes but not for reasons
of race. The benefits and problems associated with busing
for one reason are not the same as for another. Finally,
Judge Wright could not understand how the exercise of
Footnote continued on next page.

6.

II
The principles that should guide us in reviewing
the

constitutionality

established.

Initiative

of

350

are

well

To begin with, we have never held, or even

intimated, that absent a federal constitutional violation,
a State must choose to treat persons differently on the
basis of race.

In the absence of a federal constitutional

violation requiring
strict
federal

racial

race-specific

neutrality

constitutional

by

a

remedies,

State

principle.

would

Cf.

a

policy of
violate

no

University

of

California Regents v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
In particular, a neighborhood school policy and
a decision not to assign students on the basis of their
race,

does

not

offend

the

Fourteenth

Amendment. 7

The

authority
by
the
State
could
create
a
racial
classification. The State had not intervened by altering
the legislative process in a way that burdened racial
minorities.
Charged by the State Constitution with the
responsibility for the provision of public education, the
State had simply exercised its authority to run its own
school system.
Judge Wright also addressed the District Court's
alternative holdings that Initiative 350 is overbroad or
that it was motivated by discriminatory intent. He found
no basis for either conclusion.
7 see Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Ed., 402
u.s. 1, 28 (1971)
("Absent a constitutional violation
there would be no basis for judicially ordering assignment
of students on
racial basis.
All things being equal,
with no history of discrimination, it might well be
Footnote continued on next page.

7.

Court has never held that there is an affirmative duty to
integrate

the

schools

unconstitutional

in

the

absence

segregation.

of

a

Swann

v.

Charlotte-

402 U.S.

1,

24

See

Mecklenburg Board of Education,

Dayton Board of Education v. Brinkman,
(1977) .
adopt

Certainly
mandatory

busing

constitutional
desegregation

there

is
in

violation.
is

ordered

no

433

finding

u.s.

constitutional

the

absence

Indeed,
because

of

(1971);
406,

417

duty

to

such

a

of
even

a

of

where

constitutional

violation,

the Court has never held that racial balance

itself

is

a

where

there

desegregation

constitutional

requirement.

have

been

segregated

has

been

accomplished

Id.

And

schools,
no

even
once

further

desirable to assign pupils to schools nearest their
homes. 11 ) •
Indeed, in the absence of a finding of segregation by
the School District, mandatory busing on the basis of race
raises constitutional difficulties of its own. Extensive
pupil transportation may threaten liberty or privacy
interests. See University of California Board of Regents
v. Bakke, 438 u.s. 265, 300 n. 39 (opinion of Powell, J.);
Keyes v. School District No. 1_, 413 u.s. 189, 240-250
(1973) (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
Moreover, when a State or school board assigns
students on the basis of their race, it acts on the basis
of a racial classification, and we have consistently held
that 11 [a] racial classification, regardless of purported
motivtion is presumptively invalid and can be upheld only
upon
an
extraordinary
justification...
Personnel
Administrator of Massachusetts v. Feeney, 442 u.s. 256,
272 (1979).

8.

constitutional duty exists upon school boards or States to
maintain

See

integration.

Pasadena

City

Board

of

Education v. Spangler, 427 u.s. 424 (1976).
Moreover,

it

is

a

well

established

principle

that the States have "extraordinarily wide latitude •.. in
creating

various

conferring

types

authority

Tuscaloosa,

439

u.s.

of

upon
60,

political
them."

71

Holt

(1978) . 8

subdivisions
Civic

Club

and
v.

The Constitution

does not dictate to the States a particular division of
authority

between

legislature

and

state and local governing bodies.

judiciary

or

between

It does not protect or

define institutions of local government.
Thus, a State may choose to run its schools from
the state legislature or through local school boards just
as it may choose to address the matter of race relations

8 " [A]ccording to the institutions of this country,
the sovereignty in every State resides in the people of
the State, and ••• they may alter and change their form of
government at their own pleasure."
Luther v. Borden, 7
How. 1, 47 (1849).
See Community Communications Co. v.
Boulder,
U.S.
,
(1982);
Sailors v. Board of
Education;--387 u.s:-Ias,-ro9 (1967) ("Save and unless the
state, county, or municipal government runs afoul of a
federally protected right, it has vast leeway in the
management of its internal affairs"); United States v.
Kagama, 118 u.s. 375, 379 (1886) (under the Constitution,
sovereign authority resides either with the States or the
Federal government, and "[t]here exist
but these
two") •

9.

at the State or local level.
requirement

that

the

State

There is no constitutional
establish

or

maintain

local

institutions of government or that it delegate particular
powers to these bodies.

The only relevant constitutional

limitation on a

State's

freedom

institutions

that

is

it

may

to order

not

do

so

its
in

political
a

fashion

designed to "[place] special burdens on racial minorities
within

the

governmental

process."

Hunter

v.

Erickson,

supra, at 391 (emphasis added}.
In sum, in the absence of a prior constitutional
violation, the States are under no constitutional duty to
adopt integration programs in their schools, and certainly
they are under no duty to establish a regime of mandatory
busing.

Nor does

the Federal Constitution require

that

particular decisions concerning the schools or any other
matter be made on the local as opposed to the State level.
It

does

not

require

the

States

to

establish

local

governmental bodies or to delegate unreviewable authority
to them.

10.

~

----L L\

Application
demonstrates
error

the

of

serious

that cuts deeply

these

error

of

settled

principles

today's

decision--an

into the heretofore unquestioned

right of a state to structure the decisionmaking authority
of its government.

In this case, by Initiatve 350, the

State has adopted a policy of racial neutrality in student
assignments.

The

pol icy

in no way

interferes with

the

power of State or Federal Courts to remedy constitutional
violations.
of

the

And if such a policy had been adopted by any

school

districts

in

this

litigation

there could

have been no question that the policy was constitutiona1. 9
The

issue here arises only because

the Seattle

School Board--in the absence of a then established state
policy--chose
with

to adopt

extensive

busing.

School Board itself,
changed

its mind

without

violating

race
It

specific
is

not

school assignments
questioned

that

the

at any time thereafter, could have

and
the

cancelled
Federal

its

integration program

Constitution.

Yet

this

9 The Court consistently has held "that the Equal
Protection Clause is not violated by the mere repeal of
race related legislation or policies that were not
required by the Federal Constitution in the first place."
Crawford v. Los Angeles Bd. of Ed., supra, at

11.

Court holds that neither the legislature or the people of
the State of Washington could alter what the School Board
had decided.
The Court holds that the people of Washington by
Initiative

350 created a

racial classification,

and yet

must concede that identical action by the Seattle school
board

itself would have created no such classification.

This is not an easy argument to answer because it seems to
make no sense.

School boards are the creation of supreme

State authority,
legislative

whether

enactment.

in

a

Until

State constitution or
today's

decision

no

by
one

would have questioned the authority of a State to abolish
school boards altogether, or to require that they conform
to

any

lawful

washington,

State

policy.

And

in

the

State

of

a neighborhood school policy would have been

lawful.
Under today's decision this heretofore undoubted
supreme

authority

curtailed
state

whenever

board

or

of
a

a

State's

school

local

electorate

board--or

indeed

is

to

be

any other

instrumentality--adopts

a

race

specific program that arguably benefits racial minorities.

12.

Once

such

a

program

is

adopted,

only

the

local

or

subordinate entity that approved it will have authority to
change

it.

explanation

The
for

Court
this

offers

no

authority

extraordinary

or

relevant

subordination of

the

ultimate sovereign power of a state to action with respect
to racial matters by subordinate bodies.

It is a strange

notion that local governmental bodies can forever preempt
the ability of a State--the sovereign power--to address a
matter

of

compelling

concern

to

the

State.

The

Constitution of the United States does not require such a
bizarre result.
Even
Constitution

if
now

one

assumes

imposes

that

special

somehow

the

conditions

exercise of state sovereignty once a

federal
on

the

local school board

has acted, this is certainly not a case where a State--in
moving to change a locally adopted policy--has established
a

racially

discriminatory

requirement.

Initiative

350

does not impede enforcement of the Fourteenth Amendment.
If a Washington school district should be found to have
established

a

will place

no

segregated
barrier

in

school

system,

the way of

a

Initiative
remedial

350

busing

13.

order.

Nor

does

Initiative

350

authorize

segregation in any form or degree.

races

benefit

from

approve

It is neutral on its

face, and racially neutral as public policy.
all

or

neighborhood

Children of

schooling,

just as

children of all races benefit from exposure to "ethnic and
racial diversity in the classroom." Ante, at __ , quoting
Columbus Board of Education v. Penick,

443

u.s.

449, 486

no

"special

{1979) {Powell, J., dissenting) .10
Finally,
burdens

on

process,"

Initiative

racial
Hunter v.

minorities
Erickson,

350

places

within
supra,

the

governmental

at 391, such that

interference with the State's distribution of authority is
justified.

Initiative 350 is simply a reflection of the

State's political process at work.
process in any respect.

It does not alter that

It does not require, for example,

10 The policies in support of neighborhood schooling
are various but all of them are racially neutral.
The
people of the State legitimately could decide that
unlimited mandatory busing places too great a burden on
the liberty and privacy interests of families and students
of all races. It might decide that the reassignment of
students to distant schools, on the basis of race, was too
great a departure from the ideal of racial neutrality in
State action.
And, in light of the experience with
mandatory busing in other cities, the State might conclude
that such a program ultimately would lead to greater
imbalance in the schools.
See Estes v. Metropolitan
Branches of the Dallas NAACP, 444 u.s. 437, 451 {1980)
{Powell, ~ dissenting).

14.

that all matters dealing with race--or with integration in
the schools--must henceforth be submitted to a referendum
of the people.

Cf. Hunter v. Erickson, supra.

The State

has done no more than precisely what the Court has said
that

it

should

political

do:

process"

It

has

"resolved

"desirability

the

through

and

the

efficacy

of

~1-M-~~~~
[mandatory] school desegregation."
The political process
States,

1\

Ante, at

.

-

~

/.24~~~~-

in Washington, as in all

permits persons who are dissatisfied at a local

level to appeal to the State legislature or the people of
the State for redress.

It permits the people of a State

to preempt local policies, and to formulate new programs
and

regulations.

Such

a

process

is

continued sovereignty of the States.
Any time a State chooses

there

inherent

are

winners

to address a major

unfairness

in

and

losers.

this

in

the

This is our system.

persons or groups may be disadvantaged.
system

inherent

and

issue some

In a democratic
But

there

certainly

is

no
no

Constitutional violation. 11

11 cf. James v. Valtierra, 402 u.s. 137, 142 (1971)
("[O]f course a lawmaking procedure that 'disadvantages' a
Footnote continued on next page.

15.

IV
Nonetheless, the Court holds that Initiative 350
"imposes

substantial

minorities"

in

the

and

unique

governmental

burdens

process.

on
See

-~
holding is

racial
ante,

at

Hunter

v.

JtW6jh• 'i! t!
Its

authority

Erickson, supra. 12

for

this

In Hunter the people of Akron passed a

charter amendment that "not only suspended the operation
of

the

existing

discrimination,

but

ordinance
also

required

forbidding

housing

the

of

approval

the

electors before any future [anti-discrimination] ordinance
could take effect."
charter

amendment was

393

u.s.,

at 389-390.

facially neutral,

Although the

the Court

found

that it could be said to embody a racial classification:

particular group does not always deny equal protection.
Under any such holding, presumably a State would not be
able
to require
referendums on any subject unless
referendums were required on all, because they would
always disadvantage some group.
And this Court would be
required to analyze governmental structures to determine
whether a gubernatorial veto provision or a filibuster
rule is likely to 1 disadvantage 1 any of the diverse an
shifting groups that make up the American people."}.
12 The Court also relies at certain critical points
in its discussion on the summary affirmance in Lee v.
Nyquist, 318 F. Supp. 710 (WDNY 1970}, summarily aff 1 d,
402 u.s. 935 (1971}.
As we have often noted, however,
summary
aff irmances
by
this
Court
are
of
little
precedential force.
See Metromedia, Inc. v. San Diego,
453 u.s. 490, 500 (1981}. A summary affirmance "is not to
be read as an adoption of the reasoning supporting the
judgment under review."
Zobel v. Williams,
u.s. __ ,
n. 13 (1982}.

16.

"[T]he

reality

minority.

is

The

to

minorities,

the

majority

discrimination."
difficult

that

Id.,
pass

the

law's

needs
at

impact

no

391.

amendment

protection
By

legislation

in

placed

falls

making
favor

the

against
it

of

"special

on

more
racial

burdens

on

racial minorities within the governmental process." Ibid.
Nothing
extraordinary
authority.

in

in vas ion

Hunter
into

the

supports
State's

the

Court's

distribution of

Even could it be assumed that Initiative 350

imposed a ~r burden on racial minorities, 13 it simply
does not place unique political obstacles
racial

minorities.

In this case,

in the way of

~~~~

as aJ tliagy
.1\

-

ifHHea-ted,

the political system has not been redrawn or altered.

have

racial minorities been asked

.-- ,,

to bear

Nor

~~:""i cr-

compat:aeive- burden f!J...The political system is not altered

13 It is far from clear that in the absence of a
constitutional violation, mandatory busing necessarily
benefits racial minorities or that it is even viewed with
favor by racial minorities.
See Crawford v. Board of
Education of the City of Los Angeles,
U: S. _ _, - r - r;.
32 {1982). As the Court Tnaicates, thei0us1ng quest1on 1s
complex and is best resolved by the political process.
Moreover, it is significant that Initiative 350
places no limits on voluntary programs or on court ordered
reassignments.
It permits school districts to order
school closings for purposes of racial balance.
And it
permits school districts to order a student to attend the
"next nearest"--rather than nearest--school to promote
racial integration.

17.

because

the

subject

to

State

decides

its control.

to

And

regulate

within

an

racial minorities

area

are not

uniquely or comparatively burdened by the adoption by the
State of a policy that lawfully could be adopted by any
School District in the State.
Hunter is simply irrelevant.
the

Court

If anything, it is

ty~~~
that ~ disrupts the normal cours~

government. 14

Under its holding, the people of the State

~~

~

4-~

p;J:.J-.>

of Washingtonl\are forever barred~ from developingA•

~-

on mandatory busing becatt&e a School District

~

p;l,icy 4,.,~

~.
go ~ ere

t.&; ~ Ja--.:t-_

~

@eeulia.c

vV~

~

State

of

theory

of

a

~~kA.

constitutional right to local decisionmaking,"

"vested

the State

~~-~ . ,.11

tr f ~-'
+

14 The Court 1 s decision intrudes deeply into normal
State decisionmaking.
Thus, if the admissions committee
of a State law school developed an affirmative action plan
that came under fire, the Court apparently would find it
unconstitutional for any higher authority to intervene
unless that authority traditionally dictates admissions
policies.
Thus, as a constitutional matter, the Dean of
the Law School, the faculty of the University as a whole,
the University President, the Chancellor of the University
System, and the Board of Regents might be powerless to
intervene despite their greater authority under stat;la;:
~
After today 1 s decision it is unclear ~
whether the State may set policy in any area of race
relations where a local governmental body arguably has
done "more" than the Fourteenth Amendment requires.
If
local employment or benefits are distributed on a racial
basis to the benefit of racial minorities, the State
apparently may not intervene.
In
der the Court 1 s_/~
theory one must won er whether
e Federal
rnment ~
RO
len~ger
assert i s superior authority to
ulate in
these areas.
__ ~ rtJ

~

E/f1
~

vf~ 5~
~

--AL-

~

lh(
forever

1\

~~~
~

v
We

are

not

asked

to

decide

the

wisdom

of

a

4

policy that limits the ability of local school districts

-·-dU--~~~~-to adoptA mandatory reassignments for racial balance.

We

must decide only whether the Federal Constitution permits
the State to adopt such a policy.

The School Districts in

~~~~~~~~

.

7
15 Even acceptin
the dubious n t'ion that a State
must demonstrate some ast interest in public schooling or
race relations befor
intervening in these matters, the
Court's
attempt
to demonstrate
that
Initiative
350
represents a unique hrust by the State into these areas
is uetEI~ unpersua ive.
The Court's own discussion
indicates the
of the State's activity. The Common
School Provisions of the State's Code of Laws is nearly
200 pages long ) governing a broad variety of school
matters. The State has taken seriously its constitutional
obligation to provide public education. See Art. IX, §2 ;
Seattle School District v. State, 90 Wash. 2d 476, 5~ ~
585 P. 2d 71, 95 (1978). In light of the weal-4:-hA ?f ~
regulation of the public schools by the State, it is
) unclear ~ ;-ttM what degree of prior Staee iflterfereAae.,- ~
by the State would satisfy the Cour~S ~~~
In addition to public school affairs generally, the
State has taken a direct interest in ending racial
discrimination
in
the
schools
and
elsewhere.
See
§49.60.010
et ~ Article
IX,
§1
of
the
State
Constitution:Spec~ally EfOhibits discrimination in ~e ,~
· ·
public school1;:il.g:
"It is the paramount duty
1
of the state to make ample provision for the education of
f~~ ·
all
children
residing
within
its
borders
without
distinction or preference on account of race, color,
caste,
or
sex."
The State Supreme Court has not
interpreted this section of the State Constitution to
prohibit race conscious school assignments in the absence
of a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. Cf. Citizens
Against Mandatory Bussing v. Palmason, 80 Wash. 2d 445,
495 P. 2d 657 (1972). But until today's decision one would
have thought that the State Court could have rendered such
a decision without violating the Federal Constitution.

1

~

~
forever

1\

inte£8St to

~~~
~

it~

v
We

are

not

asked

to

decide

the

wisdom

of

a

""

policy that limits the ability of local school districts

- --uu--~~~~-to adoptA mandatory reassignments for racial balance.

We

must decide only whether the Federal Constitution permits
the State to adopt such a policy.

..
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15 Even acceptin
the dubious n t'ion that a State
must demonstrate some ast interest in public schooling or
race relations befor
intervening in these matters, the
Court's
attempt
to demonstrate
that
Initiative
350
represents a unique hrust by the State into these areas
is uttEr~y unpersua ive.
The Court's own discussion
indicates the
of the State's activity. The Common
School Provisions of the State's Code of Laws is nearly
200 pages long ) governing a broad variety of school
matters. The State has taken seriously its constitutional
obligation to provide public education. See Art. IX, §2 ;
Seattle School District v. State, 90 Wash. 2d 476, 5~ ~
585 P. 2d 71, 95 (1978). In light of the wea14::-h,1 ?f ~
regulation of the public schools by the State, it is
) unclear ~ ~ what degree of prior State l-fttgrfereRse.,- ~
by the State would satisfy the Cour~$ ~~~
In addition to public school affairs generally, the
State has taken a direct interest in ending racial
discrimination
in
the
schools
and
elsewhere.
See
§49.60.010
et ~ Article
IX,
§1
of
the
State
Constitution:Spec~ally BfOhibits discrimination in ~he ,,. ·
public school1;h.g:
"It is the paramount duty
1
of the state to make ample provision for the education of
f~~ ·
all
children
residing
within
its
borders
without
distinction or preference on account of race, color,
caste,
or
sex."
The State Supreme Court has not
interpreted this section of the State Constitution to
prohibit race conscious school assignments in the absence
of a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. Cf. Citizens
Against Mandatory Bussing v. Palmason, 80 Wash. 2d 445,
495 P. 2d 657 (1972). But until today's decision one would
have thought that the State Court could have rendered such
a decision without violating the Federal Constitution.

1

'

~--

~ 19.:, - .~......,-;~

~~~/\
r~~~ ~4.--~/~
-4~~~

~-6L~h>~
~

no federal constitutional obligation

this case

~
to

adopt

-

mandatory

b.!JS..i.o~ey-

mandator.y

H31vliAg

tried

a

sy steft\"'

of

~J..,..u.,~

uf~

~

.

w-ere- free to r-etour te a vol1:1n.tary

13~ ~} dee-~d.~~~ ~ ~ k
!l'be Go~ pb~4:e tft.e State

program,

:k- ~~J

tl::lis

busing.

a,r..ea.

"l:udeeEt;

opportunity

to

setttng poliey in

,_;;{-

,.-flU~ 5~#

~
~~~~
the questions ~resented ey tl::le-

j. L

address

~

deprives

the

State A of

aU?'

~4~~~
asoptioR

e~

dictate

to

mandatory busing.

'\

the

States

at

The Constitution does not

what

level

of

government

decisions
, affecting the public schools must be taken.

ce.;~
does not strip the States of their sovereignty.
1\

It

~

It does
1\

not authorize today's intrusion into the State's internal
structure.

lfp/ss 06/16/82

Rider A, p. 13 (Seattle)

SEA13 SALLY-POW
Application of these settled principles
demonstrates the serious error of today's decision - an
error that cuts deeply into heretofore unquestioned
authority of a state to structure decision-making
authority of its government.

In Washington, as in many

other states, use of an initiative - a popular referendum
- to determine state policy is a valid and uniquely
democratic legislative technique.
at 137, 142 (1971).

(?)

See James v. Valtierra,

In this case, by initiatve 350,

the state adopted a statewide policy of racial neutrality
in student assignments. As there had been no state
segregated schools, the state was perfectly free to adopt
this policy.

The issue here arises only because the

Seattle School Board - in the absence of a then
established state policy and exercising its broad
discretion - had chosen to adopt race specific school
assignments with extensive busing.

It is not questioned

in this case that the school board itself, at any time
thereafter, could have changed its mind and cancelled its

2.

integration program without violating the federal
Constitution. 13

Yet this Court, by a process of reasoning

that defies rational understanding, holds that neither the
legislature or the people of the State of washington could
alter what the school board had decided.
The Court's reasoning is that the people of
washington by initiative 350 created a racial
classification, although identical action by the Seattle
school board would have created no such classification.
This is not an easy argument to answer because it is
wholly illogical.

School boards are the creation of

supreme state authority, whether in a state constitution
or by legislative enactment.

Until today's decision no

one would have questioned that school boards could have
been abolished altogether or the operation of public
schools could be restructured in any neutral way approved
by the legislature or the people.

Under today's decision

this heretofore undoubted supreme authority of a state's
electorate is to be curtailed whenever a school board - or
indeed any other state board or local instrumentality adopts a race specific program that arguably benefits

3.

racial minorities.

Once such a program is adopted, only

the local or subordinate entity that approved it will have
authority to change it.

The Court offers no explanation

for this extraordinary subordination of the ultimate
sovereign authority of a state to action with respect to
racial matters by subordinate bodies.

The Constitution of

the United States does not require such a bizarre result.
B

This dissent well could conclude at this point.
Yet, even if one assumes that somehow the federal
Constitution imposes special conditions on the exercise of
state sovereign authority once a local school board has
acted, this is not a case where a state - in moving to
change a locally adopted policy - has established some
racially discriminatory requirement.

It is fundamental to

bear in mind that no finding has been made in this or in
any other case of schools in Washington segregated by
state action.

Nor does initiative 350 authorize or

approve segregation in any form or degree.

It is neutral

on its face, and neutral as public policy.

It merely

limits - to a specified extent - the discretionary

4.

authority of school boards to seek racial balance by
mandatory busing beyond certain limits.

The rationale of

the initiative is that children of all races benefit from
neighborhood schooling, just as children of all races
benefit from exposure to "ethnic and racial diversity in
the classroom".
443

Columbus Board of Education v. Penick,

u.s. 449, 486 (1979) (Powell,

Note to David:
III-A.

J., dissenting).

The above is a rough shot at rewriting

There may be flaws in my rather simplistic

reasoning, and I count on you to consider it critically.
If I am right, this sort of argument has considerable
force.

The difficulty is that having made it, there is

not much to be said.
If we accept the substance of what I have
dictated above, it would be a substitute for all of
present III-B.

In any event, it seems to me that most, if

not all, of III-B commencing with the last sentence at the
bottom of page 14, can be eliminated as a secondary type
of argument.

Seattle
Possible Substitute language
for III-A (pp. 13-15)

lfp/ss 6/16/82
SEA13 Sally

Application of these settled principles
demonstrates the serious error of today's decision - an
error that cuts deeply into heretofore unquestioned right
of a state to structure decision-making authority of its
government.

In Washington, as in many other states, use

of an initiative - a popular referendum - to determine
state policy is a valid and uniquely democratic
legislative technique.
142 (1971).

See James v. Valtierra, at 137,

In this case, by Initiatve 350, the state

adopted a policy of racial neutrality in student
assignments. As there had been no state segregated
schools, Washington was perfectly free to adopt this
policy.
The issue here arises only because the Seattle
School Board - in the absence of a then established state
policy and exercising its broad discretion - had chosen to
adopt race specific school assignments with extensive
busing.

It is not questioned that the school board

itself, at any time thereafter, could have changed its
mind and cancelled its integration program without
violating the federal Constitution. 13

Yet this Court, by

2.

a process of reasoning that defies rational understanding,
holds that neither the legislature or the people of the
State of washington could alter what the school board had
decided.
The Court holds that the people of Washington by
Initiative 350 created a racial classification, and yet
concedes that identical action by the Seattle school board
itself would have created no such classification.

This is

not an easy argument to answer because it seems to make no
sense.

School boards are the creation of supreme state

authority, whether in a state constitution or by
legislative enactment.

Until today's decision no one

would have questioned the authority of a state to abolish
school boards altogether, or to require that they conform
to any lawful state policy.

And in the State of

Washington, a neighborhood school policy would have been
lawful.

Under today's decision this heretofore undoubted

supreme authority of a state's electorate is to be
curtailed whenever a school board - or indeed any other
state board or local instrumentality - adopts a race
specific program that arguably benefits racial minorities.

3•

Once such a program is adopted, only the local or
subordinate entity that approved it will have authority to
change it.

The Court offers no authority or relevant

explanation for this extraordinary subordination of the
ultimate sovereign power of a state to action with respect
to racial matters by subordinate bodies.

The Constitution

of the United States does not require such a bizarre
result.
This dissent well could conclude at this point.
Yet, even if one assumes that somehow the federal
Constitution now imposes special conditions on the
exercise of state sovereignty once a local school board
has acted, this is certainly not a case where a state - in
moving to change a locally adopted policy - has
established some racially discriminatory requirement.

It

is essential to bear in mind that no finding has been made
in this or in any other case, that schools in washington
have been segregated by state action.

Thus, there had

been no constitutional violation to be remedied by the
Seattle board or the state.

Nor does initiative 350

authorize or approve segregation in any form or degree.

4.

It is neutral on its face, and neutral as public policy.
It merely limits the discretionary authority of school
boards to seek racial balance by mandatory busing beyond
certain limits.

The rationale of the initiative is that

children of all races benefit from neighborhood schooling,
just as children of all races benefit from exposure to
"ethnic and racial diversity in the classroom".
Board of Education v. Penick, 443

u.s.

Columbus

449, 486

{1979) {Powell, J., dissenting). {David:

other authority

for this?)

Note to David:
III-A.

The above is a rough shot at rewriting

There may be flaws in some of my rather simplistic

reasoning, and also some repetition.
get this straight.

I count on you to

But, if I am right, this sort of

argument has considerable force.

The difficulty is that

having made it, there is not much left to be said.
In any event, it seems to me that most, if not
all, of III-B commencing with the last sentence at the

5.

bottom of page 14, can be eliminated as a secondary type
of argument.
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Justice Powell, dissenting.

The people of the State of Washington, by a two
to one vote,

have adopted a neighborhood school policy.

The policy is binding on local school

bQar ~but

in no way

affects the authority of state or federal courts to order
school

transportation

Fourteenth
power

of

Amendment.
local

school

to
Nor

remedy
does

districts

the
to

violations
policy
establish

of

affect

the
the

voluntary

transfer programs for racial integration or for any other
purpose.
In the absence of a constitutional violation, no
decision of this Court compels a school district to adopt

'.~

...

-

2.

or

maintain

a

integration. 1
the

Accordingly,

busing

program

for

racial

the Court does not hold that

a.,..~.,.~~
ieeH ~iea-~ .

of I( aR

adopt ion

districts

mandatory

would

be

pol icy

unconstitutional.

by

local

Rather,

school

it

holds

~.a...

that the adopt ion of a .......e isaeorhood-- sefioei pol icy at the
State

level--?~~"t~~
8aQ e-£ at the
1'\

""

local level--violates the

Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
I

dissent

from

the

Court's

unprecedented

intrusion into the structure of a state government.
School

Districts

Constitutional
programs.
ultimately
education,

in

this

obligation

case
to

were
adopt

under

The

no

Federal

mandatory

busing

The State of Washington, the governmental body
responsible
has

for

the

dete,rmin~that

provision

of

certain mandatory

public
busing

programs are detrimental to the education of its children.
"[T]he

Fourteenth

Amendment

leaves

the

States

free

to

distribute the powers of government as they will between
their

legislative

and

judicial

branches."

Hughes

v.

lThroughout
this
dissent,
I
use
the
term
"mandatory busing" to refer to busing--or mandatory
student reassignments--for the purpose of achieving racial
balance. t--H-~~ ,

3.

Superior Court,

339

u.s.

that Amendment leaves

460,

467

In my view,

(1950).

the States equally free to decide

matters of concern to the State at the State, rather than
local, level of government.
I

At

the

November,

1978,

general

election,

the

voters of the State adopted Initiative 350 by a two to one
majority. 2 The Initiative sets forth a neighborhood school
policy binding on local school districts.

It establishes

a general rule prohibiting school districts from "directly
or

indirectly requir[ing]

any student to attend a school

other than the school which is geographically nearest or
next nearest , the student's place of residence." Wash. Rev.
Code

§28A.26.010

(1981).

The

rule

may

be

avoided

in

individual instances only if the student requires special
education;

if there are health or safety hazards between

the student's

residence and

the nearest or next nearest

school; or if the nearby schools are overcrowded, unsafe,

2The
Initiative
passed
by
almost
66%
of
the
statewide vote.
In Seattle the Initiative passed by over
61% of the vote.
It failed in only two of Seattle's
legislative districts--one predominantly black and one
p~dominantly white.

4.

or lacking in physical facilities.
The
limitations

Initiative
upon

It

policy.
Initiative

includes

scope

expressly

shall

offering

the

of

its

provides

"preclude

specialized

Ibid.

or

significant

two

neighborhood

that

nothing

the establishment of
enriched

educational

school
in

the

schools
programs

which students may voluntarily choose to attend, or of any
other voluntary option offered to students." §28A.26.050.
Moreover,
state

and

and

federal

assignments
untouched
prevent

critical

to

by
any

to

courts

this

case,

to

order

remedy constitutional
the

Initiative:

court

of

"This

competent

the

authority

mandatory
violations
chapter

of

school
is

shall

jurisdiction

left
not
from

adjudicating constitutional issues relating to the public
schools." §28A.26.060. 3
This

suit was

filed

in United States District

3 unlike the constitutional amendment at issue in
Crawford v. Los Angeles Bd. of Ed., __ u.s. __ (1982},
Initiative 350 places no limits on the State courts in
their interpretation of the State Constitution. Thus, if
mandatory school assignments were required by the State
Constitution--although not by the Fourteenth Amendment of
the Federal Constitution--Initiative 350 would not hinder
a State from enforcing ~te State Constitution.

~tf;L

;. \
.

'

5.

Court

shortly

after

the

Seattle School District,
School

Districts 4

and

Initiative

was

enacted.

The

joined by the Tacoma and Pasco
certain

individual

plaintiffs,

argued that the Initiative violated the Equal Protection
Clause of
agreed,

the Fourteenth Amendment.

and,

affirmed.

in

a

split decision,

Relying on Hunter

v.

The District Court
the Court of Appeals

Erickson,

393

u.s.

385

(1969), the Court of Appeals concluded that Initiative 350
"both

creates

classification

a

and

constitutionally-suspect

radically

restructures

the

racial
political

process of washington by allowing a state-wide majority to
usurp traditional local authority over local school board
educational policies." 633 F. 2d, at 1344. 5

4Tacoma School District No. 10 and Pasco School
District No. 1 are the only other school districts in
Washington with extensive integration programs. Pasco has
Lelied ~n - ~Qbool closings and mandatory busing to
achieve racial &alance in its schools.
Only minority
children are bused under the Pasco plan. 473 F. Supp., at
1002.
In addition
to school closings,
the Tacoma
integration plan relies upon voluntary techniques--magnet
schools and voluntary transfers.
5 Judge Wright dissented.
In his view Initiative
350 could not be said to embody a racial classification.
The Initiative does not classify individuals on the basis
of their race.
It simply deals with a matter bearing on
race relations.
Moreover, no racial classification is
Footnote continued on next page.

6.

II
The principles that should guide us in reviewing
the

constitutionality

established.

of

Initiative

350

are

well

To begin with, we have never held, or even

intimated, that absent a federal constitutional violation,
a State must choose to treat persons differently on the
basis of race.
violation
strict
federal

In the absence of a federal constitutional

requiring

racial

race-specific

neutrality

constitutional

by

a

remedies,

State

principle.

California Regents v. Bakke, 438

u.s.

would
Cf.

a

policy of
violate

no

University

of

-

265 (1978).

In particular, a neighborhood school policy and

1

:ty},,J'
'. fi'\ f

f..,
J

created because the citizens of a State favor mandatory
school reassignments for some purposes but not for reasons
l>~
of race. The benefits and problems associated with busing ~
~
9
for one reasonLare not the same as for anotherk
Finally, \
Y~+- _
Judge Wright could not understand how the exercise of ~~
authority
by
the
State
could
create
a
racial ~'f 7
classification. The State had not intervened by altering
the legislative process in a way that burdened racial
minorities.
Charged by the State Constitution with the
responsibility for the provision of public education, the
State had simply exercised its authority to run its own
school system.
Judge Wright also addressed the District Court's
alternative holdings that Initiative 350 is overbroad or
that it was motivated by discriminatory intent. He found
no basis for either conclusion.

c:/
e ·1·)

,.

t~

" (. , · .;

7.

a decision not to assign students on the basis of their
race,

does

not

offend

the

Fourteenth

Amendment. 6

The

Court has never held that there is an affirmative duty to
integrate

the

schools

unconstitutional

in

the

absence

segregation.

of

a

Swann

v.

Charlotte-

402 u.s.

1,

24

See

Mecklenburg Board of Education,

Dayton Board of Education v. Brinkman,
(1977) .

Certainly

there

is

no

finding

433 u.s.

constitutional

of

(1971);
406, 417
duty

to

adopt mandatory busing in the absence of such a violation.

6 see Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Ed., 402
u.s. 1, 28 (1971)
("Absent a constitutional violation
there would be no basis for judicially ordering assignment
of students on
racial basis.
All things being equal,
with no history of discrimination, it might well be
desirable to assign pupils to schools nearest their
homes.") •
Indeed, in the absence of a finding of segregation by
the School District, mandatory busing on the basis of race
raises constitutional difficulties of its own. Extensive
pupil transportation may threaten liberty or privacy
interests. See University of California Board of Regents
v. Bakke, 438 u.s. 265, 300 n. 39 (opinion of Powell, J.);
Keyes v. School District No. 1_, 413 u.s. 189, 240-250
(1973) (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
Moreover, when a State or school board assigns
students on the basis of their race, it acts on the basis
of a racial classification, and we have consistently held
that " [a] racial classification, regardless of purported
motivation is presumptively invalid and can be upheld only
upon
an
extraordinary
justification."
Personnel
Administrator of Massachusetts v. Feeney, 442 u.s. 256,
272 (1979).

8

0

Indeed, even where desegregation is ordered because of a
constitutional
racial
Id.
once

balance

And

violation,
itself

even where

the Court has never held

is

a

constitutional

that

requirement.

there have been segregated schools,

desegregation

has

been

accomplished

no

further

constitutional duty exists upon school boards or States to
maintain

integration.

See

Pasadena

City

Board

of

Education v. Spangler, 427 U.S. 424 {1976).
Moreover,

it

is

a

well

established

principle

that the States have "extraordinarily wide latitude ... in
creating

various

conferring
Tuscaloosa,

types

authority
439

u.s.

of

upon
60,

political
them."

71

Holt

{1978) .7

subdivisions
Civic

Club

and
v.

The Constitution

7 " [A]ccording to the institutions of this country,
the sovereignty in every State resides in the people of
the State, and ... they may alter and change their form of
government at their own pleasure."
Luther v. Borden, 7
How. 1, 47 {1849).
See Community Communications Co. v.
Boulder,
u.s.
,
{1982);
Sailors v. Board of
Education;-387 u.s:-I05,~9 {1967) {"Save and unless the
state, county, or municipal government runs afoul of a
federally protected right, it has vast leeway in the
management of its internal affairs"); United States v.
Kagama, 118 u.s. 375, 379 {1886) {under the Constitution,
sovereign authority resides either with the States or the
Federal government, and "[t]here exist
but these
two") .

9.

does not dictate to the States a particular division of
authority

between

legislature

and

judiciary

or

between

It does not ~~ er ~

state and local governing bodies.

define institutions of local government.
Thus, a State may choose to run its schools from
the state legislature or through local school boards just
as it may choose to address the matter of race relations
at the State or local level.
requirement

that

the

State

There is no constitutional
establish

or

maintain

local

institutions of government or that it delegate particular
powers to these bodies.

The only relevant constitutional

limitation on a

State's

freedom

institutions

that

is

it

may

to order

not

do

so

its political
in

a

fashion

designed to "[place] special burdens on racial minorities
within

the

governmental

process."

Hunter

v.

Erickson,

supra, at 391 (emphasis added}.
In sum, in the absence of a prior constitutional
violation, the States are under no constitutional duty to
adopt integration programs in their schools, and certainly
they are under no duty to establish a regime of mandatory
busing.

Nor does

the Federal Constitution require

that

particular decisions concerning the schools or any other
matter be made on the local as opposed to the State level.

10.

It

does

not

require

the

States

to

establish

local

governmental bodies or to delegate unreviewable authority
to them.
III
Application
demonstrates
error

the

of

serious

that cuts deeply

these
error

settled

of

today' s

principles
dec is ion--an

into the heretofore unquestioned

right of a state to structure the decisionmaking authority
of

its government.

In this case,

by Initiatve 350, the

State has adopted a policy of racial neutrality in student
assignments.

The policy

in no way

interferes with

the

power of State or Federal Courts to remedy constitutional
violations.
of

the

And if such a policy had been adopted by any

school districts

in

this

litigation

there could

have been no question that the policy was constitutional. 8
The

issue here arises only because

the Seattle

School Board--in the absence of a then established State
policy--chose

to adopt

race

specific

school

assignments

8 The Court consistently has held 11 that the Equal
Protection Clause is not violated by the mere repeal of
race related legislation or policies that were not
required by the Federal Constitution in the first place. 11
Crawford v. Los Angeles Bd. of Ed., supra, at

11.

with

~xtensive

busing.
It is not questioned that the
retSchool "!mara- itself, at any time thereafter, could have
~t'l) h

changed

its

mind

and

without

violating

the

cancelled
Federal

its

integration program

Constitution.

Yet

this

Court holds that neither the legislature or the people of
the State of Washington could alter what the School

~~

~JsNt(tr

had decided.
The Court
Initiative

~at

350 created a

must agree

that

j~;I~i(. t tself

the people of Washington by

racial classification,

identical

and yet

action by the Seattle

School

would have created no such classification.

This is not an easy argument to answer because it seems to
make no sense.

School boards are the creation of supreme

State authority,
legislative

whether

enactment.

in

a

Until

State Constitution or
today's

decision

no

by
one

would have questioned the authority of a State to abolish
school boards altogether, or to require that they conform
to

any

lawful

State

policy.

And

in

the

State

of

Washington, a neighborhood school policy would have been
lawful.
Under today's decision this heretofore undoubted
supreme
curtailed

authority
whenever

of
a

a

State's

school

electorate

board--or

indeed

is

to

be

any other

•'

.

12.

state

board

or

local

instrumentality--adopts

a

race

specific program that arguably benefits racial minorities.
Once

such

a

program

is

adopted,

only

the

local

or

subordinate entity that approved it will have authority to
change

i.t.

The

explanation for

Court offers no authority or

relevant

this extraordinary subordination of the

ultimate sovereign power of a State to

act~ with

respect

to racial matters by subordinate bodies. It is a strange
~t-o ~~14-· --. notion t\that' lo~ al governmental bodies can forever preempt
the ability of a State--the sovereign power--to address a
matter · of

concern

compelling

to

the

State.

~ b£;...

-'tt-

e

Constitution of the United States does not require such a
bizarre result.
Even
Constitution

if one assumes
now

imposes

that somehow the Federal

special

conditions

on

the

exercise of Sta.t e sovere.ignty once a local school board
has acted, this is certainly not

~se

where a State--in

moving to change a locally adopted .policy--has established
a

racially

does no.t

discriminatory

requirement.

Initiative

350

impede enforcement of the Fourteenth Amendment.

If a washington school district should · be found to have
established

a

segregated

will place no barrier

school

system,

~

Initiative

350

in the way of a remedial busing

)
S J-;t-

13.

order.

Nor

does

Initiative

350

authorize

segregation in any form or degree.

races

benefit

from

approve

It is neutral on its

face, and racially neutral as public policy.
all

or

neighborhood

Children of

schooling,

just as

children of all races benefit from exposure to "ethnic and
racial diversity in the classroom." Ante, at __ , quoting
Columbus Board of Education v. Penick,

443

u.s.

449, 486

no

"special

(1979) (Powell, J., dissenting) • 9
Finally,
burdens

on

process,"

Initiative

racial
Hunter v.

minorities
Erickson,

350

places

within

the

governmental

supra, at 391, such that

interference with the State's distribution of authority is
justified.

Initiative 350 is simply a reflection of the

9 The policies in support of neighborhood schooling
are various but all of them are racially neutral.
The
people of the State legitimately could decide that
unlimited mandatory busing places too great a burden on
the liberty and privacy interests of families and students
of all races • . It might decide that the reassignment of
students to distant schools, on the basis of race, was too
great a departure from the ideal of racial neutrality in
State action.
And, in light of the experience with
mandatory busing in other cities, the State might conclude
that such a program ultimately would lead to greater
racial
imbalance
in
the
schools.
See
Estes
v.
Metropolitan Branches of the Dallas NAACP, 444 u.s. 437,
451 (1980) (Powell, J., dissenting).

14.

State's political process at work.
process in any respect.

It does not alter that

It does not require, for example,

that all matters dealing with race--or with integration in
the schools--must henceforth be submitted to a referendum
of the people.

Cf. Hunter v. Erickson, supra.

The State

has done no more than precisely what the Court has said
that

it

should

political

do:

process"

has

It

the

"resolved

"desirability

and

through

the

efficacy

of

[mandatory] school desegregation" where there has been no
unlawful segregation.

~

Ante, at __,.
~

The political process in Washington, as in &H
States,

permits persons who are dissatisfied at a

local

, level to appeal to the State legislature or the people of
the State for redress.

It permits the people of a State

to preempt local policies, and to formulate new programs
and

regulations.

Such

a

process

is

continued sovereignty of the States.

inherent

persons or groups may be disadvantaged.
there

inherent

are

winners

unfairness

and

in

losers.

this

and

issue some

In a democratic
But

there

is

certainly

Constitutional violation. 10

Footnote(s) 10 will

appe~r

the

This is our system.

Any time .a State chooses to address a major

system

in

on following pages.

no
no

V'
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IV
Nonetheless, the Court holds that Initiative 350
"imposes

substantial

minorities"
Its

in

the

unique

governmental

authority

Erickson, supra. 11

and

for

this

burdens

process.
holding

on

racial

See ante, at
~h~
is l( Hunter v.

In Hunter the people of Akron passed a

charter amendment that "not only suspended the operation
of

the

existing

discrimination,

but

ordinance
also

required

forbidding

housing

the

of

approval

the

electors before any future [anti-discrimination] ordinance

10 cf. James v. Valtierra, 402 u.s. 137, 142 (1971)
("[O]f course a lawmaking procedure that 'disadvantages' a
particular group does not always deny equal protection.
Under any such holding, presumably a State would not be
able
to require
referendums on any subject unless
referendums were required on all, because they would
always disadvantage some group. And this Court would be
required to analyze governmental structures to determine
whether a gubernatorial veto provision or a filibuster
rule is likely to 'disadvantage' any of the diverse an
shifti~~ groups that make up the American people.").
The Court also relies at certain critical points
in its discussion on the summary affirmance in Lee v.
Nyquist, 318 F. Supp. 710 (WDNY 1970), summarily aff'd,
402 u.s. 935 (1971).
As we have often noted, however,
summary
affirmances
by
this
Court
are
of
little
precedential force.
See Metromedia, Inc. v. San Diego,
453 u.s. 490, 500 (1981). A summary affirmance "is not to
be read as an adoption of the reasoning supporting the
judgment under review."
Zobel v. Williams,
u.s. __,
n. 13 (1982) •

• • i'

~
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could take ef feet."
charter

393 U.S. , at 389-390.

amendment was

facially

neutral,

Although the

the Court found

that it could be said to embody a racial classification:
"[T] he

reality

minority.

is

The

to

minorities,

the

majority

discrimination."
difficult

that

Id.,
pass

the

law's

needs
at

no

in

placed

falls

protection
By

391.

legislation

amendment

impact

making
favor

"special

on

against
it

of

the

more
racial

burdens

on

racial minorities within the governmental process." Ibid.
Nothing
extraordinary

in

invasion

Hunter
into

the

supports
State's

the

Court's

distribution of

authority.

Even could it be assumed that Initiative 350

imposed a

burden on racial minorities, 12 it simply does

12 It is far from clear that in the absence of a
constitutional violation, man~atory busing necessarily
benefits racial minorie+es or that it is even viewed with
favor by racial minorities.
See Crawford v. Board of
Education of the City of Los Angeles, __ u.s. __, __
32 (1982}. As the Court indicates, the busing question is
complex and is best resolved by the political process. ~
Moreover, it is significant that Initiative 350
places no limits on voluntary programs or on court ordered
reassignments.
It permits school districts to order
school
closings
for
purposes
of
racial
balance.
§28A.26.030. And it permits school districts to order a
student to attend the "next nearest"--rather than nearest-school to promote racial integration.

n.
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not place unique political obstacles in the way of racial
minorities.

In this case, unlike in Hunter, the political

system has not been redrawn or altered.
minorities

been

asked

to

bear

Nor have racial

"special

burdens."

The

political system is not altered because the State decides
to regulate within an area subject to its control.
racial

minorities

are

not

uniquely

or

And

comparatively

burdened by the adoption by the State of a policy that
lawfully could be adopted by any School District in the
State.
Hunter is simply irrelevant.

:U aRyth-ing, j t

is

the Court that by its decision today disrupts the normal
course

of

State

government.l3

Under

its

unprecedented

13 The Court's decision intrudes deeply into normal
State decisionmaking. Under its holding the people of the
State of washington apparently are forever barred from
developing a different policy on mandatory busing where a
School District previously has adopted one of its own.
This principle would not seem limited to the question of
mandatory busing. Thus, if the admissions committee of a
State law school developed an affirmative action plan that
came under fire, the Court apparently would find it
unconstitutional for any higher authority to intervene
unless that authority traditionally dictated admissions
policies. As a constitutional matter, the Dean of the Law
School, the faculty of the University as a whole, the
University President, the Chancellor of the University
System, and the Board of Regents might be powerless to
Footnote continued on next page.
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theory

of

a

decisionmaking,"

"vested
the

constitutional
State

apparently

right
is

to

now

local
forever

barred from addressing the perplexing problems of how best
to educate fairly all children in a multi-racial society
where, as in this case, the local school board has acted
first. 14

intervene despite their greater authority under State law.
After today's decision it is unclear whether the
State may set policy in any area of race relations where a
local governmental body arguably has done "more" than the
Fourteenth Amendment requires.
If local employment or
benefits are distributed on a racial basis to the benefit
of racial minorities,
the State apparently may not
thereafter ever intervene.
Indeed, under the Court's
theory one must wonder whether--under the Equal Protection
component of
the
Fifth Amendment--even
the
Federal
Government could assert its superior authority to regulate
in these areas.
14 Even accepting the dubious notion that a State
must demonstrate some past control over public schooling
or race relations before now intervening in these matters,
ante, at 19, the Court's attempt to demonstrate that
Initiative 350 represents a unique thrust by the State
into these areas is unpersuasive.
The Court's own
discussion indicates the comprehensive character of the
State's activity.
The Common School Provisions of the
State's Code of Laws~ nearly 200 pages long, governing a
broad variety of school matters.
The State has taken
seriously its constitutional obligation to provide public
education.
See Art. IX, §2 ~ Seattle School District v.
State, 90 Wash. 2d 476, 518, 585 P. 2d 71, 95 (1978). In
light of the wide range of regulation of the public
schools by the State, it is wholly unclear what degree of
prior concern or control by the State would satisfy the
Footnote continued on next page.
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v
We are not asked to decide the wisdom of a State
pol,icy that ' limits the ability of lOCijil school districts
to adopt--on their own volition--mandatory reassignments
. .
for

racial · bal~nce.

We

must

decide

only

whether

the

\

Federal
/

'

Constitution permits

~he

'

State

to adopt

"

such a

policy.

The School ' Districts in this case were under no

feder_al

constitutional

obligation ' to

mandatory
\

busing.
its

adopt

Absent such
an obligation, · the State--exercising
.(
'
.
SOVE;!reign author-ity over all. subprdinate agencies--

should

be

free

to

reject ·this debatable

restriction on

Court's new doctrine.
In addition ~o public school affairs generally, the
State has taken a direct interest in ending racial
discrimination
in 1 the
schoots
and
elsewhere.
See
§49.60.010 .et
seq.
Article
IX,
§1
of
the
State
Constitution specifically prohibits discrimination
in
public scho6ls: "It is the paramount duty of the state to
make ample provision for the education of all children
residing
within
its
borders without distinction or
preference on account of race, color, caste, or se~." The
State Supreme Court has not interpreted this section of
the State Constitution to prohibit race conscious school
assignments
in the absence of a
violation of the
Fourteenth Amendment.
Cf. Citizens Against Mandatory
Bussing v. Palmason, 80 Wash. 2d 445, 495 P. 2d 657
(1972). But until today's decision one would have thought
that the State Court could have rendered such a decision
without violating the Federal Constitution.
~
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But

liberty.
State.
of

today's

decision

denies

this

right

to

a

In this case, it deprives the State of Washington

all

opportunity

to

address

the

unresolved

questions resulting from extensive mandatory busing.

The

Constitution does not dictate to the States at what level
of government decisions qffecting the public schools must
be taken.

It certainly does not strip the States of their

sovereignty.

It

therefore

does

not

authorize

today's

intrusion into the State's internal structure. 15

15 As a former school board member for many years, I
/\accept the privilege of a dissenting Justice to add a
personal note.
In my view, the local school board-responsible to the people of the district it serves--is
the best qualified agency of a State government to make
decisions affecting education within its district.
As a
policy matter, I would not favor reversal of the Seattle
Board's decision to experiment with a mandatory busing
program, despite my own doubts as to the educational or
social merit of such a program. See Estes v. Metropolitan
Branches of the Dallas NAACP, 444 u.s. 437, 438-458
(Powell, J., ---aissenting).
But this case presents a
question, not of educational policy or even the merits of
busing for racial balance.
The question is one of a
State's sovereign authority to structure and regulate its
own subordinate bodies.
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I

I

JUSTICE POWELL, dissenting.
The people of the State of Washington, by a two to one
vote, have adopted a neighborhood school policy. The policy
is binding on local school districts but in no way affects the
authority of state or federal courts to order school transportation to remedy violations of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Nor does the policy affect the power of local school districts
to establish voluntary transfer programs for racial integration or for any other purpose.
In the absence of a constitutional violation, no decision of
this Court compels a school district to adopt or maintain a
mandatory busing program for racial integration. 1 Accordingly, the Court does not hold that the adoption of a neighborhood school policy by local school districts would be unconstitutional. Rather, it holds that the adoption of such a
policy at the State level-rather than at the local level-violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.
I dissent from the Court's unprecedented intrusion into the
structure of a state government. The School Districts in
Throughout this dissent, I use the term "mandatory busing" to refer to
busing-or mandatory student reassignments-for the purpose of achieving racial integration.
1

I

/

;.
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this case were under no Federal Constitutional obligation to
adopt mandatory busing programs. The State of Washington, the governmental body ultimately responsible for the
provision of public education, has determined that certain
mandatory busing programs are detrimental to the education
of its children. "[T]he Fourteenth Amendment leaves the
States free to distribute the powers of government as they
will between their legislative and judicial branches."
Hughes v. Superior Court, 339 U. S. 460, 467 (1950).
In
my view, that Amendment leaves the States equally free to
decide matters of concern to the State at the State, rather
than local, level of government.
I
At the November, 1978, general election, the voters of the
State adopted Initiative 350 by a two to one majority. 2 The
Initiative sets forth a neighborhood school policy binding on
local school districts. It establishes a general rule prohibiting school districts from "directly or indirectly requir[ing]
any student to attend a school other than the school which is
geographically nearest or next nearest the student's place of
residence." Wash. Rev. Code§ 28A.26.010 (1981). The rule
may be avoided in individual instances only if the student requires special education; if there are health or safety hazards
between the student's residence and the nearest or next
nearest school; or if the nearby schools are overcrowded, unsafe, or lacking in physical facilities. Ibid.
The Initiative includes two significant limitations upon the
scope of its neighborhood school policy. It expressly provides that nothing in the Initiative shall "preclude the estab. lishment of schools offering specialized or enriched educa2
The Initiative passed by almost 66% of the statewide vote. In Seattle
the Initiative passed by over 61% of the vote. It failed in only two of Seattle's legislative districts-one predominantly black and one predominantly
white.
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tional programs which students may voluntarily choose to
attend, or of any other voluntary option offered to students."
§ 28A.26.050. Moreover, and critical to this case, the authority of state and federal courts to order mandatory school
assignments to remedy constitutional violations is left untouched by the Initiative: "This chapter shall not prevent any
court of competent jurisdiction from adjudicating constitutional issues relating to the public schools." § 28A.26. 060. 3
This suit was filed in United States District Court shortly
after the Initiative was enacted. The Seattle School District, joined by the Tacoma and Pasco School Districts4 and
certain individual plaintiffs, argued that the Initiative violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The District Court agreed, and, in a split decision,
the Court of Appeals affirmed. Relying on Hunter v.
Erickson, 393 U. S. 385 (1969), the Court of Appeals concluded that Initiative 350 "both creates a constitutionally-suspect racial classification and radically restructures the political process of Washington by allowing a state-wide majority
to usurp traditional local authority over local school board
educational policies." 633 F. 2d, at 1344. 5
' Unlike the constitutional amendment at issue in Crawford v. Los Angeles Ed. of Ed., - - U. S. - - (1982), Initiative 350 places no limits on
the State courts in their interpretation of the State Constitution. Thus, if
mandatory school assignments were required by the State Constitutionalthough not by the Fourteenth Amendment of the Federal ConstitutionInitiative 350 would not hinder a State from enforcing its Constitution.
'Tacoma School District No. 10 and Pasco School District No. 1 are the
only other school districts in Washington with extensive integration programs. Pasco has relied upon school closings and mandatory busing to
achieve racial integration in its schools. Only minority children are bused
under the Pasco plan. 473 F. Supp., at 1002. In addition to school closings, the Tacoma integration plan relies upon voluntary techniques-magnet schools and voluntary transfers.
5
Judge Wright dissented. In his view Initiative 350 could not be said
to embody a racial classification. The Initiative does not classify individuals on the basis of their race. It simply deals with a matter bearing on
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II
The principles that should guide us in reviewing the constitutionality of Initiative 350 are well established. To begin
with, we have never held, or even intimated, that absent a
federal constitutional violation, a State must choose to treat
persons differently on the basis of race. In the absence of a
federal constitutional violation requiring race-specific remedies, a policy of strict racial neutrality by a State would violate no federal constitutional principle. Cf. University of
California Regents v. Bakke, 438 U. S. 265 (1978).
In particular, a neighborhood school policy and a decision
not to assign students on the basis of their race, does not offend the Fourteenth Amendment. 6 The Court has never

I

race relations. Moreover, no racial classification is created because the
citizens of a State favor mandatory school reassignments for some purposes but not for reasons of race. The benefits and problems associated
with busing for one reason-e. g. for racial integration-are not the same
as for another-e. g. to avoid safety hazards. Finally, Judge Wright could
not understand how the exercise of authority by the State could create a
racial classification. The State had not intervened by altering the legislative process in a way that burdened racial minorities. Charged by the
State Constitution with the responsibility for the provision of public education, the State had simply exercised its authority to run its own school
system.
Judge Wright also addressed the District Court's alternative holdings
that Initiative 350 is overbroad or that it was motivated by discriminatory
intent. He found no basis for either conclusion. These alternative holdings were not addressed by the Court of Appeals majority. Nor are they
relied upon by the Court today. Accordingly, they are not discussed in
this dissent.
6
See Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Ed. of Ed. , 402 U.S. 1, 28
(1971) ("Absent a constitutional violation there would be no basis for judicially ordering assignment of students on racial basis. All things being
equal, with no history of discrimination, it might well be desirable to assign
pupils to schools nearest their homes.").
Indeed, in the absence of a finding of segregation by the School District,
mandatory busing on the basis of race raises constitutional difficulties of its
own. Extensive pupil transportation may threaten liberty or privacy in-
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held that there is an affirmative duty to integrate the schools
in the absence of a finding of unconstitutional segregation.
See Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education,
402 U. S. 1, 24 (1971); Dayton Board of Education v.
Brinkman, 433 U. S. 406, 417 (1977). Certainly there is no
constitutional duty to adopt mandatory busing in the absence
of such a violation. Indeed, even where desegregation is ordered because of a constitutional violation, the Court has
never held that racial balance itself is a constitutional requirement. I d. And even where there have been segregated
schools, once desegregation has been accomplished no further
constitutional duty exists upon school boards or States to
maintain integration. See Pasadena City Board of Education v. Spangler, 427 U. S. 424 (1976).
Moreover, it is a well established principle that the States
have "extraordinarily wide latitude . . . in creating various
types of political subdivisions and conferring authority upon
them." Holt Civic Club v. Tuscaloosa, 439 U. S. 60, 71
(1978). 7 The Constitution does not dictate to the States a
terests. See University of California Board of Regents v. Bakke, 438
U. S. 265, 300 n. 39 (opinion of POWELL, J.); Keyes v. School District No.
1, 413 U. S. 189, 240-250 (1973) (POWELL, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Moreover, when a State or school board assigns students
on the basis of their race, it acts on the basis of a racial classification, and
we have consistently held that "[a] racial classification, regardless of purported motivation is presumptively invalid and can be upheld only upon an
extraordinary justification." Personnel Administrator of Massachusetts
v. Feeney, 442 U. S. 256, 272 (1979).
' "[A]ccording to the institutions of this country, the sovereignty in
every State resides in the people of the State, and ... they may alter and
change their form of government at their own pleasure." Luther v. Borden, 7 How. 1, 47 (1849). See Community Communications Co. v.
Boulder,-- U. S. - - , - - (1982); Sailors v. Board of Education, 387
U. S. 105, 109 (1967) ("Save and unless the state, county, or municipal government runs afoul of a federally protected right, it has vast leeway in the
management of its internal affairs"); United States v. Kagama, 118 U. S.
375, 379 (1886) (under the Constitution, sovereign authority resides either
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particular division of authority between legislature and judiciary or between state and local governing bodies. It does
not define institutions of local government.
Thus, a State may choose to run its schools from the state
legislature or through local school boards just as it may
choose to address the matter of race relations at the State or
local level. There is no constitutional requirement that the
State establish or maintain local institutions of government
or that it delegate particular powers to these bodies. The
only relevant constitutional limitation on a State's freedom to
order its political institutions is that it may not do so in a
fashion designed to "[place] special burdens on racial minorities within the governmental process."
Hunter v.
Erickson, supra, at 391 (emphasis added).
.
In sum, in the absence of a prior constitutional violation,
the States are under no constitutional duty to adopt integration programs in their schools, and certainly they are under
no duty to establish a regime of mandatory busing. Nor
does the Federal Constitution require that particular decisions concerning the schools or any other matter be made on
the local as opposed to the State level. It does not require
the States to establish local governmental bodies or to delegate unreviewable authority to them.

III
Application of these settled principles demonstrates the serious error of today's decision-an error that cuts deeply into
the heretofore unquestioned right of a state to structure the
decisionmaking authority of its government. In this case, by
Initiatve 350, the State has adopted a policy of racial neutrality in student assignments. The policy in no way interferes
with the power of State or Federal Courts to remedy constitutional violations. And if such a policy had been adopted
with the States or the Federal government, and "[t]here exist ... but
these two").
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by any of the school districts in this litigation there could
have been no question that the policy was constitutional. 8
The issue here arises only because the Seattle School District-in the absence of a then established State policychose to adopt race specific school assignments with extensive busing. It is not questioned that the District itself, at
any time thereafter, could have changed its mind and cancelled its integration program without violating the Federal
Constitution. Yet this Court holds that neither the legislature or the people of the State of Washington could alter
what the District had decided.
The Court argues that the people of Washington by Initiative 350 created a racial classification, and yet must agree
that identical action by the Seattle School District itself
would have created no such classification. This is not an
easy argument to answer because it seems to make no sense.
School boards are the creation of supreme State authority,
whether in a State Constitution or by legislative enactment.
Until today's decision no one would have questioned the authority of a State to abolish school boards altogether, or to
require that they conform to any lawful State policy. And in
the State of Washington, a neighborhood school policy would
have been lawful.
Under today's decision this heretofore undoubted supreme
authority of a State's electorate is to be curtailed whenever a
school board-or indeed any other state board or local instrumentality-adopts a race specific program that arguably
benefits racial minorities. Once such a program is adopted,
only the local or subordinate entity that approved it will have
authority to change it. The Court offers no authority or relevant explanation for this extraordinary subordination of the
8
The Court consistently has held "that the Equal Protection Clause is
not violated by the mere repeal of race related legislation or policies that
were not required by the Federal Constitution in the first place."
Crawford v. Los Angeles Bd. of Ed., supra, a t -.

/
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ultimate sovereign power of a State to act with respect to racial matters by subordinate bodies. It is a strange notionalien to our system-that local governmental bodies can forever preempt the ability of a State-the sovereign power-to
address a matter of compelling concern to the State. The
Constitution of the United States does not require such a bizarre result.
This is certainly not a case where a State-in moving to
change a locally adopted policy-has established a racially
discriminatory requirement. Initiative 350 does not impede
enforcement of the Fourteenth Amendment. If a Washington school district should be found to have established a segregated school system, Initiative 350 will place no barrier in
the way of a remedial busing order. Nor does Initiative 350
authorize or approve segregation in any form or degree. It
is neutral on its face, and racially neutral as public policy.
Children of all races benefit from neighborhood schooling,
just as children of all races benefit from exposure to "ethnic
and racial diversity in the classroom." Ante, at--, quoting Columbus Board of Education v. Penick, 443 U. S. 449,
486 (1979) (POWELL, J., dissenting). 9
Finally, Initiative 350 places no "special burdens on racial
minorities within the governmental process," Hunter v.
Erickson, supra, at 391, such that interference with the
State's distribution of authority is justified. Initiative 350 is
9

The policies in support of neighborhood schooling are various but all of
them are racially neutral. The people of the State legitimately could decide that unlimited mandatory busing places too great a burden on the liberty and privacy interests of families and students of all races. It might
decide that the reassignment of students to distant schools, on the basis of
race, was too great a departure from the ideal of racial neutrality in State
action. And , in light of the experience with mandatory busing in other
cities, the State might conclude that such a program ultimately would lead
to greater racial imbalance in the schools. See Estes v. Metropolitan
Branches of the Dallas NAACP, 444 U. S. 437, 451 (1980) (POWELL, J.,
dissenting).
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simply a reflection of the State's political process at work. It
does not alter that process in any respect. It does not require, for example, that all matters dealing with race-or
with integration in the schools-must henceforth be submitted to a referendum of the people. Cf. Hunter v. Erickson,
supra. The State has done no more than precisely what the
Court has said that it should do: It has "resolved through
the political process" the "desirability and efficacy of [mandatory] school desegregation" where there has been no unlawful
segregation. Ante, at--.
The political process in Washington, as in other States,
permits persons who are dissatisfied at a local level to appeal
to the State legislature or the people of the State for redress.
It permits the people of a State to preempt local policies, and
to formulate new programs and regulations. Such a process
is inherent in the continued sovereignty of the States. This
is our system. Any time a State chooses to address a major
issue some persons or groups may be disadvantaged. In a
democratic system there are winners and losers. But there
is no inherent unfairness in this and certainly no Constitutional violation. 10
IV
Nonetheless, the Court holds that Initiative 350 "imposes
substantial and unique burdens on racial minorities" in the
governmental process. See ante, at--. Its authority for
this holding is said to be Hunter v. Erickson, supra. 11 In
Cf. James v. Valtierra, 402 U.S. 137, 142 (1971) ("[O]f course a lawmaking procedure that 'disadvantages' a particular group does not always
deny equal protection. Under any such holding, presumably a State
would not be able to require referendums on any subject unless referendums were required on all, because they would always disadvantage some
group. And this Court would be required to analyze governmental structures to determine whether a gubernatorial veto provision or a filibuster
rule is likely to 'disadvantage' any of the diverse an shifting groups that
make up the American people.").
11
The Court also relies at certain critical points in its discussion on the
10
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Hunter the people of Akron passed a charter amendment

that "not only suspended the operation of the existing ordinance forbidding housing discrimination, but also required
the approval of the electors before any future [anti-discrimination] ordinance could take effect." 393 U. S., at
389-390. Although the charter amendment was facially neutral, the Court found that it could be said to embody a racial
classification: "[T]he reality is that the law's impact falls on
the minority. The majority needs no protection against discrimination." ld., at 391. By making it more difficult to
pass legislation in favor of racial minorities, the amendment
placed "special burdens on racial minorities within the governmental process." Ibid.
Nothing in Hunter supports the Court's extraordinary invasion into the State's distribution of authority. Even could
it be assumed that Initiative 350 imposed a burden on racial
minorities, 12 it simply does not place unique political obstacles
in the way of racial minorities. In this case, unlike in
Hunter, the political system has not been redrawn or altered.
The authority of the State over the public school system, actsummary affirmance in Lee v. Nyquist, 318 F. Supp. 710 (WDNY 1970),
summarily affd, 402 U. S. 935 (1971). As we have often noted, however,
summary affirmances by this Court are of little precedential force. See
Metromedia, Inc. v. San Diego, 453 U. S. 490, 500 (1981). A summary
affirmance "is not to be read as an adoption of the reasoning supporting the
judgment under review." Zobel v. Williams,-- U.S.--,-- n. 13
(1982).
2
' It is far from clear that in the absence of a constitutional violation,
mandatory busing necessarily benefits racial minorities or that it is even
viewed with favor by racial minorities. See Crawford v. Board of Education of the City of Los Angeles,- U . S . - , - n. 32 (1982). As the
Court indicates, the busing question is complex and is best resolved by the
political process. Ante, at - - .
Moreover, it is significant that Initiative 350 places no limits on voluntary programs or on court ordered reassignments. It permits school districts to order school closings for purposes of racial balance. § 28A.26. 030.
And it permits school districts to order a student to attend the "next
nearest"-rather than nearest-school to promote racial integration.
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ing through Initiative or the legislature, is plenary. Thus,
the State's political system is not altered when it adopts for
the first time a policy, concededly within the area of its authority, for the regulation of local school districts. And certainly racial minorities are not uniquely or comparatively
burdened by the State's adoption of a policy that would be
lawful if adopted by any School District in the State.
Hunter, therefore, is simply irrelevant. It is the Court
that by its decision today disrupts the normal course of State
government. 13 Under its unprecedented theory of a vested
constitutional right to local decisionmaking, the State apparently is now f~rever ~arr~d from addressing the perplexing
problems of how best to educate fairly all children in a multiracial society where, as in this case, the local school board has
acted first. 14
The Court's decision intrudes deeply into normal State
decisionmaking. Under its holding the people of the State of Washington
apparently are forever barred from developing a different policy on mandatory busing wherea~District previously has adopted one of its own.
This principle would not seem limited to the question of mandatory busing.
Thus, if the admissions committee of a State law school developed an affirmative action plan that came under fire, the Court apparently would find it
unconstitutional for any higher authority to intervene unless that authority
traditionally dictated admissions policies. As a constitutional matter, the
Dean of the Law School, the faculty of the University as a whole, the University President, the Chancellor of the University System, and the Board
of Regents might be powerless to intervene despite their greater authority
under State law.
After today's decision it is unclear whether the State may set policy in
any area of race relations where a local governmental body arguably has
done "more" than the Fourteenth Amendment requires. If local employment or benefits are distributed on a racial basis to the benefit of racial
minorities, the State apparently may not thereafter ever intervene. Indeed, under the Court's theory one must wonder whether-under the
Equal Protection component of the Fifth Amendment-even the Federal
Government could assert its superior authority to regulate in these areas.
14
Even accepting the dubious notion that a State must demonstrate
some past control over public schooling or race relations before now intervening in these matters, ante, at 19, the Court's attempt to demonstrate
13

I
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We are not asked to decide the wisdom of a State policy
that limits the ability of local school districts to adopt-on
their own volition-mandatory reassignments for racial balance. We must decide only whether the Federal Constitution permits the State to adopt such a policy. The School
Districts in this case were under no federal constitutional obligation to adopt mandatory busing. 'Absent such an obligation, the State-exercising its sovereign authority over all
subordinate agencies-should be free to reject this debatable
restriction on liberty. But today's decision denies this right
to a State. In this case, it deprives the State of Washington
of all opportunity to address the unresolved questions resulting from extensive mandatory busing. The Constitution
does not dictate to the States at what level of government dethat Initiative 350 represents a unique thrust by the State into these areas
is unpersuasive. The Court's own discussion indicates the comprehensive
character of the State's activity. The Common School Provisions of the
State's Code of Laws are nearly 200 pages long, governing a broad variety
of school matters. The State has taken seriously its constitutional obligation to provide public education. See Art. IX, § 2; Seattle School District
v. State, 90 Wash. 2d 476, 518, 585 P. 2d 71, 95 (1978). In light of the wide
range of regulation of the public schools by the State, it is wholly unclear
what degree of prior concern or control by the State would satisfy the
Court's new doctrine.
In addition to public school affairs generally, the State has taken a direct
interest in ending racial discrimination in the schools and elsewhere. See
§ 49.60.010 et seq. Article IX, § 1 of the State Constitution specifically prohibits discrimination in public schools: "It is the paramount duty of the
state to make ample provision for the education of all children residing
within its borders without distinction or preference on account of race,
color, caste, or sex." The State Supreme Court has not interpreted this
section of the State Constitution to prohibit race conscious school assignments in the absence of a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. Cf.
Citizens Against Mandatory Bussing v. Palmason, 80 Wash. 2d 445, 495
P. 2d 657 (1972). But until today's decision one would have thought that the
State Court could have rendered such a decision without violating the Federal Constitution.
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cisions affecting the public schools must be taken. It certainly does not strip the States of their sovereignty. It
therefore does not authorize today's intrusion into the State's
internal structure. 15

" As a former school board member for many years , I accept the privilege of a dissenting Justice to add a personal note. In my view, the local
school board-responsible to the people of the district it serves-is the
best qualified agency of a State government to make decisions affecting
education within its district. As a policy matter, I would not favor reversal of the Seattle Board's decision to experiment with a reasonable mandatory busing program, despite my own doubts as to the educational or social
merit of such a program. See Estes v. Metropolitan Branches of the Dallas NAACP, 444 U. S. 437, 438-458 (POWELL, J., dissenting). But this
case presents a question, not of educational policy or even the merits of
busing for racial integration. The question is one of a State's sovereign
authority to structure and regulate its own subordinate bodies.

,.

~up-rtmt

<!Jour! of tlp~ 'Jlnitdr .$)httts-

2Jllu.s J:rin-gfon, ~.

C!J. 20 ~)!. .;l
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June 21, 1982

JUSTICE HARRY A. BLACKtvtUN

MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE
Re: No. 81-9 - Washington v . Seattle School Dist. No. 1
In response to Lewis' dissent, now in print, I shall
the following changes in the Court's opinion:

make

1. Footnote 17 on page 17 will be revised to read:
ul 7 JUSTICE
POWELL
finds
Hunter
completely
irrelevant, dismissing it with the conclusory statement
that 'the political system [of Washington] has not been
redrawn or altered. '
Post, at 10 (emphasis in original ) .
But the dissent entirely fails to address the relevance
of Hunter to the reallocation of decisionmaking authority
worked by Initiative 350 .
The evil condemned by the
Hunter Court was not the particular political obstacle of
mandatory
referenda
imposed
by
the Akron charter
amendment; it was, rather, the comparative structural
burden placed on the political achievement of minority
interests.
Thus, in Hunter, the procedures for enacting
racial legislation were modified in such a way as to
place effective control in the hands of the city-wide
electorate.
Similarly here, the power to enact racial
legislation has been reallocated .
In each case , the
effect
of
the
challenged
action
was
to
redraw
decisionmaking authority over racial matters -- and only
over racial matters
in such a way as to place
comparative burdens on minorities .
While JUSTICE POWELL
and the United States find it crucial that the _proponents
of integrated schools remain free to use Washington's
initiative system to further their ends, that was true in
Hunter as well: proponents of open housing were not
barred from invoking Akron's initiative procedures to
repeal the charter amendment, or to enact fair housing
legislation of their own .
It surely is an excessively
formal exercise, then, to argue that the procedural
revisions at issue in Hunter imposed special burdens on
minorities,
but
that
the
selective allocation of
decisionmaking authority worked by Initiative 350 does
not erect comparable political obstacles.
Indeed , Hunter
would have been virtually identical to this case had the
Akron charter amendment simply barred the city council
from passing any fair housing ordinance , as Initiative
350
forbids
the
use of virtually
all mandatory
desegregation strategies .
Surely , however, Hunter would
not have come out the other way had the charter amendment

t

Page 2.

made no provision for the passage of
legislation, instead of subjecting such
ratification by referendum.

fair housing
legislation to

''The United States also would note that Initiative
350's 'modification of state policy [was] not the result
of any unusual political procedure,' Brief for the United
States 30, for initiatives and referenda are often used
by the Washington electorate .
But that observation
hardly serves to distinguish this case from Hunter, since
the fair housing charter amendment was added through the
unexceptional use of Akron's initiative procedure.
See
393 u.s., at 387."
2. At the end of the penultimate sentence of the full
paragraph on page 18, following "393," I shall drop a footnote
(new 18) reading as follows :
18 nespite the force with which it is written, then,
JUSTICE POWELL's essay on 'the heretofore unquestioned
right of a State to structure the decisionmaking
authority of its government,' post , at 6 -- as well as
his observations on a State's right to repeal programs
designed to eliminate de facto se rega ~~ on -- is largely
beside the point .
The State's
ower has not_ been
questioned at any point during this lit'igation.
The
s ~ arrow uest 'on before us is whether the State has
" exer c 1 ~ed i s pow§!r in such a way as to p fa ce special ,
and
therefore
imperm~ burdens
on
minority
interests ."
n

,q~
Nyquist, ~
?

3. On page 22, following the citation of Lee v.
in the fifth line, I shall add the following footnote
numbered 23) :

(to

be ~·

23 Throughout his dissent, JUSTICE POWELL insists
that the Court has created a 'v ested constitutional right
to local decisionmaking,' post, at 11, that under our
holding 'the people of the State of Washington apparently
are forever barred from developing a different policy on
mandatory busing where a School District previously has
adopted one of its own,' id., at 11, n.l3, and that
today's decision somehow -raises doubts abou t
'the
authority
of
a
State
to
abolish
school
boards
altogether.' ~' at 11.
See also id., at 8, and at 11,
n.l4. These statements evidence a basic misunderstanding
of our decision.
Our analys.i_s vests no r jg hts, and has J
nothing to do with wheth er sc hOo l Soa ra action predates
that taken by the State.
Instead, what we find
o~~ ectt3~ ab l~ about Initiative 350 is the comparative t:::;::bu den 1t imposes on minority participation in the
n

Page 3.

17

political process -- that is, the racial nature of the
way in which it structures the process of dec1sionmaking.
It is evident, then, that the horribles paraded by the
dissent, post, at 11, n.l3 -- which have nothing to do
with the ability of minorities to participate in the
process of self-government -- are entirely unrelated to
this case.
It is equally clear, as we have noted at
several points in our opinion, that the State remains }
free to vest all decisionmaking power in state officials,
or to remove authority from local school boards in a
race-neutral manner."

4. On page 26, I shall modify the final sentence of the
full paragraph to read:
"And legislation of the kind challenged in Hunter
similarly falls into an inherently suspect category."
5. On page 27, following the second full sentence after
the words 11 based on race, 11 I shall add a footnote (to be
numbered 29) reading as follows:
29 Thus we do not hold, as the dissent implies,
post, at 7, that the State's attempt to repeal a
desegregation program creates a racial classification,
while 'identical action' by the Seattle School Board does
not.
It is the State's race-conscious restructuring of
its decisionmaking process that is impermissible, not the
simple repeal of the Seattle Plan. 11
u

Other footnotes would be renumbered accordingly.
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JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST

June 21, 1982
Re:

No. 81-9

Washington v. Seattle School Dist. #1

Dear Lewis:
Please join me in your dissent.
Sincerely,

Justice Powell
cc:

The Conference

June 23, 1982

81-9 Washington v. Seattle School District

Dear Harry:
In view of the additions made in your opinion for
the Court, I will add - in response - the two notes I now
circulate.
Sincerely,

~.rust ice

Blackmun

lfp/ss
cc:

The Conference
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CHAMBERS OF

JUSTICE LEWIS F. POWELL,JR .

June 23, 1982

81-9 Washington v. Seattle School District

Dear Harry:
In view of the additions made in your opinion for
the Court, I will add - in response - the two notes I now
circulate.
Sincerely,

Justice Blackmun
lfp/ss
cc:

The Conference

The following two footnotes will be added to my
dissenting
opinion
in Washington
v.
Seattle School
District No. 1--81-9.

Add as new footnote 13 at page 11:
The Court repeatedly states that the effect of
Initiative 350 is "to redraw decisionmaking authority over
racial mmaters--and only over racial matters--in such a
way as to place comparative burdens on minorities." Ante,
at ___ , n. 17 (emphasis added).
But the decision by th~
State to exercise its authority over the schools and over
racial matters in the schools does not place a comparative
burden on racial minorities.
In Hunter, as we have
understood it, "fair housing legislation alone was subject
to an automatic referendum requirement." Gordon v. Lance,
403 u.s. 1, 5 (1971)
(emphasis added).
By contrast,
Initiative 350 merely places mandatory busing among the
much larger group of matters--covering race relations,
administration of the schools, and a variety of other
matters- - addressed at the State level.
See note
,
infra.
Racial minorities, if indeed they are burdened by
Initiative 350, are not comparatively burdened.
In this
respect, they are in the same position as any other group
of persons who are disadvantaged by regulations drawn at
the State level.
Add at page 12, as a new footnote 15:
15.
Responding to this dissent, the Court
denies that its opinion limits the authority of the people
of the State of washington and the~egislature to control
or regulate school boards.
It fu}her states that "the
State remains free to vest all decisionmaking power in
state officials, or to remove authority from local school
boards in a race-neutral manner."
Ante, at
, n. 23.
These are puzzling statements that seem entirely at odds
with much of the text of the Court's opinion.
It will be
surprising if officials of the State of Washington--with
the one exception mentioned below--will have any clear
idea as to what the State now lawfully may do.
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The Court does say that "[i]t is the State's
race-conscious restructuring of its decisionmaking process
that is impermissible, not the simple repeal of the
Seattle plan". Ante, at
, n. 29. Apparently the Court
is saying that, despite-what else may be said in its
3Pinion,
the
people
of
the
State--or
the
State
aegislature--may repeal the Seattle plan, even though
neither
the people nor
the legislature validly may
prescribe statewide standards.
I perceive no logic in-and certainly no constitutional basis for--a distinction
between repealing the Seattle plan of mandatory busing and
establishing a statewide policy to the same effect.
The
people of a State have far greater interest in the general
problems associated with compelled busing for purpose of
integration than in the plan of a single school board .
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June 24, 1982

JUSTICE HARRY A. BLACKMUN

Re: No. 81-9 Washington v. Seattle School District No. 1
Dear Lewis:
I shall have no further response to your footnote addition in this case. Therefore, it is ready to come down with
Crawford.
Sincerely,

Justice Powell
cc: The Chief Justice
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dfl 03/23/82
To: Justice Powell
From: David
Re: The Busing Cases:

I

Nos. 81-9; 81-38

have thought a

bit more about these cases after

our discussion of yesterday.

The Washington case is the more

difficult of the two--because of Hunter v. Erikson.

Even so,

I think Hunter can be readily distinguished for two reasons:

I.

By

contrast

to

Hunter,

the

busing

limitation

imposes no special burden on a minority.

The
fair-housing

essential

point

legislation,

is

minority students.

here
not

is

that

necessarily

busing,

unlike

beneficial

to

In the case of de jure segregation busing

may be needed to remove the stigma of official discrimination.
Even here your opinions have noted the risks posed by busing
to desegregation itself as well as to other goals.
the

context

of

de

jure

segregation,

the

dangers

Outside
posed

by

busing would seem even more pressing because not balanced by
the desire
have

noted

to
it

remove
is

the
not

taint of official action.
always

clear

busing/integration cases seek to protect.
been

a

fourteenth

amendment

violation,

what

As you

interest

the

When there has not
mandatory

busing

2.

presumably

seeks

integration.

to

expose

students

to

the

benefits

of

But these benefits are open to black and white

alike.

A

decision

"hurts"

blacks

and

to

cease

whites

busing

in

both--both

benefits of integrated education.

this

are

circumstance

deprived

of

the

Similarly, both are helped

by being assigned to closer schools.

II.

By

contrast

to

Hunter,

there

has

been

no

radical restructuring of the political process.

In at least three ways the Washingto Initiative does
not appear

to have placed any unusual obstacle in the way of

minority groups.

First,

well

mode

established

process was

not

the
of

altered

Initiative process

legislation

in

in

is

itself a

Washington.

The

it was merely used.

this case;

Second, the state retains a certain amount of control over the
operation of the schools.
that

most

school

It appears from the state's brief

decisions

are

made

at

the

state

level.

Third, I would assume that many decisions pertaining to racial
matters are made at the state level.

Finally, there has been

no change in procedure akin to the Hunter situation.

I

think

that

James

v.

Valtierra,

(1971), has some bearing on this argument.

402

u.s.

137

That case involved

Article XXXIV of the state constitution which provided that no
low-rent housing project could be developed by a state public

3.

body until

the

project was

approved

A 3-judge court found

voting at a community e lee t ion.
the

Article

principle.
the

violated

Article

only

was

for

minority."
the

14th

Amendment

This Court reversed.
racially

referendum approval
not

the

for

on

the

that

Hunter

The Court found first

neutral:

"The

Article

that

requires

any low-rent public housing project,

projects

Second,

by a majority of those

which

will

be

occupied

by

a

racial

"California's entire history demonstrates

repeated use of referendums to give citizens a voice on

questions

of

public

policy .••.

A lawmaking

procedure

that

'disadvantages' a particular group does not always deny equal
protection."
reveals
been
group

Finally,

"an

examination

that persons advocating

singled
must

reequired

out
face

for

of

California

low- income housing

have not
no

for

mandatory

referendums

that

obstacle.

Mandatory

approval

of

state

law

while

other

referendums

constitutional

are

amendments"

etc.

I suppose it can be argued that the Washington plan
does

not

fall

neutral."

But

Initiative

of de

I

this

Valtierra

think

may--in

integration,
neutral."

under

it

because

can

be

said

effect--prohibit

does

not

mean

it

that

is
that

busing
it

is

not

"racially

although
for
not

the

racial
"racially

The benefits and burdens of busing in the setting

facto

segregation presumably fall equally upon blacks

and whites alike.

4.

There seems to be a continuum of governmental action
from Hunter to Valtierra.

I think that this Initiative is on

the Valtierra side of the line.

.
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Despite these efforts, the District in 1977 came under increa ·ng pressure/to accelerate its program Of desegregatio . 2 n response, the District's Board of Directors (School
Board) enacted a resolution defining "racial imbalance" as
"the situation that exists when the combined minority student enrollment in a school exceeds the districtwide combined average by 20 percentage points, provided that the singl~t . . .
of no school will excee 50
percent of the student body." 473
upp. 96, 1006 (WD
Wash.1979). The District resolved to eliminate all such imbalance from the Seattle public schools by the beginning of
the 1979-1980 academic year. 'l
In September 1977, the District implemented a "magnet"
program, designed to alleviate racial isolation by enhancing
educational offerings at certain schools, thereby encouraging
voluntary student transfers. A "disproportionate amount of
the overall movement" inspired by the program was undertaken by Negro students, however, id., at 1006, and racial
imbalance in the Seattle schools was found to have actually
increased between the 1970-1971 and 1977-1978 academic
years. The District therefore concluded that mandatory re-

-

1979).
' Sewral community organizations threatened legal action if the District
did not initiate a more effectiYe integration effort, while the Mayor of Seattle and a number of community leaders, by letter dated May 20, 1977,
urged the District to adopt "a definition of racial isolation and measurable
goals leading to the elimination of racial isolation in the Seattle Public
Schools prior to a Court ordered and mandated desegregation remedy."
App. 139.
' The District Court found that the actions of the School Board were
prompted by its members' "desire~·~ off threatened litigatio;1, their
desire to preYent the threatene loss of federal funds, their desire to relieve the black students of the disproportionate burden which they had
borne in the voluntar~· efforts to balance the schools racially and their perception that racial balance in the schools promotes the attainment of equal
educational opp01tunity and is beneficial in the preparation of all students
for democratic citizenship regardless of their race." 473 F . Supp., at 1007.
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assignment of students was necessary if racial isolation in its
h 1978,
schools was to be eliminated. Accordingly, in
the School Board enacted the so-calle<("Seattle Plan for desegregation. The plan, which makes eXtensive use of busing
and mandatory reassignments, desegT~tes---elemeirtary
schools by "pairing" and "triading" predominantly minority
·with predominantly white attendance areas, and by basing
student assignments on attendance zones rather than on
race. The racial makeup of secondary schools is moderated
by "feeding" them from the desegregated elementary
schools. App. 142-143. The District represents that the
plan results in the reassignment of roughly equal numbers of
white and minority students, and allows most students to
spend roughly half of their academic careers attending a
school near their homes. Brief for Appellee Seattle School
District 5.
The desegregation program, implemented in the 1978-1979
academic year, apparently was effective: the District Court
found that the Seattle Plan "has substantially reduced the
number of racially imbalanced schools in the district and has
substantially reduced the percentage of minority students in
those schools which remain racially imbalanced." 473 F.
Supp., at 1007.
B
In late 1977, shortly before the Seattle Plan was formally
adopted by the District, a number of Seattle residents who
opposed the desegregation strategies being discussed by the
School Board formed an organization called the Citizens for ~~
Voluntary Integration Committee (CiVIC). This organiza- _ C I l L
tion, which the District Court found "was formed because of
..1 ~- _ . ,. n 1:\ .its founders' opposition to The Seattle Plan," 473 F. upp., at
101J , a empte
o e 1Jom 1mplemen ation of the Board's r'~" A>V
mandatory desegregation program though litigation in state ~ ~
court; when these efforts failed, CiVIC drafted a statewide ~ ~~
initiative designed to terminate the use of mandatory busing k
'5 ~~

V

f7~
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for purposes of racial integration.~ This proposal, known as
Initiative 350, provided that "no school board ... shall directly or indirectly require any student to attend a school
other than the school which is geographically nearest or next
nearest the student's place of residence ... and which offers
the course of study pursued by such student. ... " See
Wash. Rev. Code § 28A.26.010 (1981). 5 The initiative then
set out, however, a number of broad exceptions to this requireme~
t: tudent ~ 6eyonCI his neighborhood sc
\ . he "reqmres special education, care or . guid"there are health or safety hazards, either natural
ance ," 0
or man made, or physical barriers or obstacles ... between
the student's pl~~ of residence and the nearest or next
nearest school," (OP'if "the school nearest or next nearest to
his place of residence is unfit or inadequate because of overcrowding, unsafe conditions or lack of physical facilities."
See i ~~d. Initiative 350 also speci~call:y _proscrib~d use of
t.Ls:ven epumerated ~ods of_"ind~t]" s~ssign
ment-among them the redefinition of attendance zones, the
pamng of schools, and the use of "feeder" schools-that are a
part of the Seattle Plan. See § 28A.26.030. The initiative
envisioned busing for racial purposes in only one circumstance: it did not purport to "prevent any court of competent
juris<!ictjq_n from adJucticafl'n constitUtiOnat"issue s· retatTn to
tTie pUblic schoo s.

___........_

'Washington's Constitution reserves to the people of the State "the
power to propose bills, laws, and to enact or reject the same at the polls,
independent of the legislature." Wash. Const. Art. II, ~ 1. Such initiatiYes are placed on the ballot upon the petition of 8'/C of the State's voters
registered and voting for goYernor at the last preceding regular gubernatorial election. § 1(a). If passed by the electorate, an initiative may not
be repealed by the state legislature for two years, although it may be
amended \\ithin two years by a \'Ote of two-thirds of each house of the legislature. § 41. See generally Comment, Judicial ReYiew of Laws Enacted by Popular Vote, 55 Wash. L. ReY. 175 (1979).
"The text of Initiative 350 is now codified as Wash. Rev. Code
~§ 28A.26.010--28A.26.900 (1981).

....___,,...__ _?'

81-9-0PINION
WASHINGTON r. SEATTLE SCHOOL DISTRICT NO.1

5

Its proponents placed Initiative 350 on the Washington ballot for the November 1978 general election. During the ensuing campaign, the District Court concluded, the leadership
..of CiVIC "acted legally and respon~bly," and did not address
"itsappeals fo the raciar61ases of the voters." 473 F. Supp.,
at ~i: the same 1ime, however, the court's findings
demonstrate that the initiative was directed SOiely ataesegregative busing in general, and at the Seattle Plan in particular. Thus, "[e]xcept for the assignment of students to effect
racial balancing, the drafters of Initiative 350 attempted to
preserve to school districts the maximum flexibility in the assignment of students," id., at 1008, and "[e]xcept for raciallybalancing purposes" the initiative "permits local school districts to assign students other than to their nearest or next
nearest schools for most, if not all, of the major reasons for
which students are at present assigned to schools other than
their nearest or next nearest schools." /d., at 1010. 6 In
campaigning for the measure, CiVIC officials accurately represented that its passage would result in "no loss of school
district flexibility other than in busing for desegregation purposes," id., at 1008, and it is evident that the campaign focused almost exclusively on the ·wisdom of "forced busing" for
integration. See id., at 1009.
On November 8, 1978, two months after the Seattle Plan
went into effect, Initiative 350 passed by a substantial margin, drawing almost 66Ck of the vote statewide. The
initative failed to attr~ct ~upport in two state le~
lative districts ;both in Seattle. n the City as a whole,
ever, the ·initiative passed with some 61 Ck of the vote.
Within the month, the District, together with the Tacoma
and Pasco school districts,~ initiated this suit against the

now-

• At the beginning of the 1978--1979 academic year, approximate]~·
300,000 of the 769,040 students enrolled in Washington's public schools
were bused to school. NinetY-fi\'e percent of these students were transported for reasons unrelareato race. 473 F."'S""upp., at 1002.
; Along with Seattle, Tacoma School District No. 10 and Pasco School
District No. 1 are the only districts in the State of Washington with com-

I
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State in United States District Court for the Western District of Washington, challenging the constitutionality of InitiatiYe 350 under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
The United States and several
community organizations intervened in support of the District ' ; CiVIC intervened on behalf of the defendants.
After a nine-day trial, the District Court made extensive
and detailed findings of fact. The court eter~d that
"[t]nose Seattle-SChools which are most crowded are located
in those areas of the city \\'here the preponderance of minority families live." 473 F. Supp., at 1001. Yet the court
found that Initiative 350, if implemented, "will prevent the
racial balancing of a significant number of Seattle schools and
will cause the school system to become more raciallv imbalap
than it presently is," "will rna e it 1mposs1b e or Tacoma sc~ their present racial balance," and
will make "doubtful'' the prospects for integratiOn of the
Pasco schools. !d. , at 1010: see id. , at 1001, 1011. Except
for desegrega!Jye ~ing, however, the court found. t~al
most all or t'hebusmg of students currently taking place in

-- _.......,__ ____ -

~==~

prehensiYe integration programs. and therefore the three are the only districts affected by Initiatiw 350. See 473 F. Supp., at 1009. Since 1965,
Pasco has made use of school closures and a mandatory busing program to
overcome the racial isolation caused b~· segregated housing patterns: if students attended the schools nem·est their homes, three of Pasco's seven elementary schools would haYe a primarily white and three a primarily minor1
it~· student body.
d., at 1002-1003. The Tacoma school district has
made use of schooi closures, racially controlled enrollment at magnet
schools, and \'oluntary transfers-though not mandatory busing-to enhance racial balance in its schools. ld., at 1003-1004.
' Several of the interYenor plaintiffs also alleged that the District had engaged in de jw·e segregation, and therefore was operating an unconstitutional dual school system. The District Court therefore bifurcated the litigation , first addressing the constitutionality of InitiatiYe 350. Because of
the court's conclusions on that question, the allegations of de jw·e segregation did not go to trial and haYe not been addressed by the District Court or
by the Court of Appeals.
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[Washington] is permitted bv Initiative 350." ld., at 1010.
And \\'hile the cour ound that racia 1as ... is a factor in
the opposition to the 'busing' of students to obtain racial balance," id., at 1001, it also f2fnd that voters ,ure.;noved to
support Initiative 3~0 for "a lm b r f e ons," so that "[i]t
is 1mposs1 le to ascertain al of those reasons [o]r to determine the relative impact of those reasons upon the electorate." ld ., at 1010.
The District Court then held Initiative 350 unconstitutional, for three in~ re~s ons. /.~he court first concluded that the initiative established :M-i{n ermissible racial
classification, in violation of Hunter v. Erickson, 393 . S.
. 1 ..JA385 (1969), and Lee v. Nyquist, 318 F. Supp. 710 (WDNY
Lyv ~
·~
1970) (three-judge court), summaril~' affd, 402 U. S. 935
) .W . _~
(1971), "because it permits busing for non-racial reasons but
~ :~
forbids it for racial rea~ ." 473 F. Supp., at 1012. The
-: .~ court next held Initiat~50 invalid because "a raciallJ wdis(,A-'.
criminatory _pu~ose was one of the factors which motivated
H the conception' ano adoption of the initi9-~e." !d., at 1013. ~
Finally, the District Court reasoned t~Initiative 350 was
unconstitutionally ove ·br d, because in the absence of a
. , v~
court or er 1t an·ed even school boards that had engaged in
1~
de .iure segregation from taking steps to foster integration.'"

-

r""'...:.

~

,

• The District Court acknowledged that it was impossible to determine
whether the supporters of InitiatiYe 350 "subjective!~· [had] a racially discriminatory intent or purpose," because "[a]s to that subjective intent the
secret ballot raises an impenetrable barrier." 473 F. Supp., at 1014. The
court looked instead to objective fa<:tors. noting that it "marked [a] departure from the norm ... for the autonom~· of school boards to be restricted
relatiYe to the assignment of students,'' and that it marked a similar "departure from the procedural norm" for "an administrative decision of a
subordinate local unit of government ... [to be] overridden in a statewide
initiative." !d., at 1016. These factors, when coupled with the "racially
disproportionate impact of the initiative," its "historical background," and
"the sequence of events leading to its adoption," were found to demonstrate that a "racially discriminatory intent or purpose was at least one
motivating factor in the adoption of the initiatiYe." Ibid .
'"The District Court noted that school boards that had practiced de jure
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I d., at 1016. The court permanently enjoined implementation of the initiative's restrictions.
On the merits, a divided panel of the United States Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed, relying entirely on
the District Court's first rationale. 633 F. 2d 1338 (1980). 11
By subjecting desegregative student assignments to unique
treatment, the Court of Appeals concluded, Initiative 350
"both creates a constitutionally-suspect racial classification
and radically restructures the political process of Washington
by allowing a state-wide majority to usurp traditional local
authority over local school board educational policies." 633
F. 2d, at 1344. In doing so, the court continued, the initiative "1·emove[ s} from local school boards their existing authority, and in large part their capability, to enact programs
designed to desegregate the schools." !d., at 1346 (emphasis
in original; citation omitted). The court found such a result
contrary to the principles of Hunter v. Erickson, supm, and
Lee v. y 1.s , tpm.
e cour ac now e ged that the
issue would be a different one had a successor school board
attempted to rescind the Seattle Plan. Here, however, "a
different governmental body-the state-wide electorate-rescinded a pohcy voluntadly enacted by locally elected school
boards already subject to local political control." 633 F. 2d,
at 1346. 12
segregation are under an affirmatiYe obligation to eliminate the effects of
that practice. 473 F. Supp., at 1016. See Columbus Board of Education
v. Penick, 443 U. S. 449, 458-459 (1979).
"The Court of Appeals therefore did not address the District Court's alternatiYe finding that InitiatiYe 350 had been adopted for discriminator~·
reasons, or its conclusion that the initiath·e was O\'erbroad. 633 F. 2d, at
1342.
2
' After the decision on the merits, the District Court had declined to
award attorney's fees to the plaintiff school districts because the districts
are state-funded entities. App. to Juris. Statement C-1. The Court of
Appeals reversed on this issue, concluding that the District Court had
abused its discretion in denying fees. The Court of Appeals determined
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The State appealed to this Court. We noted probable jurisdiction to address an issue of signifi~ our Nation's
system of education. - - U . S . - - (1981).
-

II

A
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees racial minorities the right to full participation in the political life of the community. It is beyond dispute, of course, that given racial or ethnic groups may not be
denied the franchise, or have the value of their vote intentionally diluted. See White v. Regester, 412 U. S. 755
(1973); Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U. S. 536 (1927). But the
Fourteenth Amendment also reaches "a political structure
that treats all individuals as equals," Mobile v. Bolden, 446
U. S. 55, 84 (1980) (STEVENS, J., concurring in the judgment), yet more subtly distorts governmental processes in
such a way as to__plac~ ecial burdens <!n the ability of minority groups to achieve beneficial legislation.
1his principle receive 1 s clearest expresion in Hunter v.
Erickson, supra, a case that involved attempts to overturn
antidiscrimination legislation in Akron, Ohio. The Akron
city council, pursuant to its ordinary legislative processes,
had enacted a fair housing ordinance. In response, the local
citizenry, using an established referendum procedure, see
393 U. S., at 390, and n. 6; 39~394, and n. - - (Harlan, J.,
concurring), amended the city charter to provide that ordinances regulating real estate transactions "on the basis of
race, color, religion, national origin or ancestry must first be
approved by a majority of the electors voting on the question
-~-

that the school districts fell within the language of the attorney's fees statutes, 42 U. S. C. § 1988 and 20 U. S. C. § 3205, seen. 28, iu.fra, and it reasoned that "(a]s long as a publicly-funded organization advances important
constitutional values, it is eligible for fees under the statutes." 633 F. 2d,
at 1348.

/~
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at a regular or general election before said ordinance shall be
effective." /d., at 387. This action "not only suspended the
operation of the existing ordinance forbidding housing discrimination, but also required the approval of the electors before any future [fair housing] ordinance could take effect."
I d., at 389-390. In essence, the amendment changed the requirements for the adoption of one type of local legislation: to
enact an ordinance barring housing discrimination on the
basis or race or religion, proponents had to obtain the approval of the city council and of a majority of the voters citywide. To enact an ordinance preventing housing discrimination on other grounds, or to enact any other type of housing
ordinance, proponents needed the support of only the city
council.
In striking down the charter amendment, the Hunter
Court recognized that, on its face, the provision "draws no
distinctions among racial and religious groups." 393 U. S.,
at 390. But it did differentiate "between those groups who
sought the law's protection against racial ... discriminations
in the sale and rental of real estate and those who sought to
regulate real property transactions in the pursuit of other
ends," ibid., thus "disadvantag[ing] those who would benefit
from laws barring racial . . . discriminations as against those
who would bar other discriminations or who would otherwise
regulate the real estate market in their favor." /d., at 391.
In "reality," the burden imposed by such an arrangement
necessaril.Y "falls on the minority. The majority needs no
protection against discrimination and if it did, a referendum
might be bothersome but no more than that." Ibid. In effect, then, the charter amendment served as an "ex licitly
racial classification treating racial housing matters differ~ial ~icc,at389.

This rna e
e amen men co 1 u wnally suspect: "the
State may no more disadvantage any particular group by
making it more difficult to enact legislation in its behalf than
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it may dilute any person's vote or give any group a smaller
representation than another of comparable size." I d., at 393
(emphasis added).
[& v. NJ!..quist, 318 F. Supp. 710 (WDNY 1970) (threejudge court), offers an application of the Hunter doctrine in a
sett~nilar to the one now before us.
That
case involved the New York education system, which made
use of both elected and appointed school boards and which
conferred extensive authority on state education officials.
In an effort to eliminate de facto segregation in New York's
schools, those officials had directed the city of Buffalo-a
municipality with an appointed school board-to implement
an integration plan. While these developments were proceeding, however, the New York Legislature enacted a statute barring state education officials and appointed-though
not elected-school boards from "assign[ing] or compell[ing]
[students] to attend any school on account of race ... or for
the purpose of achieving [racial] equality in attendance . . . at
any school." 318 F. Supp., at 712. 1'1
Applying Hunter, the three-judge District Court invalidated the statute, noting that under the provision "[t]he
Commissioner [of Education] and local appointed officials are
prohibited from acting in [student assignment] matters only
where racial criteria are involved." Id., at 719. In the
court's view, the statute therefore "place[ d) burdens on the
implementation of educational policies designed to deal with
race on the local level" by "treating educational matters involving racial criteria differently from other educational matters and making it more difficult to deal with racial imbalance
in the public schools." I d., at 719 (emphasis in original).
This drew an impermissible distinction "between the treatment of problems involving racial matters and that afforded
"' As does InitiatiYe 350, the New York statute apparently permitted Yoluntary student transfers to achieve integration. Seen. 16, in.fi·a.
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other problems in the same area." I d., at 718. This Court
affirmed the District Court's judgment without opinion. 402
u. s. 935 (1971).
These cases yield a simple but central principle. As Justice Harlan noted while concurring m ffi'e Court's opinion in
Hunter, la\\'S structuring political institutions or allocating
poli~l"...!C~ "neutral principles"-such as the
executh~e ve tO, or tne t~ically b§lens<Lm~.J eQJ.tirementsJor
amend in state constitutions-are not sub· ect to e ual protectiOn at ac , t oug t ey may "make 1 more ifficult for
minorities to achieve favorable legislation." 393 U. S., at
394. Because such laws make it more difficult for el•ery
group in the community to enact comparable laws, they "provid[e] a just framework within which the diverse political
groups in our society may fairly compete." I d., at 393.
Thus, the political majority may generally restructure the political process to place obstacles in the path of everyone seeking to secure the benefits of governmental action. But a different analysis is required when the State allocates
governmenT~fpower non-ne,9tralJ.y, by explicitly using the
L. ~;acta { na~ure of a decision to detel~mine the deciSlOnmaking
process. ~tate action of this kind, the Court said, "places
special burdens on racial minorities within the governmental
process," id., at 391 (emphasis added), thereby "making it
more difficult for certain racial and religious minorities [than
for other members of the community] to achieve legislation
that is in their interest." /d., at 395 (emphasis added) (Harlan, J., concurring). Such a structuring of the political process, the Court said, was "no more permissible than [is] denying [members of a racial minority] the vote, on an equal basis
with others." I d., at 391.

III
We believe that the Court of Appeals properly focused on

Hunter and Lee, for we find the principle of those cases dispositive of the issue here.

In our view, Initiative 350 mUSt
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fall because it does "not attemp[t] to allocate governmental
power on the basis of any general principle." Hwzte1· v.
Erickson, 393 U. S., at 395 (Harlan, J., concurring). Instead, it uses the racial ng,tml- of an issue to define the governmental decisionmaking structure, thus imposes substantial and unique burdens on racial minorities.

A
Noting that InitiatiYe 350 nowhere mentions "race" or
"integration," appellants suggest that the legislation has no
racial overtones; they maintain that Hunter is inapposite because the initiative simply permits busing for certain enumerated purposes while neutrally forbidding it for all other reasons. We find it difficult to believe that appellants' analysis
is seriously advanced, however, for despite its facial neu~ral
ity there is little doubt that the imbative was effectively
d1'1iwn for racial purposes. Neither the imtiative's sponsors,
nortneDiStrictCourt, nor the Court of Appeals had any difficulty perceiving the racial nature of the issue settled by Initiative 350. Thus, the District Court found that the text of
the referendum was carefully tailored to interfere only with
desegregative busing.~~ Proponents of the initiative candidly
"represented that there would be no loss of school district
flexibility other than in busing for desegregation purposes."
473 F. Supp., at 1008. And, as we have noted, Initiative 350
in fact allows school districts to bus their students "for most,
if not all," of the non-integrative purposes required by their
educational policies. ld., at 1010. The Washington electorate surely was aware of this, for it was "assured" by CiVIC
officials that "'99£k of the school districts in the state"'-those
that lacked mallcratory ii1tegi·ation prog1·am~would not be
affected by the passage of 350." I d., at 1008-1009. It is be"The Court of Appeals accepted the District Court's characterization of
the initiative, and eYen the dissenting judge in the Court of Appeals agreed
that Initiati\'e 350 addresses a "racial" problem. 633 F. 2d, at 1353.

-
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yond reasonable dispute, then, that the initiative was enacted
"'because of,' not merely 'in spite of,' its adverse effects
upon" busing for integration. Personnel Administrator of
Massachusetts v. Feeney, 442 U. S. 256, 279 (1979).
Even accepting the view that Initiative 350 was enacted
for such a purpose, the United States-which has changed its
position during the course of this litigation, and now supports
the State-maintains that busing for integration, unlike the
fair housing ordinance involved in Hunter, is not a peculiarly
"racial" issue at all. Brief for United States 17, n. 18.
Again, we are not persuaded. It undoubtedly is true, as the
United States suggests, that the proponents of mandatory
integration cannot be classified by race: Negroes and whites
may be counted among both the supporters and the opponents of Initiative 350. And it should be equally clear that
white as well as Negro children benefit from exposure to
"ethnic and racial diversity in the classroom." Columbus
. p ard of Education v. Penick, 443 U. S. 449, 486 (1979)
V <PowELL, J., dissenting).
See Milliken v. Bradley, 418
U. S. 717, 783 (1974) (MARSHALL, J., dissenting). 15 But neither of these factors serves to distinguish Hunter, for we
may fairly assume that members of the racial majority both
favored and benefited from Akron's fair housing ordinance.
Cf. Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman,-- U. S. - - , - (1982) (slip op. 11-12, and n. 17); Gladstone, Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U. S. 91, 111, 115 (1979).
In any event, our cases suggest that desegregation of the
public schools, like the Akron open housing ordinance, at bot'; Appellants and the United States do not challenge the propriet~· of
race-conscious student assignments for the purpose of achieYing integration, eYen absent a finding of prior de jure segregation. We therefore do
not specificall~· pass on that issue. See generall)· Su·aHH \'. CharlotteMeckleHbei'{J Board of Education, 402 U.S. 1, 16 (1971); North Carolina
State Board of Education\'. Sl!'aHH, 402 U. S. 43, 45 (1971). Cf. UHirersity o.f jlb /((orHia Regents "· Bakke , 438 U. S. 265, 300, n. 39, 312-314
(1978)\(opinion of POWELL, J.).

j?~ ~ t9{ t(, :S.

?
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tom inures primarily to the benefit of the minority, and is designed for that purpose. Education has come to be "a principal instrument in awakening the child to cultural values, in
preparing him for later professional training, and in helping
him to adjust normally to his environment." Brown v.
Boa1·d of Education, 347 U. S. 483, 493 (1954). When that
enYironment is largely shaped by members of different racial
and cultural groups, minority children can achieve their full
measure of success only if they learn to function in-and are
fully accepted by-the larger community. Attending anethnically diverse school rna~· help accomplish this goal by preparing minority children "for citizenship in our pluralistic society," Estes Y. Metropolitan !1!Jl'nches of tlze Dallas
NAACP, 444 U. S. 437, 451 (1980t(POWELL, J., dissenting),
while, we may hope, teaching members of the racial majority
"to live in harmony and mutual respect" with children of minority heritage. Colw1 ~ s Board of Education v. Penick,
443 U. S., at 485, n. 5 (POWELL, J., dissenting). Lee v.
Nyquist settles this point, for the Court there accepted the
proposition that mandatory desegregation strategies present
the type of racial issue implicated by the Hunter doctrine. )I ;
'"The United States seeks to distinguish Lee by suggesting that the statute there at issue "clear!~· prohibited" all attempts to ameliorate racial imbalance in the schools, while Initiative 350 permits voluntary desegregation efforts. Brief for United States 25. Even assuming that this
distinction would otherwise be of constitutional significance, its premise is
not accurate. The legislation challenged in Lee did permit voluntary integration efforts, for it expressly exempted from its restrictions "the assignment of a pupil in the manner requested or authorized b~· his parents or
guardian." 318 F. Supp., at 712. Thus, as the District Court in Lee
noted, the statute "denie[ d) appointed officials the power to implement
uon-volzwtary programs for the improvement of racial balance.'' /d., at
715 (emphasis added). The difficulty in Lee-as in this case-stemmed
from the Lee District Court's conclusion that a voluntary program would
not sen-e to integrate the community's schools: "Voluntary plans for
achieving racial balance ... have not had a significant impact on the problems of racial segregation in the Buffalo public schools; indeed it would ap-
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It is undeniable that busing for integration-particularly
when ordered by a federal court-now engenders considernor iably more controversy than does the sort of fair housi~
nance debated in Hunter. See Estes v. Met1'0'J ·an
Branches o.ftlze Dallas NAACP, 444 U. S., at 448-45 (PowELL, J., dissenting). But in the absence of a constitutional vi- }
olation, the desirability an~cac~~ ool dese~~tion
are matter§._ to '9e resolv~tnrough_ the eoiilical .,Er£CeSS.
For present purposes, it is enough that minorities may c·onsider busing for integration to be "legislation that is in their
interest." Hunter v. E1·ickson, 393 U. S., at 395 (Harlan,
J., concurring). Given the racial focus of Initiative 350, this
suffices to trigger application of the Hunter doctrine.

B
We are also satisfied that the practical effect of Initiative
350 is to work a reallocation of RO~r of the kind condemned
in Hunte1·. The initiative removes the authority to address a
racial problem-and only a racial problem-from the existing
decisionmaking body, in such a way as to burden minority interests. Those favoring the elimination of de facto school
segregation now must seek relief from the state legislature,
or from the statewide electorate. Yet authority over all
other student assignment decisions, as well as over most
other areas of educational policy, remains vested in the local
school board. Indeed, by specifically exempting from Initiative 350's proscriptions most non-racial reasons for assigning
students away from their neighborhood schools, the initiative
expressly requires those championing school integration to
surmount a considerably higher hurdle than persons seeking
comparable legislative action. As in Hunter, then, the compear that racial isolation is actually increasing." Ibid. Thus the statute
challenged in Lee and InitiatiYe 350 operated in precisely the same way to
"deny ... student[s] the right to attend a fully integrated school.'' Brief
for United States 25.
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munity's political mechanisms are modified to place effective
decisionmaking authority over a racial issue at a different
level of government. 17 In a very obvious sense, the initiative
thus "disadvantages those who would benefit from laws barring" de facto desegregation "as against those who ... would
otherwise regulate" student assignment decisions; "the reality is that the law's impact falls on the minority." Hunter v.
Erickson, 393 U. S., at 391.
The State appellants and the United States, in response to
this line-0" ana ys1s, argue that Initiative 350 has not wor ed
any reallocati~_Qf_~::--They note t at the State necessanfy retainsplenary authority over Washington's system of
education, and therefore they suggest that the initiative
"In Hunter, the procedures for enacting racial legislation were modified
in such a way as to place effective control in the hands of the citywide electorate; here, the power to enact racial legislation has been reallocated. In
each case, the effect of the challenged action was to redraw decisionmaking
authority over racial matters-and only over racial matters-in such a way
as to place comparative burdens on minorities. While the United States
observes that the proponents of integrated schools remain free to use
Washington's initiative system to further their ends, that was true in
Hunter as well: proponents of open housing were not barred from invoking
Akron's initiative procedures to repeal the charter amendment, or to enact
fair housing legislation of their own. It surely is an excessively formal exercise, then, to argue that the procedural revisions at issue in Hunte1· imposed special burdens on minorities, but that the selective allocation of
decisionmaking authority worked by Initiative 350 does not erect comparable political obstacles. Indeed, in a sense the situation here is less favorable tr minority interests than was the arrangement in Hunter, for the Akron cb rter amendment at least made provision for the passage of fair
housing legislation, while Initiative 350 on its face forbids virtually all mandatory desegregation strategies. The United States would note that Initiative 350's "modification of state policy [was] not the result of any unusual
political procedure," Brief for United States 30, for initiatives and referenda are often used by the Washington electorate. But that observation
hardly serves to distinguish this case from Hunter, since the fair housing
charter amendment was added through the unexceptional use of Akron's
initiative procedure. See 393 U. S., at 387.
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amounts to nothing more than an unexceptional example of a
State's intervention in its own school system. In effect, they
maintain that the State functions as a "super school board,"
Tr. of Oral Arg. 5, 17, which typically involves itself in all areas of educational policy. And, the argument continues, if
the State is the body that usually makes decisions in this
area, Initiative
worked a simple change in policy rather
than a forbidden reallocation of power. Cf. C1·al.t:(o1·d v. Los

350

Angeles Board of Education, post.
This at fi_r.st..,glance would seem to be a potent ar~ment,
for States traditionally have been accorded the widest latitude in ordering their internal governmental processes, see
Holt Civic Club v. Tuscaloosa, 439 U. S. 60, 71 (1978), and
school boards, as creatures of the State, obviously must give
effect to policies announced by the state legislature. But
"insisting that a State may distribute legislative power as it
desires ... furnish[es] no justification for a legislative structure which otherwise would violate the Fourteenth Amendment. Nor does the implementation of this change through
popular referendum immunize it." Hunter v. Erickson,
U. S., at 392. The issue here, after all, is not whether
Washington h~ !:,he ..ati't'h'OiJty to intervene in the affairs of
local' school boards; it is, rather, whether the State has E;l'ercised that authorit r in a manner consiste witfi t he E ual
Pro~~n h~use.
s t e ourt noted in unter, "t ough
Akron mig t ave proceeded by majority vote ... on all its
municipal legislation, it has instead chosen a more complex
system. Having done so, the State may no more disadvantage any particular group by making it more difficult to
enact legislation in its behalf than it may dilute any person's
vote." Id., at 392-393. Washington also has chosen to
make use of a more complex governmental structure, and a
close examination both of the Washington statutes and of the
Court's decisions in related areas convinces us that Hunter is
fully applicable __..,
here.
Q
.-

393 1

______

81-9-0PINION
WASHINGTON r. SEATTLE SCHOOL DISTRICT NO.1

19

At the outset, it is irrelevant that the State might have
vested all decisonmaking authority in itself, so long as the political structure it in fact erected imposes comparative burdens on minority interests; that much is settled by Hunter
and by Lee. 1" And until the passage of Initiative 350, Washington law in fact had established the local school board,
rather than the State, as the entity charged \\'ith making decisions of the type at issue here. Like all 50 States, see Brief
for National School Boards Assn. as Amic11s C1n·iae 11,
14-16, Washington of course is ultimately responsible for providing education within its borders, see Wash. Const., Art.
IX; Wash. Rev. Code *28A.02.010 (1981); ch. 28A.41 (establishing a uniform school financing system); Seattle Scllool
Dist. v. State, 90 Wash. 2d 476, 585 P. 2d 71 (1978), and it
therefore has set certain procedural requirements and minimum educational standards to be met by each school. See,
e. g., §§ 28A.Ol.010, 28A.Ol.020 (length of school day and
year); ch. 28A.27 (mandatory attendance); ch. 28A.67
(teacher
qualifications);
ch.
28A.05
and
§§ 28A.58. 750-28A.58. 754 (curriculum).
But Washington
has chosen to meet its educational responsibilities primarily
through "state and local officials, boards, and committees,"
§ 28A.02.020, and the responsihll.j.ty to devise and tailor educational programs to suit local needs has emphatically been
vested in the local school boards.
Thus "each ~~on S'Chool district board of directors" is
made "accountable for the proper operation of [its] district .!£
the local community and its electorate." § 28A.58.758(1).
''The Court noted in Hunter that Akron "might have proceeded by majority vote ... on all its municipal legislation," 393 U. S., at 392; the charter amendment was inYalidated because the citizens of Akron did not reserve all power to themse!Yes, but rather distributed it in a non-neutralf manner. In Lee, of course, the State had unquestioned authority to vest
all power overeducation in state officials.

------
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To this end, each school board is "vested with the .final
responsibility for the setting of policies ensuring quality in
the content and extent of its educational program" (emphasis
added). Ibid. School boards are given responsibility for,
among many other things, "establish[ing] performance criteria" for personnel and programs, for assigning staff "according to board enumerated classroom and program needs," for
setting requirements concerning hours of instruction, for
establishing curriculum standards "relevant to the particular
needs of district students or the unusual characteristics of the
district," and for evaluating teaching materials.
§ 28A.58. 758(2). School boards are generally directed to
"develop a program identifying student learning objectives
for their district[s]," ~~ 28A.58.090; see also § 28A.58.092, to
select instructional materials, § 28A.58.103, to stock libraries
as they deem necessary, § 28A.58.104, and to initiate a variety of optional programs.
See, e. g., §§ 28A.34.010,
28A.35.010, 28A.58.105. School boards, of course, are given
broad corporate po\\'ers.
§ § 28A.58.010, 28A.58.075,
28A.59.180. Significantly for present purposes, school
boards are directed to determine which students should be
bused to school and to provide those students with transportation. § 28A.24.055.
Indeed, the notion of school board responsibility for local
educational programs is so firmly rooted that local boards are
subject to disclosure and reporting provisions specifically designed to ensure the board's "accountability" to the people of
the community for "the educational programs in the school
distric[t]." ~28A.58.758(3). And , perhaps most relevantly
here, before the adoption of Initiative 350 the Washington
Supreme Court had found it within the general discretion of
local school authorities to settle problems related to the denial of "equal educational opportunity." IH Citizens Against
'" Indeed , even the State's efforts to help ensure equal opportunit~· in
education and to encourage desegregation are cast in cooperatiYe terms ,

I
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Mandatory Bussing v. Palmason, 80 Wash. 2d 445, 453, 495
P. 2d 657, 663 (1972). It therefore had squarely held that a
program of desegregative busing was a proper means of furthering the school board's responsibility to "administe[r] the
schools in such a way as to provide a sound education for all
children." ld., at 456, 495 P. 2d, at 664. 21 ' See State ex rel.
Citizens Against Mandatory Bussing v. Brooks, 80 Wash. 2d
121, 492 P. 2d 536 (1972); State e:r rel. Lukens v. Spokane
School Dist1·ict, 147 Wash. 467, 474, 266 P. 189, 191 (1928). ~~
Given this statutory structure, we have little difficulty concluding that Initiative 350 worked a maior reorde1jng_Q!J,he
State's educati~ikii~cess:--Befol·e adoption of the 1111 Ia 1ve, the power to determine what programs
would most appropriately fill a school district's educational
needs-including programs involving student assignment and
desegregation-was firmly committed to the local board's
discretion. The question whether to provide an integrated
learning environment rather than a system of neighborhood
schools surely involved a decision of that sort. See Citizens
and are designed to assist school districts in implementing programs of
their choosing.
See, e. g., Wash. ReY. Code §* 28A.21.010(3),
28A.21.136(1) and (3) (1981): cf. § 28A.58.245(3).
2\' The Washington Supreme Court noted that "as long as the school board
authorized or required students to attend schools geographically situated
close to their homes, they had such a rig-ht. But the right existed only
because it was giYen to them b~· the school authorities." 80 Wash. 2d. at
452, 495 P. 2d, at 662.
2
' We also note that the State has not attempted to resen·e to itself exclusiYe power to deal with racial issues generally. Municipalities in Washington have been giYen broad po\\'ers of self-goYernment, see generally Wash.
Const., Arndt. 40: Wash. ReY. Code ~§ 35.22.020, 35.23.440, 35.27.370,
35.30.010 (1981); Wash. ReY . Code Tit. 35A (Optional Municipal Code), and
Washington courts specifically haYe held that municipalities haw the
power to enact antidiscrimination ordinances. See, e. g., Seattle Nen·spaper-Web Pressmen's Union Local No. !26 v. City of Seattle, 24 Wash. App.
462, 604 P. 2d 170 (1979). Cf. 5 E. McQuillin, Municipal Corporations
§ 19.23, p. 425 (3d ed. reY. 1981).
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Against Mandato1·y Bussing v. Palmason, 80 Wash. 2d, at
459-460, 495 P. 2d, at 66~667. After passage of Initiative
350, authority over all but one of those areas remained in the
hands of the local board. By placing uower o~er dese~·ega
tive busing at the state leve1, then, Initiative 350 plainly zrdifferentiates between the treatment of problems involving racial matters and that afforded other problems in the same
u ., at 718. The District
area." Lee v. Ny uist 318
the
Court and t
ourt of Appeals similar y cone u
initiative estructur th
as in o olitical proces and
son to challenge the determinations o
rts fawe see no
Cf. Millike1
y, 418 U.S., at
miliar with loca
769 (WHITE, J., dissenting).
That we reach this conclusion should come as no surprise,
for when faced with a similar educational scheme in Millik en
v. Bradley, supra, 22 the Court concluded that the actions of a
local school board could not be attributed to the State that
had created it. We there addressed the Michigan education
system, which vests in the State constitutional responsibility
for providing education: "'The policy of [Michigan] has been
to retain control of its school system, to be administered
throughout the State under State laws by local State agencies ... to carry out the delegated functions given [them] by
the legislature."' Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U. S., at 794
(MARSHALL, J., dissenting), quoting School Dist1--ict of the
City of Lansing v. State Board of Education, 367 Mich. 591,
595, 116 N.W. 2d 866, 868 (1962). See Milliken v. Bradley,
supra, at 726, n. 5. To fulfill this responsibility, the State of
Michigan provided a substantial measure of school district
funding, established standards for teacher certification, determined part of the curriculum, set a minimum school term,
approved bus routes and textbooks, established disciplinary
22
One amicus observes that many States employ a similar educational
structure. See Brief for National School Boards Assn. as Amicus Clll·ia e
11 , 14-16, App. 1a-10a.
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procedures, and under certain circumstances had the power
even to remove local school board members. See id., at
795-796 (MARSHALL, J., dissenting). See id., at 726, n. 5,
727 (describing State controls over education); id., at 768 and
n. 4 (WHITE, J., dissenting) (same); id., at 794 (MARSHALL,
J., dissenting) (same).
Yet the Court, noting that "[n]o single tradition in public \
education is more deeply rooted than local control over the
operation of schools," concluded that the "Michigan educational structure ... in common with most States, provides
for a large measure of local control." /d., at 741-742. Relying on this analysis, the Court determined that a Michigan
school board's assignment policies could not be attributed to
the State, and therefore declined to permit interdistrict busing as a remedy for one school district's acts of unconstitutional segregation. If local school boards operating under a
similar statutory structure are considered separate entities
for purposes of constitutional adjudication when they make
segregative assignment decisions, it is difficult to see why a
different analysis should apply when a local board's desegregative policy is at issue.
In any event, we believe that the question here is again
settled by Lee. There, state control of the educational
sfstemwaslfilly as complete as it now is in Washington.
See generally N.Y. Educ. Law §§ 305, 306, 308--310 (McKinney) (1969 and Supp. 1981). The state statute under attack
reallocated power over mandatory desegregation in two
ways: it transferred authority from the State Commissioner
of Education to local elected school boards, and it shifted authority from local appointed school boards to the state legislature. 2;l When presented ·with this restruc!u!}ng Qf !:.he political proces_§ , the District Court deciaredtliat Tt" could

-

"" When authority to initiate desegregation programs was remoYed from
appointed school boards and from state education officials, the only body
capable of exercising power over such programs was the state legislature.
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"conceive of no more compelling case for the application of
the Hunter principle." 318 F. Supp., at 719. This Court of
course affirmed the District Court's judgme
We see...!!Q_
relevant distinction between this case a Lee; · deed, it is
di cult to imagine a m ·e precise para le . 2•

c
To be sure, "the simple repeal or modification of desegregation or anti-discrimination laws, without more, never has
been viewed as embodying a presumptively invalid racial
classification." Cmw(ord v. Los Angeles Board of Education, post, at--, (slip op. 10). See Dayton Board of Ed1lcation v. B1-inkman, 443 U. S. 526, 531, n. 5 (1979); Hunter
v. Erickson, 393 U. S., at 390, n. 5. As Justice Harlan
noted in Hunter, the voters of the polity may express their
displeasure through an established legislative or referendum
procedure when particular legislation "arouses passionate opposition." I d., at 395 (concurring opinion). Had Akron's
"The United States makes only one attempt to distinguish Lee in this
regard: Lee is inapposite, the United States maintains, because the statute
at issue there "blocked desegregation efforts even b~· 'a school district subject to a pre-existing order to eliminate segregation in its schools,"' and
therefore-purportedly in contrast to Initiative 350-"interfere[d] with the
efforts of individual school districts to eliminate de jure segregation."
Brief for the United States 25, quoting Lee v. Nyquist, 318 F. Supp., at
715. If by this statement the United States seeks to place the District
Court's holding and this Court's affirmance in Lee on the ground that the
New York statute interfered with Buffalo's attempts to eliminate de jure
segregation, its submission is simply inaccurate. At the time of the Lee
litigation, Buffalo had not been found guilty of practicing intentional segregation. See Arthur v. l\'yquist, 573 F. 2d 134, 137 (CA2 1978). As the
United States notes, Buffalo was under a "pre-existing order to eliminate
segregation in its schools"-but that order was issued by the New York
Commissioner of Education, because he had found Buffalo's schools de
facto segregated. Appeal of Di.ron, 4 N.Y. Educ. Dept. Reports 115
(1965). See Lee v. Nyquist, 318 F. Supp., at 714-715. Lee did not concern de jure segregation; it is to be explained only as a straightforward
application of the Hunter doctrine.

-~
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fair housing ordinance been defeated at a referendum, for example, "Negroes would undoubtedly [have lost] an important
political battle, but they would not thereby [have been] denied equal protection." /d., at 394.
Initiative 350, however, works something more than the
"_!!lere r~al" of a desegregation law by the political enti ty
that created it. It b rde s all future attem ts t in e ·ate
Washington schools in 1stncts t rou out the ta e, y
lodgmg ec1sionmaking authority over the question at a new
and remote level of government. Indeed, the initiative, like
t~ent at issue in Hunter, has its most pernicious effect on integration programs that do "not arouse extraordinary controversy." I d., at 396 (emphasis in original).
In such situations the initiative makes the enactment of racially beneficial legislation difficult, though the particular
program involved might not have inspired opposition had it
been promulgated through the usual legislative processes
used for comparable legislation. 23 This imposes direct and
undeniable burdens on minority interests. "If a governmental institution is to be fair, one group cannot always be
expected to win," id., at 394; by the same token, one group
cannot be subjected to a debilitating and often insurmountable disadvantage.

l

IV
In the end, appellants are reduced to suggesting that
Hunter has been effectively overruled by more recent deciz; That phenomenon is graphically demonstrated b~· the circumstances of
this litigation. The long-standing desegregation programs in Pasco and
Tacoma, as well as the Seattle middle school integration plan, have functioned for years without creating undue controversy. Yet they have been
swept away, along with the Seattle Plan, by Initiative 350. As a practical
matter, it seems most unlikely that proponents of desegregative busing in
smaller communities such as Tacoma or Pasco will be able to obtain the
statewide support now needed to permit them to desegregate the schools
in their communities.
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sions of this Court. As they read it, Hunter applied a simple
"disparate impact" analysis: it invalidated a facially neutral
ordinance because of the law's adverse effects upon racial minorities. Appellants therefore contend that Hunter was
swept away, along with the disparate impact approach to
equal protection, in Washington v. Davis, 426 U. S. 229
(1976), and Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Dev.
Corp., 429 U. S. 252 (1977). Cf. James v. Valtierra, 402
u. s. 137 (1971).
Appellants unquestionably are correct when they suggest
that "purposeful discrimination is 'the condition that offends
the Cons 1 u 10 ,
ersonnel Admunstmtor of Massachusetts v. Feeney, 442 U. S., at 274, quoting Swann v. Clza1·lotte-Mecklenbem Board of Education, 402 U. S. 1, 16
(1971), for the "central purpose of the Equal Protection
Clause ... is the prevention of official conduct discriminating
on the basis of race." Washington v. Davis, 426 U. S., at
239. Thus, when facially neutral legislation is subjected to
equal protection attack, an inquiry into intent is necessary, to
determine whether the legislation in some sense was designed to accord disparate treatment on the basis of racial
considerations. Appellants' suggestion that this analysis
somehow conflicts with Hunte1·, however, misapprehends the
basis of the Hunter doctrine. We have not insisted on a particularized in uiry into motivati · a e ual rotection
cases: "A racia classification, regardless of purported motivation, is presumptively invalid and can be upheld only upon
an extraordinary justification." Personnel Administrator of
Massachusetts v. Feeney, 442 U. S., at 272. And legislation
of the kind challenged in Hunter falls into this inherently suspect category. 26
There is one immediate and crucial difference between
Hunter and the cases cited by appellants. While decisions

~
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The State does not suggest that Initiative 350 furthers the kind of compelling interest necessary to overcome the strict scrutiny applied to explicit racial classifications.
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such as Washington v. Davis and Arlington Heights consid-.
ered classifications facially unrelated to race, the charter
amendment at issue in Hunter dealt in explicitly racial terms
·with legislation designed to benefit minorities "as minorities," not legislation intended to benefit some larger group of
underprivileged citizens among whom minorities were dis- ~
proportionately represented. This does not mean, of course,
that every attempt to address a racial issue gives rise to an
impermissible racial classification. See Crau:ford v. Los Angeles Board of Education, post. But w_!1en the~l process or the decisionmaking mechanism used to add1·ess racially
coi1s'Cious legis ation-an on y such legi--slatio~ngled
out for peculiar and disadvantageous treatment, thegov~n
mental action plainly "rests on 'distinctions based
race."'
Jmnes v. 'altterrcr;4'0~ 1 1, quoting Hunter v.
Erickson, 393 U. S., at 391. And when the State's allocation of power places unusual burdens on the ability of racial
groups to enact legiSlatiOn specffi"cally designed to overcome
the "special condition" of prejudice, the governmental action
seriously "curtail[s] the operation of those political processes
/?~
ordinarily t~ relied upon to protect minorities." United
States v. Carolene Products Co. 304 U. S. 144, 152-153, n. 4 c.-~
~
(1938). In a mos 1rec s nse, this implicates the judiciary's
special role in safeguarding the interests of those groups that
are "relegated to such a position of political powerlessness as
to command extraordinary protection from the majoritarian
political process." San Antonio School Dist. v. Rod1-iguez,
411 u. s. 1, 28 (1973). 2'
Hunter recognized the considerations addressed above,
and it therefore rested on a principle that has been vital for

on

27
We also note that singling out the political processes affecting racial issues for uniquely disadYantageous treatment ineYitably raises dangers of
impermissible motivation. When political institutions are more generally
restructured, as JuSTICE BRENNAN has noted in another context: "The
very breadth of [the] scheme ... negates any suggestion" of improper purpose. Walz v. Taa· Commission, 397 U. S. 664, 689 (1970) (concurring
opinion).
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over a century-that "the core of the Fourteenth Amendment is the prevention of meaningful and unjustified official
distinctions based on race." 393 U. S., at 391. Just such
distinctions infected the reallocation of decisionmaking authority considered in Hunter, for minorities are no less powerless with the vote than without it when a racial criterion is
used to assign governmental power in such a way as to exclude particular racial groups "from effective participation in
the political proces[s]." Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U. S., at 94
(WHITE, J., dissenting). Certainly, a State requirement
that "desegregation or anti-discrimination laws," Crau:ford
v. Los Angeles Bom·d of Education, post, at - - (slip op.
10), and only such laws, be passed by unanimous vote of the
legislature would be constitutionally suspect. It would be
equally questionable for a community to require that laws or
ordinances "designed to ameliorate race relations or to protect racial minorities," id., at-- (slip op. 11), be confirmed
by popular vote of the electorate as a whole, while comparable legislation is exempted from a similar procedure. The
amendment addressed in Hunte1·-and, as we have explained, the legislation at issue here-was less obviously pernicious than are these examples, but was no different in
principle.

v
In reaching this conclusion, we do not undervalue the magnitude of the State's interest in its system of education.
Washington could have reserved to state officials the right to
make all decisions in the areas of education and student assignment. It has chosen, however, to use a more elaborate
system; having done so, the State is obligated to operate that
system ·within the confines of the Fourteenth Amendment.
That, we believe, it has failed to do. 2>.
Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is

Affinned.
2>

Appellants also challenge the Court of Appeals' award of attorney's
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fees to the school district plaintiffs, see n. 12. supm, arguing that statefunded entities are not eligible to receive such awards from the State. In
our view, this contention is without merit. The districts are plainly parties covered b~· the language of the fees statutes. See 42 U. S. C. ~ 1988
(1976 eel., Supp. IV) ("In any action ... to enforce a provision of sections
1981, 1982, 1983, 1985, and1986 of this title ... the court, in its discretion,
may allow the prevailing party, other tlza11 the United States, a reasonable
attorney's fee as part of its costs.") (emphasis added); 20 U. S. C. ~ 3205
(1976 eel., Supp. IV) ("Upon the entry of a final order by a court of the
United States against a ... State ... for failure to comply with ... the
fourteenth amendment to the Constitution of the United States as [it] pertain[s] to elementary and secondary education, the court, in its discretion
... may allow the prevailing pal'ty, other tlwn the United States, a reasonable attorney's fee as part of its costs.") (emphasis added). Nothing in the
history of the statutes suggests that this language was meant to exclude
state-funded entities. To the contrary, the Courts of Appeals have held
with substantial unanimity that· publicly-funded legal services organizations may be awarded fees. See, e. g., Dennis v. Chang, 611 F. 2d 1302
(CA9 1980); Holley v. Larine, 605 F. 2d 638 (CA2 1979), cert. denied sub
nom. Blum v. Holley, 446 U. S. 913 (1980); Lund v. Affleck, 587 F. 2d 75
(CAl 1978). And when it enacted § 1988, Congress cited with approval a
decision awarding fees to a state-funded organization. See H.R. Rep. No.
94-1558, p. 8, n. 16 (1976) (citing l11carcerated Men q(A/len County Jail v.
Fair, 507 F. 2d 281 (CA6 1974). In any event, the underlying congi·essional policies are served by awarding fees in cases such as the one before
us: no matter what the source of their funds, school boards have limited
budgets, and allowing them fees "encourage[s] compliance >Yith and enforcement of the civil rights laws." Dennis v. Chang, 611 F. 2d, at 1306.
See id., at 1306--1307. While appellants suggest that it is incongruous for
a State to pay attomey's fees to one of its school boards, it seems no less
incongruous that a local board would feel the need to sue the State for a
violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. We see no reason to disturb the
judgment of the Court of Appeals on this point.

